Sunday, December 13, 2015

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: OKLAHOMA

Updated 3.1.16

This is part ten of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

OKLAHOMA

Election type: primary
Date: March 1 
Number of delegates: 43 [25 at-large, 15 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional (with majority (50%) winner-take-all trigger statewide and in congressional districts)
Threshold to qualify for delegates: 15% (both statewide and within the congressional districts)
2012: proportional primary

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Changes from 2012
The Oklahoma Republican Party made bigger changes to their method of delegate allocation from 2008-2012 than they did from 2012 until now. The state legislature in the Sooner state shifted back the presidential primary in the state by a month from February 2008 to March 2012. Squarely within the month-long -- all of March -- proportionality window for 2012, the reaction of the Republican Party in Oklahoma was to switch from winner-take-most (winner-take-all by congressional district) plan to an across-the-board proportional plan to comply with the new RNC rules four years ago.

But rather than proportionally allocating all of the delegates -- at-large and congressional district -- based on the statewide results, Oklahoma Republicans opted to award delegates in a proportionate manner based on the results statewide and in the several congressional districts. The at-large delegates were allocated and bound based on the statewide results and the congressional district delegates were awarded based on the results in each of the congressional districts.

That change ended up being more proportional than was necessary under the RNC rules in 2012. The only switch that was required to comply was the at-large delegate allocation. In 2012, a state could be considered compliant with the proportionality requirement if it proportionally allocated those at-large delegates. A state could continue to allocated congressional district delegates in a winner-take-all fashion (based on the congressional district results). Ohio made that incremental change, but states like Oklahoma and Georgia went the extra step and proportionalized the allocation of all of their delegates.

A total proportionalization for 2012 meant that states like Oklahoma and Georgia were ahead of the curve under the stricter definition of proportional the RNC has rolled out for the 2016 cycle; the one eliminating the winner-take-all allocation of congressional district delegates.

The historical rundown is intended to show that Oklahoma had no impetus to make any changes to its delegate allocation rules for 2016. And it has not really made any alterations.

So what does the process look like?


Thresholds
To win any delegates under the Oklahoma Republican Party delegate allocation rules, a candidate must pull in an at least 15% share of the vote in the March 1 presidential primary. That is true at both statewide and at the congressional district level. Should any candidate win a majority of the votes in the primary statewide or in a congressional district that candidate would be allocated all of the statewide, at-large delegates (25) or all of the congressional district delegates (3 in each district).

The usual caveats apply here. The more candidates who are alive by SEC primary day on March 1, the less likely it is that that majority winner-take-all trigger will be tripped. However, as the number of candidates drops, the likelihood of a majority winner either statewide or in a congressional district increases.

It should be noted also that the Oklahoma Republican Party delegate allocation rules do not prohibit the possibility of a backdoor winner-take-all allocation. That possibility is unit-specific and limited though. A candidate can be the only one to clear the 15% threshold either statewide or in a congressional district and claim all of the either at-large or congressional district delegates, respectively. It is not possible for a candidate to win all 43 delegates from Oklahoma unless that candidate is above the 50% threshold statewide and in each of the five congressional districts or unless that candidate is the only one above 15% statewide and in each of the five congressional districts. Both outcomes are possible but not probable. Call that a limited backdoor winner-take-all allocation or a backdoor winner-take-most plan.


Delegate allocation (at-large and automatic delegates)
This is a simulation of the allocation; not a projection. The numbers are less important than how the rules operate in this exercise.

The at-large and automatic delegates -- 28 delegates in total -- will be proportionally allocated to candidates with a vote share above the 15% mark. Based on the last poll conducted on the race in Oklahoma (the mid-November Sooner poll), the statewide allocation would look something like this1:
  • Trump (27%) -- 7.560 delegates
  • Carson (18%) -- 5.040 delegates
  • Cruz (18%) -- 5.040 delegates
  • Rubio (16%) -- 4.48 delegates
  • Huckabee (4%) -- 0 delegates
  • Bush (2%) -- 0 delegates
  • Fiorina (2%) -- 0 delegates
  • Paul (2%) -- 0 delegates
  • Kasich (1%) -- 0 delegates

  • Uncommitted -- 6 delegates
The first observation is that, as is the case in other states with a minimum qualifying threshold, Oklahoma's rules would limit the number of candidates who are actually allocated delegates. If a top tier emerges (and/or is maintained), then there will be a class of have candidates and a class of have not candidates. Of course, it should be noted that the carve-out contests have winnowed some of those have not candidates from the race.

