Sunday, May 18, 2008

Nevada Final Tally: 45% of the Vote, 56% of the Delegates

What started out four months ago as a Clinton win (in terms of votes) ended up as a Nevada victory for Barack Obama in terms of caucus strategy. Obama parlayed a solid January showing in rural Nevada and lower than expected Clinton support at the district caucuses into a three delegate advantage (14-11) over Clinton in the Silver state. All this after losing 51%-45 to Clinton in the first round of the caucuses. Clinton's six point win was not only reversed as Nevada's caucus process progressed, but Obama's perceived advantage was improved upon and solidified coming out of the state convention yesterday.

This fits in with the discussions here concerning the caucus question. Under circumstances that can be considered commonplace in the frontloaded period of presidential primaries, a party's presumptive nominee, having wrapped the nomination up early, would gain support in caucuses through subsequent steps in the process. If a candidate effectively wrapped the nomination up during Super Tuesday, for example, and forced his opponents out of the race, they would stand to increase their support in caucus states where the process's first step was held during the competitive phase of primary season. A presumptive nominee gains as turnout among supporters of the withdrawn candidates at subsequent caucus meetings declines relative to their original turnout. We saw this in Nevada during this cycle as Clinton's support in the district caucuses lag behind her original level of support. The nomination race was still active in 2008 though; Clinton had not dropped out of the race. It can be considered a real victory for Obama then, in terms of strategizing about the caucuses and building up support and turning people out on the grassroots level.

There were also state conventions in Colorado and Kansas yesterday as well as congressional district conventions in Washington. News has been slow filtering out about the final numbers at all those proceedings (other than Udall becoing the senate nominee in Colorado and an add-on delegate going for Obama in Kansas). Unlike Nevada, though, all three of those states handed Obama decisive victories. In other words, there was not that much room for improvement on the original numbers. However, if Obama had such overwhelming victories in those states, it stands to reason that Clinton's support in those states may be depressed compared to what it was originally.

Once that information surfaces, we'll see which way (if any) that went. Tracking...


Recent Posts:
Obama in the Red States: What Mississippi's 1st District Means

Will Obama's Seeming Inevitability Help Him as the Caucus Process Draws to a Close?

Let the Backloading Begin: 2012 Arkansas Primary

Friday, May 16, 2008

Obama in the Red States: What Mississippi's 1st District Means

The New York Times ran a story this morning that raised the idea of Obama putting Republicans on the defensive in the South. At issue was what happened in Mississippi's first district special runoff election Tuesday night. The question has been asked in terms of what the outcome (Democrat Travis Childers won in a district that handed Bush over 60% of the vote in 2004.) meant for congressional Republicans, but what does it mean for the presidential race? In late February, The Fix asked a similar question based on the observation that the higher a state's African American population, the more Republican it voted in the 2000 and 2004 elections (Here's my analysis.). Well, that means the South. The Obama campaign has shown the ability to bring many new voters in to the political process during primary season and many have been black. As Merle Black predicted in the Times piece, African American turnout will be high this fall, and that is likely to put the Republicans on the defensive to some extent.

Where and how that higher level of turnout makes the GOP work in the region are the real questions. As the FHQ electoral college maps (see links in the right side bar) have shown, Obama's strength in the South is on the periphery: in Virginia, North Carolina and Texas. The further in to the Deep South the discussion goes, the less likely Obama is to do well, despite increased (or historical) turnout among African Americans. Increased black turnout is one thing, but when it is combined with disaffection among white and typically loyal Republicans across the region, things become more troublesome for the Republican Party. If you are the Republican Party now, you have to hope that both Tuesday's runoff results and the prior special election results were just the product of an energized group of Democrats turning out in numbers well above average for two typically low turnout types of elections. This was a high salience, competitive election (and will be again in the fall), though, and that is more ominous for the GOP. When the trend goes beyond just low turnout in a special runoff election and veers off in direction of disaffection, the GOP, on both the congressional and presidential level, will have to spend time in states in which they don't usually spend too much money and effort having to defend.

Time and effort expended in the South is time and effort that could be spent in swing states. That, more than anything prove to be the power of Obama's ability to bring more states to the table than does Clinton in the general election. If McCain has to work in traditional red states while Obama works on Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Ohio, that would give the Illinois senator a decided advantage in the general election.


Recent Posts:
Will Obama's Seeming Inevitability Help Him as the Caucus Process Draws to a Close?

