Look, I'm a basketball fan. It is hard to grow up in North Carolina and not be. Indiana may get the Basketball State distinction, but that's high school basketball. So I say Indiana Schmindiana. I'm talking about college basketball. And North Carolina is the home of college basketball (in my opinion).
The fact that I'm a fan, then, may have been lost during last year's NCAA tournament, but I was much more involved in the presidential tournament that coincided with the Big Dance. This is true every four years, but 2008 was unusual. Typically the presidential candidates take care of their party business and clear out in time for the basketball start. But not in 2008. No, the top two seeds in the Democratic bracket had to extend their contest until June. And even though there weren't any contests after March 11 (or before April 22 for that matter), the battle was still on. Who can forget Obama's "bittergate" injury or his association with the now infamous agent, Jeremiah Wright, which jeopardized his amateur status?
[Note to self: No more bad jokes linking politics and basketball.]
Well, maybe just one more.
Seeding above is a bit post hoc, but I had to weigh the difference between issue/longshot candidates and when each candidate dropped out. There is no perfect formula. However, this is my opinion of where everyone would have been slotted. And as is the case with the NCAA Selection Committee, the FHQ Committee of One is second-guessed to no avail (...or those watching usually forget about the selection process and get wrapped up in the tournament process once it begins).
Just for fun, I'll try and put up a prospective 2012 bracket at some point in the next couple of days.
Related reading:
The Obama Basketball Bracket
FiveThirtyEight's Swing State Bias Analysis of the Obama Bracket and [UPDATE] Nate Silver's overall projections as well.
Now, let the real upsets begin.
Recent Posts:
Election 2012: Obama 55 - Palin 35
Now Why Didn't They Just Do This Last Week?
The Links (3/18/09): ANES Edition
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Election 2012: Obama 55 - Palin 35
It's just too bad Public Policy Polling didn't do this at the state level. I would have been tempted to start a new spreadsheet.
...three years in advance.
I would try to draw a comparison, but Pollster's archives only go back to late 2006. Plus, the inevitable Clinton-McCain head-to-heads that likely would have been done probably would have been much closer than 20 points. As the PPP release indicates, that's in Nixon-McGovern blowout territory. We know, for instance, that presidential elections are typically "closer" races than those downballot on average. Let's put it this way: Obama would have to do really well relative to expectations (Yes, that's a moving target.) and Palin would have to come across as really (probably extremely) conservative for 2012 to come anywhere close to that margin.
A couple of points on that last statement:
1) Some probably already view Palin as extremely conservative. But those are mostly Democrats (only 3% of which were undecided in this poll; compared with 18% of Republicans.).
2) Yes, there are extenuating circumstances that are confined to the campaign environment that could also help push that margin up or make it closer.
And here's the caveat to the poll:
This was a national poll conducted between March 13-15, but there were only a shade under 700 respondents. Yeah, that's a few hundred under where the usual national sample is in terms of numbers.
But hey, it's a 2012 poll, right?
(A doff of my cap to Pollster for the heads up.)
Recent Posts:
Now Why Didn't They Just Do This Last Week?
The Links (3/18/09): ANES Edition
More on 2008 Candidate Visits
...three years in advance.
I would try to draw a comparison, but Pollster's archives only go back to late 2006. Plus, the inevitable Clinton-McCain head-to-heads that likely would have been done probably would have been much closer than 20 points. As the PPP release indicates, that's in Nixon-McGovern blowout territory. We know, for instance, that presidential elections are typically "closer" races than those downballot on average. Let's put it this way: Obama would have to do really well relative to expectations (Yes, that's a moving target.) and Palin would have to come across as really (probably extremely) conservative for 2012 to come anywhere close to that margin.
A couple of points on that last statement:
1) Some probably already view Palin as extremely conservative. But those are mostly Democrats (only 3% of which were undecided in this poll; compared with 18% of Republicans.).
2) Yes, there are extenuating circumstances that are confined to the campaign environment that could also help push that margin up or make it closer.
And here's the caveat to the poll:
This was a national poll conducted between March 13-15, but there were only a shade under 700 respondents. Yeah, that's a few hundred under where the usual national sample is in terms of numbers.
But hey, it's a 2012 poll, right?
(A doff of my cap to Pollster for the heads up.)
Recent Posts:
Now Why Didn't They Just Do This Last Week?
The Links (3/18/09): ANES Edition
More on 2008 Candidate Visits
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Now Why Didn't They Just Do This Last Week?
A little more than a week after posting the revealing Nearly Three Dozen GOP House Members Dodged Obama's Coattails -- an article that clearly laid out the number of president/House split districts in last year's election and thus indirectly the electoral vote total under a Maine/Nebraska system -- CQ finally followed with a piece that made mention of the 301-237 electoral vote advantage President Obama would have had under a system of congressional district electoral vote advantage.
No, they didn't have a map, but they include a pdf file with a nice breakdown of the totals by state:
[Source: CQ Politics -- Click to Enlarge]
Now why didn't I think of that?
Recent Posts:
The Links (3/18/09): ANES Edition
More on 2008 Candidate Visits
2008 Presidential Candidate Visits by State and Party
No, they didn't have a map, but they include a pdf file with a nice breakdown of the totals by state:
[Source: CQ Politics -- Click to Enlarge]Now why didn't I think of that?
Recent Posts:
The Links (3/18/09): ANES Edition
More on 2008 Candidate Visits
2008 Presidential Candidate Visits by State and Party
The Links (3/18/09): ANES Edition
There has been no shortage of blog posts by political scientists using the newly released American National Election Study since the latest wave went public a little more than a week ago.
Below are a handful of good examples:
John Sides over at The Monkey Cage has a look at respondents' campaign donations
during the 2008 campaign (and over time since 1952). The percentage contributing to political campaigns rose to the highest level witnessed since 1976. However, that didn't hold (for all groups) once the sample was grouped according to income.
Tom Holbrook used the NES to examine just how far behind the eight ball John McCain was in 2008 because of the economy. The answer? Very much behind it. Respondents judging the economy to have been somewhat or much worse off than it was a year prior reached an all-time high (1980-2008). That the "much worse" crowd totalled two-thirds of the sample indicates just how much ground McCain had to make up with that Republican brand in tow. [The same basic pattern holds when party identification is controlled for as well. ...even among Strong Republicans. Nearly half of those in that group found the economy to be much worse off.]
The question I had for Tom (and you can read the exchange we had in the comments via the link to the post above) was whether there were any differences in the economic evaluations based on when the interview was conducted. There was an almost two week period on the front end of the interviewing window that preceded the Lehman Brothers collapse/McCain suspension of his campaign. Were views during that period any less negative than they were after that new broke (and until election day)? Sadly (surprisingly?), the NES doesn't provide an "interview date" variable in the data. However, the separate panel data set (that interviewed and re-interviewed respondents throughout the campaign) did not find any significant differences from the summer to the fall. They were slightly more negative later, but not surprisingly so. In other words, opinions on the economy were already cemented prior to the Lehman news.
Finally, John Sides also tried his hand at whether racial prejudice had any impact on presidential vote totals (1972-2008). In 2008, Obama's total would have risen by one percentage point among white voters if those white voters who had a "less favorable view of blacks, relative to whites, were magically transformed into someone with equivalent views of blacks and whites." So, not that much.
Interesting stuff that will only multiply as the data gets into more people's hands.