The other thing that stands out about the Oklahoma delegate allocation formula for at-large and automatic delegates is the calculation itself. Unlike most other states, the language in the Oklahoma Republican Party rules uses the total vote -- and not the qualifying vote -- as the denominator in the equation. This is similar to how New Hampshire allocated delegates. Such a plan tamps down on the number of delegates the qualifying candidates -- those over the 15% threshold -- receive, but it also leaves a cache of delegates in limbo. In New Hampshire, the rule has always been to allocated those leftovers to the statewide winner in the Granite state primary.

But such a contingency is not a part of the Oklahoma rules. In the simulated allocation above, six delegates would not be allocated.

...to anyone. They would remain uncommitted. This is similar to the state of affairs in the Louisiana rules. But here's the thing: there is a range of possibilities here. If three candidates -- say, Trump, Cruz and Rubio -- just barely clear the 15% threshold. They end up with around 45% of the total vote. That leaves 55% of the vote under the threshold. All three candidates would claim four delegates and the remaining 16 at-large/automatic delegates would be uncommitted.

If, however, those same three candidates all receive 30% of the vote -- no, that's not likely -- then they combine for 90% of the vote and leave only 10% unaccounted for. Collectively, Trump, Cruz and Rubio would receive 24 delegates and four would be uncommitted.

That is a big range, but the results are likely to be somewhere in between. However, that does mean that there will be a small group of uncommitted delegates coming out of the Oklahoma primary.


Delegate allocation (congressional district delegates)
If the above statewide numbers are extended to the congressional district level, there would be four candidates over the 15% threshold. However, there would only be three delegates to go around in a given district. Trump, Carson and Cruz would qualify for one delegate each and Rubio would be left out of the allocation.

That same sort of allocation -- one delegate each -- would also hold if three candidates cleared the 15% barrier. If only two candidates draw 15% or more of the vote in a congressional district, the district winner would win two delegates and the runner-up would be allocated the remaining delegate.   That is consistent with the baseline allocation of congressional district delegates in Alabama and Georgia.

And again, should only one candidate clear the 15% barrier (or if a candidate wins a majority of the vote) in a district, then that candidate would take all three delegates from that district.


Things left out/unclear
There are a number of matters left unclear in addition to the automatic delegate question above.
  1. What are the rounding rules? There is little guidance in the Oklahoma rules here other than to "round to the nearest whole number". It appears as if there is no process for dealing with over- and under-allocated delegates. Yet, given the structure of the rules, it would seem as if most of this is taken care of in the uncommitted delegate procedure described above.
  2. How long does the bind on delegates last? Again, this is something that is left unsaid in the Oklahoma Republican Party delegate allocation rules. 1st ballot? Two ballots? Infinitely. It is not clear. 
  3. What if no one reaches 15%? Oklahoma Republicans do describe a number of scenarios for the allocation of delegates based on the numbers of candidates clearing the qualifying threshold. However, that list does not include contingencies for the case where no candidate clears the 15% threshold statewide or in a congressional district. This seems unlikely and would require something like a seven-way logjam, but again, this possibility is not covered. Given Oklahoma's position on the calendar -- after the carve-out states -- and the pretty clear top tier of candidates in polling, the chances of a "no one above 15%" scenario seems limited.

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State allocation rules are archived here.


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1 This poll is being used as an example of how delegates could be allocated and not as a forecast of the outcome in the Sooner state presidential primary.



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Saturday, December 12, 2015

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: MINNESOTA

Updated 2.29.16

This is part nine of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

MINNESOTA

Election type: caucuses
Date: March 1 
Number of delegates: 38 [11 at-large, 24 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional (with supermajority (85% statewide) winner-take-all trigger)
Threshold to qualify for delegates: 10% (both statewide and within the congressional districts)1
2012: non-binding caucuses

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In 2012, the Minnesota Republican Party exploited a loophole in the RNC delegate selection rules and held a non-binding caucus a month before non-carve-out states were supposed do so. Since the preference vote at those February precinct caucuses had no direct, rules-based bearing on the delegate allocation process -- the results did not bind delegates to candidates -- the party was able to skirt sanctions from the national party. Not only was the initial step in the caucus/convention process earlier than the RNC would have preferred, but because the delegates were unbound, it meant that there was ultimately a divergence between the preference vote winner (Rick Santorum) and the candidate who controlled the Minnesota delegates at the national convention in Tampa (Ron Paul).

The RNC made some rules changes in Tampa and at subsequent meetings in the time between then and late summer 2014. Many of those rules changes were intended to target the states just like Minnesota in 2012.2 Not only will Minnesota Republicans caucus about a month later in 2016 than the party did in 2012, but the delegates will be allocated and bound to candidates based on the preference vote at the March 1 precinct caucuses.