Let the Backloading Begin: 2012 Arkansas Primary

Did IN/NC Deal Clinton a Death Blow in the Electoral College?: The Electoral College Maps (5/14/08)

Thursday, May 15, 2008

Will Obama's Seeming Inevitability Help Him as the Caucus Process Draws to a Close?

As the race for the Democratic nomination has continued into parts unknown (namely April and May), some attention has been paid in this space to the idea that a candidate gains or loses support/delegates as the caucus process moves from step to step. The posts examining the Caucus Question, as it has come to be known, have focused on the second step of these processes in locales like Texas and Nevada. Nothing, though, is official until the state conventions close in each of the 14 caucus states (Texas included).

There are 498 total delegates (not counting superdelegates and add-ons) at stake in these caucus states and the actual allocation of 286 of them (57%) remains unsettled. In some states, all (Minnesota) or part (Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Wyoming) of the allocations were settled during the first step and only the identity of those pledged delegates remains uncertain until after the conventions. For 11 of the states (North Dakota already held its state convention and Hawaii's delegates are bound by the outcome of voting in the first step.), there are still delegates on the table, ranging in number from 5 (Wyoming) to 78 (Washington) depending on the state.
AK 13 delegates
CO 33 delegates (14 in congressional districts/19 at the state convention)
ID 6 delegates
IA 16 delegates
KS 11 delegates
ME 24 delegates
NE 8 delegates
NV 25 delegates
TX 67 delegates
WA 78 delegates (51 in congressional districts/27 at the state convention)
WY 5 delegates

Will Obama's inevitability (at least in terms of how his campaign has been covered in the media since Indiana and North Carolina last week) affect the delegate distributions from those states. Obviously there is a baseline in place in each of these states based on how the voting in the original, precinct-level caucuses came out. However, as we've seen in Texas and Nevada already (see above), there has been a modest amount of movement toward Obama as the caucus process has moved to subsequent steps. With the exception of Wyoming, Iowa, Texas and Nevada, the other caucus states delivered Obama a 2:1 or 3:1 victory over Clinton. Iowa and Nevada had more candidates involved than just Clinton and Obama, so shifts in those totals as the steps progressed would be expected. By the time of the contests in Wyoming and Texas, the Clinton campaign was aware of and defending against (to some degree) Obama's organizational advantages in caucuses. In the states where he had at least a 2:1 advantage during the first step, there is only limited room for improvement.

Starting tomorrow and over the weekend, observers can begin to test whether Obama's status now as the "nearly presumptive nominee" (and you thought presumptive nominee was already too much to include in a title) will have an effect on his delegate totals from the caucus states. Colorado has three more congressional district caucuses scheduled for tomorrow and the state convention scheduled for the weekend with 14 and 19 delegates to the national convention on the line respectively. Kansas and Nevada wrap up their caucus processes with state conventions over the weekend as well. The big prize will be the Washington congressional district meetings, where 51 delegates to the national convention in Denver will be at stake.

After this weekend the undetermined caucus delegates will dwindle to 166, over a third of which is accounted for by Texas. After the upcoming contests in Kentucky and Oregon on Tuesday, those remaining caucus delegates may not matter as much if Obama reaches the majority of the pledged delegates, as his campaign is projecting.


Recent Posts:
Let the Backloading Begin: 2012 Arkansas Primary

Did IN/NC Deal Clinton a Death Blow in the Electoral College?: The Electoral College Maps (5/14/08)

20%!?! That's the Bar in West Virginia?

Wednesday, May 14, 2008

Let the Backloading Begin: 2012 Arkansas Primary

There has already been a handful of states that have introduced or signaled that they would introduce state legislative bills to establish and/or move up a presidential primary for the 2012 cycle. Indiana and Kentucky have indicated that their May primaries could coincide with what would be Super Tuesday during the next cycle (should the same rules from 2008 be used then), the first Tuesday in February. The legislature in Kansas (here, here and here) has gone back and forth over the idea of establishing a presidential primary for 2012 and scheduling it for the Saturday before Super Tuesday. And Minnesota has discussed shifting from a caucus system to a primary, but would keep the contest on Super Tuesday for 2012.

Arkansas, however, becomes the first state to reconsider their decision to frontload the state's presidential primary for 2008. State Rep. Nathan George has already said that he will introduce legislation next year to move the newly-created, separate presidential primary election back to the late May date that coincides with the state's primaries for state and local offices (via Ballot Access News). Of course, had the Natural state held its primary where it had been since 1992, we'd be talking about Clinton's great chances next week in Arkansas and Kentucky and possibly of Obama needing to come through with a victory in Oregon to hold off a late Clinton charge.