Recent Posts:
More on 2008 Candidate Visits
2008 Presidential Candidate Visits by State and Party
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part Two)
Below are a handful of good examples:
John Sides over at The Monkey Cage has a look at respondents' campaign donations
during the 2008 campaign (and over time since 1952). The percentage contributing to political campaigns rose to the highest level witnessed since 1976. However, that didn't hold (for all groups) once the sample was grouped according to income.
Tom Holbrook used the NES to examine just how far behind the eight ball John McCain was in 2008 because of the economy. The answer? Very much behind it. Respondents judging the economy to have been somewhat or much worse off than it was a year prior reached an all-time high (1980-2008). That the "much worse" crowd totalled two-thirds of the sample indicates just how much ground McCain had to make up with that Republican brand in tow. [The same basic pattern holds when party identification is controlled for as well. ...even among Strong Republicans. Nearly half of those in that group found the economy to be much worse off.]
The question I had for Tom (and you can read the exchange we had in the comments via the link to the post above) was whether there were any differences in the economic evaluations based on when the interview was conducted. There was an almost two week period on the front end of the interviewing window that preceded the Lehman Brothers collapse/McCain suspension of his campaign. Were views during that period any less negative than they were after that new broke (and until election day)? Sadly (surprisingly?), the NES doesn't provide an "interview date" variable in the data. However, the separate panel data set (that interviewed and re-interviewed respondents throughout the campaign) did not find any significant differences from the summer to the fall. They were slightly more negative later, but not surprisingly so. In other words, opinions on the economy were already cemented prior to the Lehman news.
Finally, John Sides also tried his hand at whether racial prejudice had any impact on presidential vote totals (1972-2008). In 2008, Obama's total would have risen by one percentage point among white voters if those white voters who had a "less favorable view of blacks, relative to whites, were magically transformed into someone with equivalent views of blacks and whites." So, not that much.
Interesting stuff that will only multiply as the data gets into more people's hands.
Recent Posts:
More on 2008 Candidate Visits
2008 Presidential Candidate Visits by State and Party
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part Two)
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
More on 2008 Candidate Visits
Let's look a bit deeper at the 2008 presidential candidates data I posted the other day. Instead of looking at it in terms of raw percentage shares for each state, I grouped the states according to the size of those shares. These cut points are rather arbitrary, but it does drive home the point. Recall that if all states were created equally, each would receive two percent of the total number of candidate visits in each presidential cycle. And just by eyeballing it, that 2% mark is a good cut off for the uppermost grouping. That group, then, is comprised of those states that garnered at least a two percent share of total candidate visits. I wanted to allow for another couple of categories, but no natural breaking point really emerged. What I did was to set the upper bound of the bottommost grouping at .5%, but as you'll see below, an additional category could have been created to provide for further differentiation. [I'll discuss this a bit more below.] The resultant three groups, then were states that received a:
[Click Chart to Enlarge]
In other words, only nine states got anything more than a two percent share of candidate visits (including both parties' candidates). Over three times that many states had a less that half a percent share of overall visits during the 2008 primary campaign. Now, this lowest category could further be broken down into states that got less than .25% of visits and between .25% and .5%. That would basically split that group in half with the former group containing 14 states and the latter, 16.
Looking at those below that .25% line, half (7 states) had concurrent Democratic and Republican contests on Super Tuesday. Of the other seven states, four had their Democratic contests on Super Tuesday while the Republican Party's contests came later (after the point at which McCain had wrapped up the nomination). There are several factors at work here. First, size is a common theme among these seldom-visited states. I'll use electoral votes as a proxy here. Of those 14 (<.25%) states, all fell at or below the 10 electoral vote line and nine have five or less electoral votes. The other obvious points here are that competition for candidate visits matters, and so too does the fact that a contest may fall after the point at which the nomination has been decided. Small states already fighting for attention are even more up against it when there are, say, 25 other states going on the same date. The saving grace for those Super Tuesday small states is that their voters at least had the opportunity to weigh in on both nominations. And while those states with split GOP contests (the ones with Democratic contests on Super Tuesday) were able to avoid the competition for attention, they missed out on the attention altogether by being so late in the process. The voters in those states were in a lose-lose situation. But shifting back to those top nine attention-grabbing states, we see that they accumulated 84% (57% in Iowa and New Hampshire) of the total amount of attention. Now granted, the advance build up of visits in Iowa and New Hampshire in the year(s) prior to the presidential election year skews these figures to some extent. However, when the Iowa and New Hampshire visits are dropped altogether, there are still only 11 states overall with visits shares over 2%. That's a net gain of two states in that category, but the cumulative share of visits to that group of states now drops to just under 73% of the total. Whether Iowa and New Hampshire are withheld does not change the fact that this group of states had one or more of three basic properties. These states were early, big and/or the only event on a given date. Ah, but what happens when these figures are separated by party?
[Click Chart to Enlarge]
The distribution of visits across Republican primaries and caucuses didn't stray too far from the overall distribution above. But once the same procedure as in the above example is employed there are some subtle differences under the surface.
If the large collection of seldom-visited states is split along the .25% line, 18 of the 31 states fall below that line and 13 above it. The thing about the Republican nomination race was that it conformed for the most part to previous nomination races, and that leaves us with two main sets of contests: the compressed states held prior to the nomination being decided and those that are more spread out yet fall after the contest is over. Those are the two categories represented by an overwhelming number of those 18 states below the line. Just three of those states weren't either on Super Tuesday or after March 4 when John McCain became the presumptive nominee of the Republican Party.
On the flip side of the chart, those 7 states in that (>2%) category made up 84% (52% in Iowa and New Hampshire) of the Republican candidate visits. That matches the percentage in the overall case. Yet, if Iowa and New Hampshire are dropped from consideration, there are only six states that exceed that 2% level and they only comprise just under 70% of the total Republican visits.
[Click Chart to Enlarge]
In the Democratic contests, the distribution looks pretty much the same, but there is a trade-off between the lower two categories, with the the two being closer in frequency than they were in the previous two examples. Splitting the lowest category along the .25% line doesn't have the same effect as it did in the previous two instances. 20 states fall below that point and just six above it. Three-quarters of those 20 very seldom-visited states were on Super Tuesday. And that is telling. Since the Democratic race extended to the final contest, many more states had an opportunity to have attention that otherwise would not have. The states that paid the price, then, were those in the most compressed environment, Super Tuesday.
And the attention-grabbing states? Well, those seven states received just under 80% (62% in Iowa and New Hampshire) of the Democratic candidate visits. And that number hardly changes when Iowa and New Hampshire are dropped. However, double the number of states fall into that (>2%) category when the two lead-off contests are withheld. Those fourteen states make up 76% of the Democratic contests. Again, that speaks to the longevity of the competition on the Democratic side. The tie that binds those contests (with or without Iowa and New Hampshire) is the fact that most were stand-alone contests or on a date where there was far less competition for attention.
NOTE: I have to confess that I've put most of these last two posts together for an exercise on descriptive statistics that I'm doing in one of my classes. But I thought I'd share and provide a bit of background information in the process. That will help us down the road if I get around to doing a projection model for 2008 based on candidate visits.