That means no fantasy delegates from Minnesota in 2016. But it does mean digging into a new delegate allocation formula.


Thresholds
As the Minnesota caucuses are scheduled for March 1, the party's initial step in its delegate allocation process will fall within the RNC's proportionality window. MNGOP will separately allocate statewide, at-large delegates and the congressional district delegates in a proportionate manner based on the results either statewide or within each of the eight congressional districts. Candidates qualify for delegates in those respective units -- again, statewide or within the congressional districts -- if they receive 10% or more of the vote. That is a hard 10%. A candidate with 9.5% of the vote cannot round up to 10%, for example, and be awarded delegates.

The exception to this is if a candidate wins 85% or more of the vote across the precinct caucuses statewide. Under the rules of delegate allocation in Minnesota, a candidate meeting that threshold statewide would be awarded all 38 delegates. Even in a field less crowded than the 2016 group of Republican candidates that 85% barrier is a high bar to surpass. Unless, something wild happens, then no candidate is going to trigger that winner-take-all allocation. Again, the bar is higher in Minnesota than in those states in which a simple majority triggers the allocation of all at-large and/or congressional district delegates to one candidate.

On the other end of that threshold spectrum, however, is that 10% bar to qualify for delegates. In terms of what is allowed under RNC rules -- a qualifying threshold up to 20% -- the Minnesota bar is pretty low. That, in turn, reduces that likelihood that just one candidate clears that hurdle. Obviously, with a large field of candidates, that outcome is more likely, but as the field of candidates winnows over the course of the February contests in the four carve-out states, just one candidate surpassing 10% of the vote statewide or at the congressional district level decreases.

Yet, it should be noted that there is nothing in the Minnesota Republican Party delegate allocation rules prohibiting a winner-take-all allocation either statewide or at the congressional district level should only one candidate crest above 10%. That differs from, say, Arkansas in the allocation of statewide delegates and Alabama, for example, with respect to congressional district delegates. Still, those structural differences across those states would tend to balance out in terms of their effects (which is to say, it would only tend to have an impact at the margins).

Delegate allocation (at-large/automatic delegates)
Both at-large and automatic delegates -- 14 delegates in total -- will be proportionally allocated to candidates with a vote share above the 10% mark. Based on the last poll conducted on the race in Minnesota (PPP's July poll), the statewide allocation would look something like this3:
  • Walker (19%) -- 4.22 delegates
  • Trump (18%) -- 4.0 delegates
  • Bush (15%) -- 3.33 delegates
  • Carson (11%) -- 2.44 delegates
  • Cruz (7%) -- 0 delegates
  • Huckabee (6%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Rubio (5%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Paul (5%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Christie (4%) -- 0 delegates
  • Fiorina (3%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Kasich (3%) -- 0 delegates
  • Jindal (1%) -- 0 delegates 
This actually ends up nicely capturing how rounding would work under the Minnesota rules. First, the allocation is done in descending order according to how the candidates finish. Fractional delegates of .5 or greater would be rounded up. The combination of a sequential allocation and rounding is one of the potential hidden advantages in these rules across states.

In the above example, no one has a remainder greater than .5, so no one rounds up. That means Walker ends up with 4 delegates, Trump 4, Bush 3 and Carson 2. That is a total of 13 delegates, leaving one delegate out of the original 14 unallocated. In some states, that unallocated delegate is awarded to the top finisher. In still others, the candidate with the largest remainder is given that last delegate. Minnesota falls in latter category. Carson, with a remainder of .44, would gain that final delegate, pushing his total up to 3.

Carson gains in that instance, but if those in front of him had had larger remainders or fractional delegates above .5, Carson would have been at a disadvantage by virtue of being the last over the threshold (and thus last in the sequence to be allocated delegates). Those toward the end of the sequence have the potential of being squeezed out of delegates dependent upon how qualified candidates with higher vote shares statewide round.

Delegate allocation (congressional district delegates)
Allocating the congressional district delegates is easier or harder. If there are multiple candidates above the 10% threshold and they are clustered together, then the top three in the vote count within the district will be allocated one delegate each. If we extend the above statewide results to the congressional district level, Walker, Trump and Bush would be allocated one delegate and Carson, despite being over 10%, would be on the outside looking in. That is the easy way of thinking about this.