Such a move is not without precedence. Arkansas moved its delegate selection back to the same May period for the 1992 cycle after a caucus in 1984 and a primary among the other southern states during the Southern Super Tuesday in 1988. In both instances the benefits of the move didn't necessarily match (or exceed) the costs. Both times Republicans benefited from the move Arkansas made. In 1988, George H.W. Bush used the southern swing as means of establishing himself as the front-runner (and nearly inevitable nominee) while the Democrats split the contests of that day. The 2008 Arkansas primary was an afterthought on the Democratic side because of Clinton's presence on the ballot. Meanwhile, favorite son, Mike Huckabee used his win there combined with his other southern wins on Super Tuesday to cast doubt on McCain's ability to appeal to the conservative side of the Republican Party. In essence, then, the Democratic-controlled state legislature in Arkansas has helped the Republican Party more with its moves (Though, with some potential division within the GOP bubbling below the surface, it could be argued that Arkansas helped to raise questions about McCain, if that division were to become more pronounced. But in a world of quick fixes and instant gratification, that's crazy talk. "Wait for the effects of these things before reacting? I don't think so. Let's move this thing back.").

I would wager that this decision in Arkansas over this proposed move (if, in fact, it is introduced) hinges on a couple of things:
1) Financial concerns: If the return on investment is viewed as sub-par, then the decision may be made to move back and save the money. Having an influence over who the nominee is before the decision is made, though, may outweigh that. Which brings up...

2) Will 2012 more closely resemble 2004 or 2008? If it is the former, Arkansas may value that influence even if it means scant attention from the candidates among a crowded field of contests. If 2012 looks like 2008, Arkansas could move back and get more attention.

I've maintained in this space before that 2008 is move aberration than anything and that 2012 will offer a return to the past in many respects; rapid-fire nomination decision(s) being one of them. More often than not though, what we've witnessed in the post-reform era is that once a state moves early, it stays early. The jury's still out on what Arkansas will do.


Recent Posts:
Did IN/NC Deal Clinton a Death Blow in the Electoral College?: The Electoral College Maps (5/14/08)

20%!?! That's the Bar in West Virginia?

Would McCain Have Won Under the Ohio Plan?

Did IN/NC Deal Clinton a Death Blow in the Electoral College?: The Electoral College Maps (5/14/08)

In the wake of the primaries in Indiana and North Carolina, many pundits called the Democratic nomination in favor of Barack Obama. But a resounding win last night in West Virginia indicated 1) that it was a good state for Clinton to rebound and 2) that there is still some support for a Clinton candidacy out there. A win in the Mountain state was expected for Clinton and that expectation in conjunction with the pundits' declarations and the steady march of superdelegates to Obama would have triggered a downward trend in her poll numbers in the hypothetical match ups with John McCain. Has this been the case, though?

[Keep in mind that these maps reflect the weighted averages of the state polls since Super Tuesday. They give more emphasis to the recent polls and that has the effect of tamping down the volatility of focusing on just the most recent poll(s). It would take a shock to the system--IN/NC perhaps--to move those numbers.]
There were eleven new polls from ten different states this week, but there was very little change in the aggregate (reflected by the electoral college). The McCain-Clinton map is largely the same. The two new polls in North Carolina moved that state from being a strong one for McCain to a McCain lean. Other than that, though, this week's map is the exact same as the one from last week. So, North Carolina and Indiana had no effect, right? Well. over the previous two weeks Clinton had made gains to pull within 16 electoral votes of McCain (where she still is this week). Over the course of the FHQ's map-making efforts, Clinton had made up a 94 electoral vote deficit. It is too early to tell, but what we may be witnessing is a plateauing of Clinton's numbers against McCain before they begin to fall.
Obama continued his rebound from the slight, if inconsistent (across all the states), dip in the polls after the Wright/bittergate revelations. Most of that decline was in swing states, where he has bounced back; adding Michigan to his side of the ledger last week and Pennsylvania this week. In the electoral college, that decrease in the weighted average of the polls meant a decrease in his number of electoral votes. Two weeks ago, he was at 229, but in that interim, he has pulled back into that virtual tie that with McCain; trailing the Arizona senator by just two electoral votes.
What effect does it have, though? Obama doesn't pick up any more states at the expense of Clinton. She still maintains an advantage over the Illinois senator in the same 14 (or so) states she has had a better McCain margin in since March. New polling in Oregon gave Obama a higher McCain margin against Clinton there while an additional poll in Georgia had the effect of pulling the two candidates closer together there in relation to McCain. Neither candidate makes much of a difference there now (That Obama had a more comfortable margin before was inconsequential anyway, as the state was still strong to McCain in both instances.). The basic picture remains the same, though: Obama does better against McCain in more states than Clinton does. He only has eight more electoral college votes against the Arizona senator then does Clinton, however.
Is Clinton out in the electoral college race against McCain? No, not yet. But her numbers there have stabilized this week and that may indicate a line of demarcation between competitiveness in that hypothetical race and a decided advantage to McCain. More data in the week to come will help us answer that question in the aftermath of Clinton's victory last night.