Recent Posts:
2008 Presidential Candidate Visits by State and Party
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part Two)
Michael Steele by the Numbers
- 0-.5% share of 2008candidate visits
- .5%-2% share of 2008 candidate visits
- greater than 2% share of 2008 candidate visits
[Click Chart to Enlarge]In other words, only nine states got anything more than a two percent share of candidate visits (including both parties' candidates). Over three times that many states had a less that half a percent share of overall visits during the 2008 primary campaign. Now, this lowest category could further be broken down into states that got less than .25% of visits and between .25% and .5%. That would basically split that group in half with the former group containing 14 states and the latter, 16.
Looking at those below that .25% line, half (7 states) had concurrent Democratic and Republican contests on Super Tuesday. Of the other seven states, four had their Democratic contests on Super Tuesday while the Republican Party's contests came later (after the point at which McCain had wrapped up the nomination). There are several factors at work here. First, size is a common theme among these seldom-visited states. I'll use electoral votes as a proxy here. Of those 14 (<.25%) states, all fell at or below the 10 electoral vote line and nine have five or less electoral votes. The other obvious points here are that competition for candidate visits matters, and so too does the fact that a contest may fall after the point at which the nomination has been decided. Small states already fighting for attention are even more up against it when there are, say, 25 other states going on the same date. The saving grace for those Super Tuesday small states is that their voters at least had the opportunity to weigh in on both nominations. And while those states with split GOP contests (the ones with Democratic contests on Super Tuesday) were able to avoid the competition for attention, they missed out on the attention altogether by being so late in the process. The voters in those states were in a lose-lose situation. But shifting back to those top nine attention-grabbing states, we see that they accumulated 84% (57% in Iowa and New Hampshire) of the total amount of attention. Now granted, the advance build up of visits in Iowa and New Hampshire in the year(s) prior to the presidential election year skews these figures to some extent. However, when the Iowa and New Hampshire visits are dropped altogether, there are still only 11 states overall with visits shares over 2%. That's a net gain of two states in that category, but the cumulative share of visits to that group of states now drops to just under 73% of the total. Whether Iowa and New Hampshire are withheld does not change the fact that this group of states had one or more of three basic properties. These states were early, big and/or the only event on a given date. Ah, but what happens when these figures are separated by party?
[Click Chart to Enlarge]The distribution of visits across Republican primaries and caucuses didn't stray too far from the overall distribution above. But once the same procedure as in the above example is employed there are some subtle differences under the surface.
If the large collection of seldom-visited states is split along the .25% line, 18 of the 31 states fall below that line and 13 above it. The thing about the Republican nomination race was that it conformed for the most part to previous nomination races, and that leaves us with two main sets of contests: the compressed states held prior to the nomination being decided and those that are more spread out yet fall after the contest is over. Those are the two categories represented by an overwhelming number of those 18 states below the line. Just three of those states weren't either on Super Tuesday or after March 4 when John McCain became the presumptive nominee of the Republican Party.
On the flip side of the chart, those 7 states in that (>2%) category made up 84% (52% in Iowa and New Hampshire) of the Republican candidate visits. That matches the percentage in the overall case. Yet, if Iowa and New Hampshire are dropped from consideration, there are only six states that exceed that 2% level and they only comprise just under 70% of the total Republican visits.
[Click Chart to Enlarge]In the Democratic contests, the distribution looks pretty much the same, but there is a trade-off between the lower two categories, with the the two being closer in frequency than they were in the previous two examples. Splitting the lowest category along the .25% line doesn't have the same effect as it did in the previous two instances. 20 states fall below that point and just six above it. Three-quarters of those 20 very seldom-visited states were on Super Tuesday. And that is telling. Since the Democratic race extended to the final contest, many more states had an opportunity to have attention that otherwise would not have. The states that paid the price, then, were those in the most compressed environment, Super Tuesday.
And the attention-grabbing states? Well, those seven states received just under 80% (62% in Iowa and New Hampshire) of the Democratic candidate visits. And that number hardly changes when Iowa and New Hampshire are dropped. However, double the number of states fall into that (>2%) category when the two lead-off contests are withheld. Those fourteen states make up 76% of the Democratic contests. Again, that speaks to the longevity of the competition on the Democratic side. The tie that binds those contests (with or without Iowa and New Hampshire) is the fact that most were stand-alone contests or on a date where there was far less competition for attention.
NOTE: I have to confess that I've put most of these last two posts together for an exercise on descriptive statistics that I'm doing in one of my classes. But I thought I'd share and provide a bit of background information in the process. That will help us down the road if I get around to doing a projection model for 2008 based on candidate visits.
Recent Posts:
2008 Presidential Candidate Visits by State and Party
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part Two)
Michael Steele by the Numbers
Sunday, March 15, 2009
2008 Presidential Candidate Visits by State and Party
I don't know that I set out initially to put data directly up on this site, but since I've been looking into the candidate visits data from the 2000 and 2004 primary seasons (see here and here), I thought I might also look into the availability of similar data for 2008. The great thing about the 2008 cycle -- other than it being fantastic overall -- was that there was no shortage of data collection going on. The drawback in many cases was that it wasn't cataloged in a way that could naturally be transferred into a spreadsheet for the type of analyses I like to do. One case of this was the fabulous candidate tracker (with maps!) Slate.com ran during the primaries. The problem with Map the Candidates was that, despite the great documentation, there was only individual candidate aggregation of visits and not party by party visit tabulations. Easily remedied, right?
Well, that's what I've tried to provide below:
Let me add a few notes:
Recent Posts:
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part Two)
Michael Steele by the Numbers
GOP Temporary Delegate Selection Committee for 2012
Well, that's what I've tried to provide below:
Let me add a few notes:
- Only visits where there was an "active" competition going on were counted. That does include the Republican primaries after McCain wrapped up the nomination on March 4, but only because those contests were still scheduled to happen. In other words, there was some, albeit small, draw for the candidate(s) there. This also includes Democratic caucuses past their initial steps. Both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton showed up at the North Dakota State Democratic Convention in early April, for instance, after the initial caucuses took place on February 5. Those visits count. The two candidates were seeking delegates. GOP contests of a similar ilk were not included (though Ron Paul supporters tried to and in some cases did overrun some of those state conventions).
- I highlighted the top 5 states overall and for each party. The key is at the bottom of the spreadsheet. Iowa, New Hampshire and South Carolina (in that order) were the top three draws overall and for both parties. Florida was fourth overall and in terms of GOP visits. The half-delegation penalty by the Republican Party did not have an impact on Florida's share of attention and overall the Sunshine state was not terribly negatively affected by the Democrats stripping the state of its entire delegation for a period. Michigan wasn't hurt too badly either; garnering the fifth slot in the percentage of GOP visits. California drew that distinction overall, while Pennsylvania claimed the final spot for the Democrats. The rules mattered in this regard for the Democratic Party. All four exempt states -- Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Nevada -- placed one through four (Nevada was fourth), while the two penalized states -- Florida and Michigan -- fell much further back.
Recent Posts:
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part Two)
Michael Steele by the Numbers
GOP Temporary Delegate Selection Committee for 2012
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part Two)
The View from 2004 Continued
I left off the other day having predicted that Indiana would have received a much greater share (nearly 60 times greater) of candidate attention during the 2004 Democratic primaries and caucuses had the Hoosier state government opted to move their presidential primary from May to the earliest possible, non-exempt date (February 3). That Indiana would have gotten what amounted to about 5.25% of the total candidate attention -- in terms of both candidates visits and ad buys -- did not really leave us with any hard numbers in terms of what the state tangibly would have received. Instead of collectively then, let's look at the percentage of candidate ad buys and visits individually and parse this out a bit.
The model(s) here is (are) the same as it was in the previous post. All that is changing is the dependent variable. The result is that we'll construct two separate models (visits and ad buys) to get a clearer picture of what Indiana would have gotten out of an earlier presidential primary in 2004. Let's start with ad buys...
A Model Based on Candidate Ad Buys
In the 41 states where ad data was available for 2004, the number of candidates in the race during a particular contest and the number of events during a given Wednesday-Tuesday campaign week were significant factors (...as they were in the cumulative model). However, the number of simultaneous primaries and caucuses was also significant in this case. As was the case previously, though, the resultant relationship runs counter to what was hypothesized. It was expected that as the number of contests on any given day increases, the amount of attention -- in this case candidate ad buys -- would decrease. Again, this may have much to do with the high level of correlation between both "events" variables. To check this out, I ran the model twice more but without the events/day variable in one and the events/week variable in the other. In the events/day model, that variable loses its statistical significance, but the relationship with candidate ad buys is in the hypothesized direction. In the alternate model, events/week remains both statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction.
Before we get into interpreting what we see in the table above or the prediction, let me at least mention the model's fit. Performance-wise, this collection of variables explains nearly two-thirds of the variation in ad buy shares across states. That is an improvement over what was witnessed in the overall attention model. But effect of the statistically significant variables is largely the same (...save the events/day variable). A one candidate increase in the number of active candidates in the race creates an added 2.1% ad buy share for a state. Additionally, a one state increase in the number of states in a given Wednesday-Tuesday campaign week makes for a 2% decrease in a state's ad buy share. Beyond that, primary states got a bump of nearly 1% increase in their ad buy share over caucus states. Though that isn't a statistically significant finding it is substantively significant.
Fine, but what about Indiana? If the state had held its presidential primary on February 3, how much would the state's ad buy share have increased? After adjusting the timing (15 days after Iowa), the number of active candidates at the time of the contest (7), the number of other simultaneous events (7) and the number of other events in the same campaign week (7) variable values to reflect the that primary shift, Indiana would have significantly improved its stock. The Hoosier state had no ads bought/aired on its airwaves for its May primary (and thus a 0% share of the total ad buys). In February, however, the state's share of overall ad buys would have increased to nearly 8%, going from no ads to over 3000 ads aired. The other states holding delegate selection events on the same date (excluding Delaware and North Dakota because they had no data) averaged about 2700 ads aired. And while Indiana is predicted to have exceeded that number, the average of actual ads was weighted down by a relatively low number of ads aired in Missouri ahead of the Show-Me state's primary (see Gephardt discussion from the previous post).
Basically then, Indiana moves from getting nothing in May to garnering -- as the other states on the date had individually -- about half the ad buys as Iowa did to kick off the 2004 campaign.
A Model Based on Candidate Visits
And what about the other piece of the puzzle, candidate visits to the state? The results here are very similar to what we saw in the candidate ad buys model above.
Overall, the visits model isn't as good of a fit as the ads model. The included variables account for only 43% of the variation in the number of visits to a state (and that's despite the fact that there was visits data for all 50 states). However, the same basic group of variables was significant. Again, it is all about the number of candidates actively competing for the nomination at the time of a contest and the number of events in a week that matter at least statistically. The same phenomenon we saw above in terms of the two events variables is at play in this model as well. Namely, the events/week variable is significant and its relationship with visits is in the predicted direction, but events/day is neither significant nor in the hypothesized direction. Excluding each from the model has the same effect as well. Events/week doesn't change while events/day approaches statistical significance and has a negative effect on the number of visits to a state (as hypothesized).
Finally, a state's percentage of delegates also has a significant impact on a candidate deciding to touch down and actually campaign in a state. For each 1% increase in a state's share of delegates, the average state receives a bonus .85% of candidates visit shares. No, that doesn't seem like much, but the hypothetical difference between Indiana and, say, California would be 7% of the overall number of visits (based on delegates alone).
If Indiana would have moved its presidential primary to the earliest possible date in 2004, though, what would its share of candidate visits have been? The increase wasn't as great as it was in the case of ads, but Indiana's share of overall candidate visits increased nearly four and three-quarters percent by hypothetically shifting its presidential primary from May to February in 2004. At 4.69%, Indiana's predicted February share of candidate visits was 26 times greater than it was in actuality in May. A mere 6 candidate visits in May would have been nearly 160 visits had the Indiana primary been on February 3. The other seven states on February 3 averaged 57 visits, so the Indiana prediction greatly exceeds that average. The problem there is that the seven state average includes the depressed totals from Delaware and Missouri and the complete absence of visits to North Dakota for the state's caucuses. With those three states dropped from the average, the February 3 states averaged 88 candidate visits. Indiana, then, would have had a share of visits on par but shy of the number of visits South Carolina received on the same date.
Conclusion
In 2004, Indiana could have significantly improved the amount of attention it received from the candidates in the race had it shifted its presidential primary from May to February; going from 0 to 3051 ads aired and 6 to 158 candidate visits. But 2004 was unique in the opportunity it provided states in regard to moving delegate selection events in exchange for the spoils of the system. Only the Democratic Party had a contested nomination and their allowing for February contests opened the door for states to move, but only a handful of states took advantage of that rule change. However, those states on average increased their share of candidate attention. Yet that was probably a one and done proposition as many more states joined those seven at the front of the queue in 2008. The result was that those states saw a drop in the amount of attention each received. So, while Indiana could have significantly increased the attention the state received in 2004, that same increase would not have been available to the state in 2008 or in 2012 simply because, unless the rules change to regulate which states go when, there will be too much competition at the earliest allowable date (February 7, 2012).
The lesson? If the party rules change to allow for early dates, a state would be smart to move earlier rather than later to capture an increased share of candidate attention. Of course, Indiana was not in the most advantageous position prior to 2004. The Indiana House was controlled by Democrats who could potentially have been interested in moving the state's primary date for a competitive Democratic nomination (but never introduced a bill to do so). However, the state Senate was controlled by the Republicans. Had a bill to move the primary been introduced, the divided legislature could have proven a significant obstruction to such a move. It may, then, appear that Indiana missed an opportunity prior to 2004, regardless of legislative politics.
Up next? The 2000 primaries.
Recent Posts:
Michael Steele by the Numbers
GOP Temporary Delegate Selection Committee for 2012
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part One)
I left off the other day having predicted that Indiana would have received a much greater share (nearly 60 times greater) of candidate attention during the 2004 Democratic primaries and caucuses had the Hoosier state government opted to move their presidential primary from May to the earliest possible, non-exempt date (February 3). That Indiana would have gotten what amounted to about 5.25% of the total candidate attention -- in terms of both candidates visits and ad buys -- did not really leave us with any hard numbers in terms of what the state tangibly would have received. Instead of collectively then, let's look at the percentage of candidate ad buys and visits individually and parse this out a bit.
The model(s) here is (are) the same as it was in the previous post. All that is changing is the dependent variable. The result is that we'll construct two separate models (visits and ad buys) to get a clearer picture of what Indiana would have gotten out of an earlier presidential primary in 2004. Let's start with ad buys...