***Please see the side bar for links to past electoral college comparisons.***


Recent Posts:
20%!?! That's the Bar in West Virginia?

Would McCain Have Won Under the Ohio Plan?

Tales from the Kennedy School Symposium on Presidential Primaries

Tuesday, May 13, 2008

20%!?! That's the Bar in West Virginia?

You have to love the expectations game. One week you're winning North Carolina and doing better than expected in Indiana. The next? You're hoping for twenty percent in West Virginia. How far the mighty have fallen. Well, not really. But when the outcomes of the remaining contests are clearer than North Carolina and Indiana were a week ago, it is easier for a candidate to fend off a poor showing; even if that showing is 20% of the vote for the presumptive nominee/front-runner for the Democratic Party. There Barack Obama was yesterday, shooting pool in West Virginia and claiming that he'd accept anything higher than that mark in today's West Virginia primary.

So the Obama campaign is setting the bar low and driving down national attention to the race in the Mountain state. What's on the table for today's contest, though? 28 of the states 39 delegates are at stake in West Virginia's semi-open primary (the other eleven are superdelegates or add-ons). Independents can vote but Republicans can't. Are those on the right tempted to switch sides and take "Operation Chaos" to another state? Well, the GOP held a convention in February to decide on delegate allocation for its presidential candidates. Two thirds of the state's delegates were decided upon then and the rest will be at stake today. There is also a gubernatorial election in West Virginia this year, but only one Republican is vying for the opportunity to take on incumbent Democrat, Joe Manchin. With only congressional and local candidates on the ballot then, Republican identifiers in the state may be motivated to change registration and bump up Hillary Clinton's vote percentage in the Democratic contest. I haven't seen any reports of this, but you have to think it is a possibility with no serious action on the Republican ballot. The question is how widespread it would be. Not enough to swing the contest; Clinton already seems to have that in the bag. However, it could help her secure more delegates from the state. And in her position, where every single delegate counts, any extras would be beneficial.

Polls close at 7:30p.

Related:
West Virginia Preview: Clinton by 39 points, 105,000 votes (via fivethirtyeight.com)


Recent Posts:
Would McCain Have Won Under the Ohio Plan?

Tales from the Kennedy School Symposium on Presidential Primaries

The Delegate Race: Is Obama There Yet?

Monday, May 12, 2008

Would McCain Have Won Under the Ohio Plan?

I spent the weekend (at least in terms of this blog) looking at the potential presidential nomination reform plans that are being considered by both of the parties. The one plan that has some traction for the moment, is the Ohio Plan that the Republican Party Rules Committee passed last month. Next stop? St. Paul, where the plan will face increased scrutiny this summer at the GOP convention. And it may even face a hostile group of delegates if it reaches the floor for broad consideration. No, not because of those Ron Paul delegates. The Ohio Plan could encounter resistance from McCain delegates. Why, you ask? Well, victorious nominees rarely back plans that change the rules under which they won their nomination, especially if that means they (or someone similar to them) wouldn't have won. If it ain't broke, don't fix it. And at a McCain-centered convention, delegates may be more willing to yield to their standard bearer on the issue.

Plus, let's remember that the GOP won't have the benefit of hindsight. Unlike the Democrats, the GOP can only alter its rules for presidential nomination during the preceding national convention. The Republicans then, won't know if having McCain wrap up their nomination three months prior to the Democrats will have an effect on the general election outcome (though they'll likely have a good idea whether the Democrats are indeed divided as a result of their longer process).