A Model Based on Candidate Ad Buys
| Regression Analysis of State-level Ad Buy Shares (2004) | |||
| Variable | Coefficient | Indiana Value (actual/earlier) | Explanation of Measurement |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delegates | .026 | 1.87 | Percentage of total Democratic delegates |
| Timing | .0001 | 106/15 | Number of days since first contest |
| Primary? | .941 | 1 | Dichotomous: 0 = Caucus 1 = Primary |
| Candidates | 2.117*** | 2/7 | Number of candidates vying for nomination at time of contest |
| Events/Day | 1.569*** | 0/7 | Number of other simultaneous events |
| Events/Week | -2.034*** | 0/7 | Number of other events in the same week (Wednesday-Tuesday) |
| Neighbors? | .018 | 0/0 | Percentage of neighboring states holding simultaneous events |
| Ad Buys (DV) | -- | 0 | Average percentage of candidate ad buys |
| Constant | -4.646 | ||
| R2 = .63 | n = 41 | Significance: *.05 **.01 ***<.01 | |||
In the 41 states where ad data was available for 2004, the number of candidates in the race during a particular contest and the number of events during a given Wednesday-Tuesday campaign week were significant factors (...as they were in the cumulative model). However, the number of simultaneous primaries and caucuses was also significant in this case. As was the case previously, though, the resultant relationship runs counter to what was hypothesized. It was expected that as the number of contests on any given day increases, the amount of attention -- in this case candidate ad buys -- would decrease. Again, this may have much to do with the high level of correlation between both "events" variables. To check this out, I ran the model twice more but without the events/day variable in one and the events/week variable in the other. In the events/day model, that variable loses its statistical significance, but the relationship with candidate ad buys is in the hypothesized direction. In the alternate model, events/week remains both statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction.
Before we get into interpreting what we see in the table above or the prediction, let me at least mention the model's fit. Performance-wise, this collection of variables explains nearly two-thirds of the variation in ad buy shares across states. That is an improvement over what was witnessed in the overall attention model. But effect of the statistically significant variables is largely the same (...save the events/day variable). A one candidate increase in the number of active candidates in the race creates an added 2.1% ad buy share for a state. Additionally, a one state increase in the number of states in a given Wednesday-Tuesday campaign week makes for a 2% decrease in a state's ad buy share. Beyond that, primary states got a bump of nearly 1% increase in their ad buy share over caucus states. Though that isn't a statistically significant finding it is substantively significant.
Fine, but what about Indiana? If the state had held its presidential primary on February 3, how much would the state's ad buy share have increased? After adjusting the timing (15 days after Iowa), the number of active candidates at the time of the contest (7), the number of other simultaneous events (7) and the number of other events in the same campaign week (7) variable values to reflect the that primary shift, Indiana would have significantly improved its stock. The Hoosier state had no ads bought/aired on its airwaves for its May primary (and thus a 0% share of the total ad buys). In February, however, the state's share of overall ad buys would have increased to nearly 8%, going from no ads to over 3000 ads aired. The other states holding delegate selection events on the same date (excluding Delaware and North Dakota because they had no data) averaged about 2700 ads aired. And while Indiana is predicted to have exceeded that number, the average of actual ads was weighted down by a relatively low number of ads aired in Missouri ahead of the Show-Me state's primary (see Gephardt discussion from the previous post).
Basically then, Indiana moves from getting nothing in May to garnering -- as the other states on the date had individually -- about half the ad buys as Iowa did to kick off the 2004 campaign.
A Model Based on Candidate Visits
And what about the other piece of the puzzle, candidate visits to the state? The results here are very similar to what we saw in the candidate ad buys model above.
| Regression Analysis of State-level Visit Shares (2004) | |||
| Variable | Coefficient | Indiana Value (actual/earlier) | Explanation of Measurement |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delegates | .851 | 1.87 | Percentage of total Democratic delegates |
| Timing | -.016 | 106/15 | Number of days since first contest |
| Primary? | .156 | 1 | Dichotomous: 0 = Caucus 1 = Primary |
| Candidates | 1.414* | 2/7 | Number of candidates vying for nomination at time of contest |
| Events/Day | .855 | 0/7 | Number of other simultaneous events |
| Events/Week | -1.627* | 0/7 | Number of other events in the same week (Wednesday-Tuesday) |
| Neighbors? | .020 | 0/0 | Percentage of neighboring states holding simultaneous events |
| Visits (DV) | -- | 0.18 | Average percentage of candidate visits |
| Constant | -1.303 | ||
| R2 = .43 | n = 50 | Significance: *.05 **.01 ***<.01 | |||
Overall, the visits model isn't as good of a fit as the ads model. The included variables account for only 43% of the variation in the number of visits to a state (and that's despite the fact that there was visits data for all 50 states). However, the same basic group of variables was significant. Again, it is all about the number of candidates actively competing for the nomination at the time of a contest and the number of events in a week that matter at least statistically. The same phenomenon we saw above in terms of the two events variables is at play in this model as well. Namely, the events/week variable is significant and its relationship with visits is in the predicted direction, but events/day is neither significant nor in the hypothesized direction. Excluding each from the model has the same effect as well. Events/week doesn't change while events/day approaches statistical significance and has a negative effect on the number of visits to a state (as hypothesized).
Finally, a state's percentage of delegates also has a significant impact on a candidate deciding to touch down and actually campaign in a state. For each 1% increase in a state's share of delegates, the average state receives a bonus .85% of candidates visit shares. No, that doesn't seem like much, but the hypothetical difference between Indiana and, say, California would be 7% of the overall number of visits (based on delegates alone).
If Indiana would have moved its presidential primary to the earliest possible date in 2004, though, what would its share of candidate visits have been? The increase wasn't as great as it was in the case of ads, but Indiana's share of overall candidate visits increased nearly four and three-quarters percent by hypothetically shifting its presidential primary from May to February in 2004. At 4.69%, Indiana's predicted February share of candidate visits was 26 times greater than it was in actuality in May. A mere 6 candidate visits in May would have been nearly 160 visits had the Indiana primary been on February 3. The other seven states on February 3 averaged 57 visits, so the Indiana prediction greatly exceeds that average. The problem there is that the seven state average includes the depressed totals from Delaware and Missouri and the complete absence of visits to North Dakota for the state's caucuses. With those three states dropped from the average, the February 3 states averaged 88 candidate visits. Indiana, then, would have had a share of visits on par but shy of the number of visits South Carolina received on the same date.
Conclusion
In 2004, Indiana could have significantly improved the amount of attention it received from the candidates in the race had it shifted its presidential primary from May to February; going from 0 to 3051 ads aired and 6 to 158 candidate visits. But 2004 was unique in the opportunity it provided states in regard to moving delegate selection events in exchange for the spoils of the system. Only the Democratic Party had a contested nomination and their allowing for February contests opened the door for states to move, but only a handful of states took advantage of that rule change. However, those states on average increased their share of candidate attention. Yet that was probably a one and done proposition as many more states joined those seven at the front of the queue in 2008. The result was that those states saw a drop in the amount of attention each received. So, while Indiana could have significantly increased the attention the state received in 2004, that same increase would not have been available to the state in 2008 or in 2012 simply because, unless the rules change to regulate which states go when, there will be too much competition at the earliest allowable date (February 7, 2012).
The lesson? If the party rules change to allow for early dates, a state would be smart to move earlier rather than later to capture an increased share of candidate attention. Of course, Indiana was not in the most advantageous position prior to 2004. The Indiana House was controlled by Democrats who could potentially have been interested in moving the state's primary date for a competitive Democratic nomination (but never introduced a bill to do so). However, the state Senate was controlled by the Republicans. Had a bill to move the primary been introduced, the divided legislature could have proven a significant obstruction to such a move. It may, then, appear that Indiana missed an opportunity prior to 2004, regardless of legislative politics.
Up next? The 2000 primaries.
Recent Posts:
Michael Steele by the Numbers
GOP Temporary Delegate Selection Committee for 2012
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part One)
Friday, March 13, 2009
Michael Steele by the Numbers
or A Look at the Potential for the Current RNC Chair Being Removed
Speaking of that possibility and with chatter ramping up of late, the removal of the RNC chairman requires a two-thirds vote of the RNC according to Rule 5(1)(a)[See page 7 in rules here.]. Now, whether that is probable is beside the point. Chris Cillizza thinks it is unlikely, but let's look at this from a numbers standpoint. We know that 112 RNC members (out of 168) would have to vote to remove Steele. We also know that Steele got 91 votes on the sixth and final ballot of the chair election in January. The 77 votes that went to runner-up Katon Dawson would have to be augmented by 35 of those 91 Steele supporters to remove the current chair.
But not all of those 91 were initially among Steele's supporters. In fact, of those 91, at most 45 were not with Steele on the first ballot. [That assumes that all of the original 46 stuck by Steele throughout.] That's 45 soft Steele supporters who could potentially be swayed by an effort to assemble a successful vote of no confidence to oust the chairman. Of course 78% of those 45 would have to be persuaded that Steele needs to removed to make that a reality (or to break into the original 46 hard supporters) and I'm not sure that's anywhere close to happening. But more statements like those given to GQ and/or Republican James Tedisco failing to win new Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand's vacated NY-20 congressional seat in the upcoming special election likely wouldn't help.
But put it this way: It is closer now than it was on January 30 when Steele was elected.
Recent Posts:
GOP Temporary Delegate Selection Committee for 2012
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part One)
WA-SoS Urges Steele to Back a Regional Primary System
Speaking of that possibility and with chatter ramping up of late, the removal of the RNC chairman requires a two-thirds vote of the RNC according to Rule 5(1)(a)[See page 7 in rules here.]. Now, whether that is probable is beside the point. Chris Cillizza thinks it is unlikely, but let's look at this from a numbers standpoint. We know that 112 RNC members (out of 168) would have to vote to remove Steele. We also know that Steele got 91 votes on the sixth and final ballot of the chair election in January. The 77 votes that went to runner-up Katon Dawson would have to be augmented by 35 of those 91 Steele supporters to remove the current chair.
| RNC Chair Votes by Ballot | |||||
| Candidate: | Steele | Dawson | Anuzis | Duncan | Blackwell |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st ballot | 46 | 28 | 22 | 52 | 20 |
| 2nd ballot | 48 | 29 | 24 | 48 | 19 |
| 3rd ballot | 51 | 34 | 24 | 44 | 15 |
| 4th ballot | 60 | 62 | 31 | -- | 15 |
| 5th ballot | 79 | 69 | 20 | -- | -- |
| 6th ballot | 91 | 77 | -- | -- | -- |
| Source: National Review Online | |||||
But not all of those 91 were initially among Steele's supporters. In fact, of those 91, at most 45 were not with Steele on the first ballot. [That assumes that all of the original 46 stuck by Steele throughout.] That's 45 soft Steele supporters who could potentially be swayed by an effort to assemble a successful vote of no confidence to oust the chairman. Of course 78% of those 45 would have to be persuaded that Steele needs to removed to make that a reality (or to break into the original 46 hard supporters) and I'm not sure that's anywhere close to happening. But more statements like those given to GQ and/or Republican James Tedisco failing to win new Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand's vacated NY-20 congressional seat in the upcoming special election likely wouldn't help.
But put it this way: It is closer now than it was on January 30 when Steele was elected.
Recent Posts:
GOP Temporary Delegate Selection Committee for 2012
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part One)
WA-SoS Urges Steele to Back a Regional Primary System
GOP Temporary Delegate Selection Committee for 2012
I had a link to a full version of the Republican National Committee rules (2009-2012) come into my inbox this morning and thought I would cut and paste the relevant language concerning delegate selection for the 2012 GOP presidential nomination here. Additionally, the full text of those rules is appended at the bottom of the post.
The section, Rule 10(d) follows [See page 17 of rules below.]:
The membership aspects have been discussed, but what is lost in this is the fact that two-thirds of the RNC still has to vote in favor of any change. Now, the committee already voted in favor of the Ohio Plan, but had that derailed by the McCain campaign at last year's St. Paul convention. Hypothetically then, this could be pushed through again without the same obstruction. Whether that comes to pass or not depends on the changes made at the state level for each state's member(s). Then again, these are the folks that elected Steele in the first place.
In other words, this situation is a bit fluid. And with chatter ramping up the last couple of weeks that Steele may be out of a job, the formation of the committee is even more up in the air. If you are betting on when the TDSC will be up and running, I'd opt for later rather than sooner if I were you.
Republican National Committee Rules, Adopted 2008
*Incidentally, when I was searching for news about Blake Hall, I came across this podcast where he addresses presidential primary reform; specifically the Ohio Plan, which at that point -- summer 2008 -- had been passed by the RNC to be voted on at the national convention. The vote failed, but did lead to the crafting of the rule creating the Temporary Delegate Selection Committee. There were some interesting notes in this interview. Number one, Hall, whether he is retained as general counsel and is on the TDSC or not, supports primary reform of some sort. He indicated that the RNC penalty for violating a hypothetical Ohio Plan would be the same as it was in 2008 (a loss of 50% of a state's delegates). However, he also indicated that there had been discussion about increasing that penalty. Hall closed by discussing the tradeoff there, citing the Democratic problems in 2008. Namely, if a party is going to have a severe delegate penalty, said penalty has to be enforced.
[Original link to podcast here.]
Recent Posts:
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part One)
WA-SoS Urges Steele to Back a Regional Primary System
2008 Electoral College by Congressional District
The section, Rule 10(d) follows [See page 17 of rules below.]:
(d) There shall be a temporary committee to review the timing of the election, selection, allocation, or binding of delegate and alternate delegates pursuant to Rule No. 15(b) of these rules to the 2012 Republican National Convention. The Temporary Delegate Selection Committee shall be composed of fifteen (15) members, which shall include one (1) member of the Republican National Committee from each of the four (4) regions described in Rule No. 5, elected by the members of the Republican National Committee from each region at the 2009 Republican National Committee Winter Meeting; further, the chairman of the Republican National Committee will appoint three (3) additional members of the Republican National Committee and six (6) Republicans who are not members of the Republican National Committee. The chairman and general counsel of the Republican National Committee shall serve as ex-officio voting members. The chairman of the Republican National Committee shall convene the Temporary Delegate Selection Committee as soon as practicable after the 2009 Republican National Committee Winter Meeting. The Temporary Delegate Selection Committee shall make any recommendations it deems appropriate concerning additions to Rule No. 15(b) of these rules, provided that such additions shall preserve the provisions of Rule No. 15(b) adopted by the 2008 Republican National Convention, which shall be voted upon without amendment by the Republican National Committee at the 2010 Republican National Committee Summer Meeting and which shall require a two-thirds (2/3) vote to be adopted. Any action adopted would take effect sixty (60) days after passage. The Temporary Delegate Selection Committee shall disband following the 2010 Republican National Committee Summer Meeting.Thus far, the membership of the Temporary Delegate Selection Committee (TDSC) has been scrutinized to some extent (see here and here), but not fully and the other related rules have been ignored as well. An important question emerges:
- How much power does the newly-instated Chairman Michael Steele actually have in this process?