The question then, is would McCain have won the Republican nomination under the rules outlined in the Ohio Plan? First, let's glance at that map again:
Next, we'll have to willingly suspend our disbelief that such a plan could ever be put in place (and if you've been reading, you know FHQ has a laundry list of disbeliefs that will have to be suspended here). Let's also assume that if a candidate won a contest in 2008 under the current rules, they would have won the same contest under the Ohio Plan rules (at least among the competitive group of Republican contests--anything from Iowa to Texas/Ohio). According to the Ohio Plan rules, the same four states that led off the process under the current rules, would have kicked off primary season (Sorry Wyoming, Michigan and Florida). Iowa would have been followed by New Hampshire which would have been followed by South Carolina and Nevada. That wouldn't change any of the results we've seen under the current rules (but it would change the timing of the contests. None of these states would have been allowed to go prior to the beginning of February). Huckabee would have won Iowa. McCain still would have won New Hampshire and South Carolina and Romney would have won the Nevada caucuses.

Instead of Florida coming next, though, the process would shift from the "early 4" to a grouping of the least populous states (in teal above). In the process, McCain would have lost the advantage of that Florida win; a win that propelled him to the showing he had the next week on Super Tuesday. By the same token, Romney would have lost the influence of Michigan and Wyoming; wins that kept him viable heading into the next, contest-heavy week. With three different winners of four contests, there would be no clear favorite heading into the small state primary (Dare I call it Tiny Tuesday?) during the third week of February.

Among these 12 states' contests, McCain would have won one (Vermont), Huckabee would have won one (West Virginia) and Romney would have won five (Alaska, Montana, North Dakota, Maine and Wyoming). The remaining five states (Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico and South Dakota) are states that have yet to hold contests during this cycle, so we don't know how those outcomes would have looked in a competitive environment.

What are the most likely directions those contests would have gone, though? Given Romney's success in the Prairie and Rocky Mountain states, the temptation is there to allocate him the wins in both Idaho and South Dakota. The difference is that the wins he actually got in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming were all caucus victories (Romney seems to have approached the 2008 primary season in much the same way that Barack Obama and his campaign did. They both focused on organization in those small, caucus states.). Idaho and South Dakota have primary systems in place and it is unclear how Romney would have fared in such a scenario in those states. Southern Idaho looks a lot like Utah, where Romney did very will on Super Tuesday and it is likely he would have won Gem state. South Dakota is bordered by six states, four of which Romney won, so I'll lump it in with the other Romney wins. That gives him seven wins out of those 12 small states.

As for the other three unknown states, McCain's home state advantage would likely have stretched into New Mexico, but Hawaii and Nebraska are tough ones to figure out. Nebraska likely would have been a Romney/Huckabee battle given the strength both had in the region. I'll be generous and throw Huckabee a bone on this one. Hawaii would have been a far away caucus; a set of circumstances that would have favored Romney. Of the 12 small states, Romney would have been a winner (or in good shape) in eight, while McCain and Huckabee each would have managed two wins.

That's a pretty significant win for Romney heading into the big states. Do those eight wins equal what Florida did for McCain, though? That's a tough question to answer. Romney looked good in Iowa, New Hampshire and Nevada before the actual primary season got underway in 2008, and though he had several foreseeable paths to the GOP nomination, just couldn't come through in the end. Projecting Romney's potential success in the early states of the Ohio Plan to the rest of the country, then, is not automatic, but nine wins in sixteen early contests is nothing to sneeze at either. He clearly would have had an advantage in money and delegates prior to the three "pods" of big state contests. That could have pitted McCain and Huckabee in a one-on-one battle for the number two position behind Romney instead of the Romney/Huckabee fight for the same distinction behind front-runner McCain that we actually witnessed. And that is a position Romney did not find himself in in 2008.

Under the Ohio Plan then, McCain would have been in trouble instead of being in control after the first month of the process. Would McCain give his blessing at (or before) the convention to a plan that would have potentially cost him the 2008 nomination had it been in place? That, too, is a tough one to answer. McCain is a maverick (or so they tell me), so he may be willing to buck conventional wisdom. The only recent precedent is the Bush convention in 2000. That convention discussed the Delaware Plan (minus the New Hampshire/Iowa exemption) but it ultimately failed. And even in a season of change, the Ohio Plan will likely face similar resistance at the St. Paul convention (whether McCain endorses it or not).


Recent Posts:
Tales from the Kennedy School Symposium on Presidential Primaries

The Delegate Race: Is Obama There Yet?