The membership aspects have been discussed, but what is lost in this is the fact that two-thirds of the RNC still has to vote in favor of any change. Now, the committee already voted in favor of the Ohio Plan, but had that derailed by the McCain campaign at last year's St. Paul convention. Hypothetically then, this could be pushed through again without the same obstruction. Whether that comes to pass or not depends on the changes made at the state level for each state's member(s). Then again, these are the folks that elected Steele in the first place.
In other words, this situation is a bit fluid. And with chatter ramping up the last couple of weeks that Steele may be out of a job, the formation of the committee is even more up in the air. If you are betting on when the TDSC will be up and running, I'd opt for later rather than sooner if I were you.
Republican National Committee Rules, Adopted 2008
*Incidentally, when I was searching for news about Blake Hall, I came across this podcast where he addresses presidential primary reform; specifically the Ohio Plan, which at that point -- summer 2008 -- had been passed by the RNC to be voted on at the national convention. The vote failed, but did lead to the crafting of the rule creating the Temporary Delegate Selection Committee. There were some interesting notes in this interview. Number one, Hall, whether he is retained as general counsel and is on the TDSC or not, supports primary reform of some sort. He indicated that the RNC penalty for violating a hypothetical Ohio Plan would be the same as it was in 2008 (a loss of 50% of a state's delegates). However, he also indicated that there had been discussion about increasing that penalty. Hall closed by discussing the tradeoff there, citing the Democratic problems in 2008. Namely, if a party is going to have a severe delegate penalty, said penalty has to be enforced.
[Original link to podcast here.]
Recent Posts:
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part One)
WA-SoS Urges Steele to Back a Regional Primary System
2008 Electoral College by Congressional District
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Should Indiana Frontload in 2012? (Part One)
The View from 2004
A couple of weeks ago I laid out a simple model for examining the variation in the amount of attention (candidate visits and ad buys) states receive during any given presidential primary season. I further offered that one could use the information from this model to then predict the amount of attention a state would have gotten had it been in a different, more advantageous, calendar position. Let's reproduce the list of factors hypothesized to have an effect on the amount of attention a state would garner:
For the purposes of this exercise, we'll define earlier as the earliest date on which a state could hold its delegate selection event without sanction from the national party. And we'll be looking at this in terms of the 2004 primary calendar (Not to brag, but it is awfully nice to be able to reference all the primary calendars back to 1976 now.). I'll add in a 2000 projection later, but it is a bit messier with both parties having contested nominations. There are a couple of additional factors to consider. For now though, I'll focus on 2004, when only the Democratic nomination was at stake. In 2004, the earliest a non-Iowa/New Hampshire state could hold its contest was a week after the New Hampshire primary, February 3. Indeed, six states moved into the brave new world of February for the 2004 cycle, the cycle when the Democratic Party initially allowed for contests that early. In other words, there was some competition on that date but not anywhere close to the level of competition for attention on that same first Tuesday in February of 2008.
If Indiana had moved from the first week in May to the first week in February for the 2004 cycle, then, what would the Hoosier state have taken home? I looked at the descriptives of this recently and found that a handful of similarly-sized states to Indiana frontloaded in 2004 and gained as a result of the move. Tennessee and Wisconsin essentially went from nothing to around the amount of attention a state of their sizes would be expected to be if all other factors were equal. The other state, Missouri, unfortunately suffered because its favorite son, Dick Gephardt, was running and the contest had been pre-emptively ceded to the Congressman by the other candidates. [Yes, Gephardt had dropped out by this point, but the amount of attention the state got was far less than it would have been if Gephardt hadn't been in the race at all. He had only dropped out a couple of weeks prior and other states on February 3 -- especially South Carolina -- were getting much more attention.] Moving into February, then, had its advantages.
The Model
Before we look into the ramifications of Indiana having been the eighth state on February 3, 2004, let's look at how the underlying model performed.
Looking at Indiana in particular, we're talking about a primary 106 days after the nomination race began -- well after it was over in fact -- that basically got nothing in terms of attention. Despite the fact that it is around the median for size and the fact that Indiana held the only event on its date or week, the Hoosier state primary just fell too far after the point at which the nomination had been decided to matter.
The Results
Across the board, though, what factors did matter?* I'm not terribly surprised that the percentage of delegates wasn't a significant variable. As I've said before, it just doesn't seem to matter in the context of frontloading. Timing didn't even matter, but that may have more to do with the fact that it is fairly highly correlated (>.8) with the number of candidates in the race at the time of the primary or caucus, which was a significant factor. Multicollinearity is a potential problem with the events/day and events/week variables. Obviously there is some amount of overlap between those two concepts, but the two are nearly perfectly correlated (>.9). That said, when events in a week is dropped, the simultaneous events on a date variable is still not significant. In events/day's absence, events/week remains significant. The oddity here is that with both are included in the model, they run in counter directions, which is not consistent with the hypothsized (the more events, the less attention). As it turns out, it is the significant variable (events/week) that runs in the proper direction. [Fortunately.] Together, these seven variables account for just shy of half of the variation in attention we see across the fifty states. Not a great fit, but not all that bad for a first pass.
The Prediction
With that baseline set, what level of attention can we predict Indiana would have gotten if it had shifted its presidential primary to February 3? We'll have to alter Indiana's numbers on events/day (7 events), events/week (7 events), percentage of neighbors going on the same date (0%) and the number of days after Iowa (15) to make this prediction. With those numbers imputed into the regression equation Indiana's predicted share of candidate attention rises from essentially nothing in reality to over five and a quarter percent had the Hoosier state's primary been held during the first week in February. That is consistent with the amount of attention Arizona actually got. Now, size doesn't matter in this model, but Arizona is a similarly-sized state to Indiana. Arizona did get the benefit of having a primary simultaneously with its eastern neighbor, New Mexico, which got a similar share of the total attention for the cycle.
Great, so, Indiana would have gotten about 60 times as much attention as it got in 2004 by moving from May to February, but how do we go about interpretting a share of attention. What does that mean in terms of the number of ads bought or the number of candidate visits to the state? I'm glad you asked. I'll pick up there tomorrow with part two.
*Yeah, but how do we go about reading those coefficients from the table above? We can see that the number of candidates in the race at the time of the contest and the number of events occurring in the same week as any given contest matter, but what do those numbers mean? In the case of the candidates variable, we can interpret that coefficient to mean that a one candidate increase translates to a 1.5% increase in the amount of attention a state receives. In a somewhat counteractive fashion, a one contest increase in the number of events in a given Wednesday-Tuesday week causes a 1.4% decrease in the share of attention a state garners. Of course the other variables play a role in determining this as well despite not being statistically significant. Substantively, both the percentage of delegates and primary/caucus distinction are significant, though the latter isn't as much as the extant literature might lead s to believe. In the case of the former, a one percent increase in the share of delegates a state had means a .4% increase in the amount of attention that state got.