ABC News: Obama Now Leads in Superdelegates

Saturday, May 10, 2008

Tales from the Kennedy School Symposium on Presidential Primaries

Recently, I brought up Harvard's Kennedy School symposium on presidential primaries. The meeting brought together election law scholars, journalists and partisans all of all stripes to discuss whether and how best to reform the presidential process. Though a paper on the proceedings is to be released by the Kennedy School, it has yet to emerge and information on the meeting has been been lacking at best. Rick Hasen, law professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles and moderator/author of the Election Law Blog, was a participant and had this to say:
"It was very interesting to see the very wide spectrum of views represented at the Kennedy school event yesterday on reforming the presidential primary process. (The conversation was on the record, and a transcript will be posted by the Kennedy school at some point.) I would say I walked away thinking how difficult change is going to be, how intractable the positions of those supporting and opposing a system that allows Iowa and New Hampshire to go first, how different the Democratic and Republican party philosophies are on how flexible rule changes should be, and how little support there was among this very diverse audience for a congressional solution (at least one that is foisted upon the national political parties against their will). There was talk of congressional carrots, and there seemed to be a consensus that fundamental changes to the Democratic rules would take place if Sen. McCain ended up winning in November. There also seemed to be agreement that something had to be done to fix the administration of caucuses in some states, such as Texas. But as for this diverse group reaching a general consensus over (1) what, if anything, is wrong with the current system of nominating the presidential candidates; (2) how, if at all, the system should be changed, and (3) who should implement those changes, forget about it."

That jibes with what I've been saying all along in regard to reforming the presidential primary process: that big changes would be difficult to pull off. Small changes, especially to caucuses seem more likely. We've already seen one caucus state from 2008 discuss both switching to a primary and scheduling the contest early in the process (Kansas) in 2012 and another caucus state that was already early discuss switching to a primary (Minnesota). The Republicans, though, have advanced one plan already that they will deal with at their convention in St. Paul, MN this summer. And as Hasen mentions, a consensus had formed among symposium participants that the Democrats would move in the direction of big changes if their chosen nominee lost to McCain in Novemeber. Back in January I posted a link to a CQ article that outlined the most of the big plans being considered by both national parties (and within Congress).

I want to revisit those plans but lay them out visually (Yes, more maps.) to examine where the differences really lie. All of these plans involve grouping the states in various ways as a means of combating frontloading but differ on how they group the states and whether to exempt Iowa and New Hampshire.

Modified Delaware Plan:
This altered version of the plan originally proposed in the lead up to the 2000 GOP convention groups the states by population size. After Iowa and New Hampshire, the next group of states to go are the smallest 10 states and Washington, DC (in teal) sometime in March. The remaining three groups of states go over the successive three months, one group per month. The drawbacks of this plan are the travel strains put on the candidates and their campaigns. Retail politics in Iowa and New Hampshire is one thing, but extending that to an area stretching from Maine to Idaho would favor the front-running candidates (at least in terms of fund-raising) as they are favored in the current system.
Ohio Plan:
The Ohio Plan is the plan that the GOP pushed forward last month in anticipation of a broader hearing on the issue at the convention this summer. Iowa and New Hampshire maintain their traditional positions and South Carolina and Nevada would be next in line as they were in 2008. Following the exempt states, the smallest states go as they do in the Delaware plan. The remaining states are divided in a way that splits the groups' total electoral votes as evenly as possible. California and Texas will have the advantage over the other states in their "pods" while Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania are all lumped together in one group. The two biggest states, then, get the spotlight all to themselves while the next six largest states all go on the same day. That's a good number of the most populous states that will bring up the rear of the process every third cycle. When that group goes immediately after the pre-window states and the smallest states, it will put a lot of pressure on the candidates to be ready organizationally for all those big states as opposed to focusing much of the attention on California and Texas.
NASS Plan:
The plan that the National Association of Secretaries of States has been promoting places value on regional contiguity. There is a modified plan that removes the first-in-the-nation distinction from Iowa and New Hampshire, but the map below reflects the original plan from the NASS. This plan does offer a mix of both big and small states in each of the regions, and with the exception of the western region and California, all the big states are balanced out by other big states. California, in that scenario, could get all the attention or candidates could opt for an "everything but California" strategy. Given the way primary seasons of the past have progressed, this seems unlikely, but in light of Obama's small state strategy in 2008, this sort of strategy could gain momentum in the future. The regions would rotate--a different one going first each cycle--so when the western region went first, this strategy could play out. The one drawback to this system is that potential candidates could gain an advantage when their regions are first (similar to the favorite son success that some candidates have enjoyed in their home states.).
Dingell-Anuzis Modified Plan:
This is the plan that has been introduced in Congress. It divides the nation into six regions and splits primary season into six contests that are three weeks apart beginning in March and ending in June. Under this plan, Iowa and New Hampshire lose their favored, early positions. The contests are not simply made up of the regions though.
There are six contests, but a lottery determines what week anywhere from one to four states from each region will hold their contests. The map below shows one possible way that a lottery could split the states. The fifth week (in brown), for example, takes one state from each region: New Jersey from the Northeast, North Carolina from the South, Maryland from the Border states, Illinois from the Upper Midwest, Louisiana from the Southwest, and Oregon from the West. Believe it or not, the Michigan-based plan has Michigan going during the first week of the process during the first iteration.
Texas Plan:
Finally, the Texas plan splits the country into four groups of contiguous states (They are not completely contiguous, but as you can see in the map below, a group of three or more contiguous states in one region may be together with three or more contiguous states from another region--see states in green for example.). Again, Iowa and New Hampshire are stripped of their customary first positions, but are in the same group together and would go first with the rest of their group every fourth cycle. This is the group that is made up of the smallest states. The other three groups have most of the heavy hitters which have tended to get the attention.
For other symposium materials: See here and here.


Recent Posts:
The Delegate Race: Is Obama There Yet?

ABC News: Obama Now Leads in Superdelegates

Obama's Slide Revisited

Friday, May 9, 2008

The Delegate Race: Is Obama There Yet?

Editor's Note: The following comes to us from University of Georgia political science professor, Paul Gurian.

In her 2000 article
"The End Game in Post-Reform Presidential Nominations", Barbara Norrander evaluated several indicators of when a nomination campaign is effectively over, specifically, when the frontrunner's last remaining opponent would drop out of the race. Two of these indicators are especially relevant at this point in time: the "gain-deficit ratio" (Collat, Kelley and Rogowski, 1981) and the "bandwagon curve" (Straffin, 1977).
These formulas are not precise predictors of when a candidate will drop out -- that is a decision made by the candidate and her staff. However they do indicate when conditions are such that the frontrunner's nomination seems inevitable -- conditions that figure into the opponent's decision-making.

Before the Indiana and North Carolina primaries, Obama needed 273 delegates to achieve a majority. To exceed the gain-deficit ratio threshold of .36, he needed to win 98.3 delegates. On Tuesday he won approximately 97 or 98 pledged delegates (estimates vary from 95-100). However, he also won about 10 super-delegates the next day. Whether the super-delegates are counted as part of the same "event" or not, Obama is very close to, or just above the threshold. (These numbers change if one assumes that the Michigan and Florida delegates will be seated.)

The Straffin formula suggests that Obama is still just shy of the "bandwagon" threshold. Considering the delegates won by each candidate, the current delegate margin (Obama's delegate total divided by Clinton's) is 1.09, not quite enough to exceed the current threshold of 1.14 (see below).

Although it is still possible for Clinton to win the nomination, there is an emerging consensus among reporters and politicians that the race is over. This perception coincides with the two mathematical indicators: it's not over yet, but it's very close.


Calculations:
BO 1854; HRC 1696 (as of 5/9)
total BO+HRC = 3550
total all dels = 4049
BO+HRC/totalDels = 0.876759693752
4.596 - 7.28 + 3.824 = 1.14
BO/HRC = 1.09

--posted by Paul-Henri Gurian (Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia)


Related: (from fivethirtyeight.com...)

Everything you always wanted to know about Obama's pledged delegate clinching scenarios


Recent Posts:
ABC News: Obama Now Leads in Superdelegates

Obama's Slide Revisited

Unpledged Add-On Delegates

ABC News: Obama Now Leads in Superdelegates

With an additional switch this morning (Rep. Donald Payne, NJ) and a new endorsement (Rep. Peter DeFazio, OR), Obama now leads Clinton 267-266 among the superdelegates.


(via Daily Kos)

Paul has mentioned this several times in our discussion group meetings, but I'll reiterate the point here. It has seemed like only a matter of time before this happened. A new leader in the count has emerged and Clinton has one less thing to lean on in making an argument to the other uncommitted superdelegates.