Recent Posts:
WA-SoS Urges Steele to Back a Regional Primary System
2008 Electoral College by Congressional District
2008 Presidential Primary Calendar
A couple of weeks ago I laid out a simple model for examining the variation in the amount of attention (candidate visits and ad buys) states receive during any given presidential primary season. I further offered that one could use the information from this model to then predict the amount of attention a state would have gotten had it been in a different, more advantageous, calendar position. Let's reproduce the list of factors hypothesized to have an effect on the amount of attention a state would garner:
- Delegates: As I have alluded to before, size maters. California is likely to get more attention from moving than Indiana.
- Primary or caucus?: Despite all the chatter about caucuses in 2008, primaries still get the most attention from candidates.
- Event Scheduling: This site is pretty much predicated on the idea that in the current system, earlier is better.
- Number of candidates: Obviously, the greater the number of candidates in the nomination race at the time of a state's contest, the more attention that state is likely to get.
- Number of simultaneous events: A crowded field of contests on any one day translates into candidate resources stretched thin. Look no further than Arkansas on this one.
- Number of events in the same week: The reasoning above holds true here as well. If a state has a contest on the weekend following Super Tuesday, it may receive short shrift from the candidates than if it had not been as close to so many other contests.
- Number of nearby states on the same date: Finally, resources are hypothetically more efficiently spent if a cluster of contests in neighboring states occur simultaneously. If John McCain is already in Missouri it is much easier (and more likely) to go campaign in nearby Oklahoma or Arkansas or Tennessee prior to February 5, 2008.
For the purposes of this exercise, we'll define earlier as the earliest date on which a state could hold its delegate selection event without sanction from the national party. And we'll be looking at this in terms of the 2004 primary calendar (Not to brag, but it is awfully nice to be able to reference all the primary calendars back to 1976 now.). I'll add in a 2000 projection later, but it is a bit messier with both parties having contested nominations. There are a couple of additional factors to consider. For now though, I'll focus on 2004, when only the Democratic nomination was at stake. In 2004, the earliest a non-Iowa/New Hampshire state could hold its contest was a week after the New Hampshire primary, February 3. Indeed, six states moved into the brave new world of February for the 2004 cycle, the cycle when the Democratic Party initially allowed for contests that early. In other words, there was some competition on that date but not anywhere close to the level of competition for attention on that same first Tuesday in February of 2008.
If Indiana had moved from the first week in May to the first week in February for the 2004 cycle, then, what would the Hoosier state have taken home? I looked at the descriptives of this recently and found that a handful of similarly-sized states to Indiana frontloaded in 2004 and gained as a result of the move. Tennessee and Wisconsin essentially went from nothing to around the amount of attention a state of their sizes would be expected to be if all other factors were equal. The other state, Missouri, unfortunately suffered because its favorite son, Dick Gephardt, was running and the contest had been pre-emptively ceded to the Congressman by the other candidates. [Yes, Gephardt had dropped out by this point, but the amount of attention the state got was far less than it would have been if Gephardt hadn't been in the race at all. He had only dropped out a couple of weeks prior and other states on February 3 -- especially South Carolina -- were getting much more attention.] Moving into February, then, had its advantages.
The Model
Before we look into the ramifications of Indiana having been the eighth state on February 3, 2004, let's look at how the underlying model performed.
| Regression Analysis of State-level Attention Shares (2004) | |||
| Variable | Coefficient | Indiana Value (actual/earlier) | Explanation of Measurement |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delegates | .434 | 1.87 | Percentage of total Democratic delegates |
| Timing | -.011 | 106/15 | Number of days since first contest |
| Primary? | .569 | 1 | Dichotomous: 0 = Caucus 1 = Primary |
| Candidates | 1.496*** | 2/7 | Number of candidates vying for nomination at time of contest |
| Events/Day | .753 | 0/7 | Number of other simultaneous events |
| Events/Week | -1.366* | 0/7 | Number of other events in the same week (Wednesday-Tuesday) |
| Neighbors? | .022 | 0/0 | Percentage of neighboring states holding simultaneous events |
| Attention (DV) | -- | 0.09 | Average percentage of candidate visits and ad buys |
| Constant | -2.136 | ||
| R2 = .47 | n = 50 | Significance: *.05 **.01 ***<.01 | |||
Looking at Indiana in particular, we're talking about a primary 106 days after the nomination race began -- well after it was over in fact -- that basically got nothing in terms of attention. Despite the fact that it is around the median for size and the fact that Indiana held the only event on its date or week, the Hoosier state primary just fell too far after the point at which the nomination had been decided to matter.
The Results
Across the board, though, what factors did matter?* I'm not terribly surprised that the percentage of delegates wasn't a significant variable. As I've said before, it just doesn't seem to matter in the context of frontloading. Timing didn't even matter, but that may have more to do with the fact that it is fairly highly correlated (>.8) with the number of candidates in the race at the time of the primary or caucus, which was a significant factor. Multicollinearity is a potential problem with the events/day and events/week variables. Obviously there is some amount of overlap between those two concepts, but the two are nearly perfectly correlated (>.9). That said, when events in a week is dropped, the simultaneous events on a date variable is still not significant. In events/day's absence, events/week remains significant. The oddity here is that with both are included in the model, they run in counter directions, which is not consistent with the hypothsized (the more events, the less attention). As it turns out, it is the significant variable (events/week) that runs in the proper direction. [Fortunately.] Together, these seven variables account for just shy of half of the variation in attention we see across the fifty states. Not a great fit, but not all that bad for a first pass.
The Prediction
With that baseline set, what level of attention can we predict Indiana would have gotten if it had shifted its presidential primary to February 3? We'll have to alter Indiana's numbers on events/day (7 events), events/week (7 events), percentage of neighbors going on the same date (0%) and the number of days after Iowa (15) to make this prediction. With those numbers imputed into the regression equation Indiana's predicted share of candidate attention rises from essentially nothing in reality to over five and a quarter percent had the Hoosier state's primary been held during the first week in February. That is consistent with the amount of attention Arizona actually got. Now, size doesn't matter in this model, but Arizona is a similarly-sized state to Indiana. Arizona did get the benefit of having a primary simultaneously with its eastern neighbor, New Mexico, which got a similar share of the total attention for the cycle.
Great, so, Indiana would have gotten about 60 times as much attention as it got in 2004 by moving from May to February, but how do we go about interpretting a share of attention. What does that mean in terms of the number of ads bought or the number of candidate visits to the state? I'm glad you asked. I'll pick up there tomorrow with part two.
*Yeah, but how do we go about reading those coefficients from the table above? We can see that the number of candidates in the race at the time of the contest and the number of events occurring in the same week as any given contest matter, but what do those numbers mean? In the case of the candidates variable, we can interpret that coefficient to mean that a one candidate increase translates to a 1.5% increase in the amount of attention a state receives. In a somewhat counteractive fashion, a one contest increase in the number of events in a given Wednesday-Tuesday week causes a 1.4% decrease in the share of attention a state garners. Of course the other variables play a role in determining this as well despite not being statistically significant. Substantively, both the percentage of delegates and primary/caucus distinction are significant, though the latter isn't as much as the extant literature might lead s to believe. In the case of the former, a one percent increase in the share of delegates a state had means a .4% increase in the amount of attention that state got.
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