It gets more complicated when considering the possibility of one candidate receiving enough support in a congressional district so as to win two delegates. It should be noted that this is less likely too. To accomplish this, a candidate would have to win more than half of the vote among the candidates over 10% (as opposed to using the votes cast for all candidates as the denominator). That is something that would be conditioned by how many candidates break the 10% threshold. If only two candidates are above 10%, then it would only take the top finisher one more vote than the candidate in second place in the district to be allocated two delegates. More candidates above 10% pushes the margin necessary to be allocated two of the three delegates upward.

Binding
Delegates from Minnesota under these rules are bound to their candidates through the first ballot at the national convention. If a candidate with delegates from Minnesota withdraws from the race, then those delegates would attend the national convention unbound. Interestingly, should a withdrawn candidate return to the race, those delegates would return to that candidate. That return contingency is unique to Minnesota so far as FHQ can tell.



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One fun side note is that congressional district delegates under these rules can be allocated based on the statewide results rather than congressional district results. This is a little like the idea behind the National Popular Vote plan, but more likely operates like a blanket proportional allocation of all delegates, regardless of distinction, based on the statewide vote. What's "fun" is that the rules do allow for some variation. There could be some districts that would tether the allocation of their delegates to the statewide result while others would allocate theirs based on the results within the congressional district.

But that -- a decision to allocate congressional district delegates based on the statewide preference vote results -- can only happen if the party Executive Committee on the congressional district level makes that decision before August 31 of the year prior to the presidential election. That option was meaningless for the 2016 cycle, though. The allocation rules, including this option, were not adopted until September 17, 2015, after that August 31 deadline.



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State allocation rules are archived here.


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1 If no candidate reaches the 10% threshold either statewide or at the congressional district level, then the threshold is lowered by rule to 0%. In practice, though, to qualify for delegates a candidate would have to be closer to the top votegetter's vote share than zero. That is particularly clear at the congressional district level where only three delegates are available in each district. Statewide, if the winner is below 10%, then there would presumably be a great number of candidates around 9%. If Minnesota was the first contest on the calendar that would be one thing, but being positioned a month after Iowa kicks off the process means that the winners -- statewide and within the districts -- will be above the 10% barrier.

2 To some extent Iowa was also similarly hit by the rules changes. As Iowa is a carve-out state, though, the Hawkeye state was only affected by the addition of the binding requirements the RNC put in place for the 2016 cycle.

3 This poll is being used as an example of how delegates could be allocated and not as a forecast of the outcome in the Land of 10,000 Lakes. Obviously, Scott Walker is unlikely to receive 19% of the vote at the Minnesota caucuses.


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Thursday, December 10, 2015

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: GEORGIA

Updated 4.18.16

This is part eight of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

GEORGIA

Election type: primary
Date: March 1 
Number of delegates: 76 [31 at-large, 42 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional (with winner-take-most trigger statewide and congressional district)
Threshold to qualify for delegates: 20% (to win statewide, at-large delegates)1
2012: proportional primary

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For the most part Georgia Republicans have retained the same method for allocating national convention delegates as the state party utilized in 2012. Unlike states such as Ohio, though, the Georgia interpretation of proportional in 2012 is still consistent with the changed definition the national party is using in 2016. But in 2012, the allocation of delegates in the Peach state was overly proportional.2 In 2016, Georgia is still compliant with the RNC proportionality requirement with much the same rules.

At-large delegates
Georgia Republicans will proportionally allocate the 31 at-large delegates apportioned to the state by the RNC to candidates who clear the 20% threshold in the statewide vote in the presidential primary election. If no candidate receives 20% of the vote, the threshold is lowered to 15%. Should no candidate reach 15%, then that threshold is decreased to just 10% of the statewide vote.

It is worth noting that despite the varying thresholds, if only one candidate clears whatever barrier is established, then that candidate would be entitled to all 31 of the statewide, at-large delegates. If, for instance, Ted Cruz is the top votegetter statewide at 10.1% and Marco Rubio is the runner-up at 9.9%, then Cruz would win all 31 at-large delegates, even with such a narrow advantage. The fact that the Georgia threshold for a candidate to qualify for delegates is a bit of a moving target adds some intrigue to the process, but it does make it more difficult to game out. It is a potentially low mark to trigger a possible backdoor winner-take-all scenario for the at-large delegates.

One new aspect in Georgia for 2016 is that if a candidate wins 50% of the statewide vote, then that candidate wins all of the at-large delegates. If the field remains even somewhat crowded though, this seems more unlikely than a backdoor winner-take-all scenario.

Unlike the RNC summary, the Georgia rules specify that winning a majority statewide entitles a candidate to all at-large delegates, not all delegates in the state.3

***
UPDATE
"Rounding" of at-large delegates
The Georgia rules clearly state that there is no allocation of fractional delegates. But there is no defined method of rounding delegates. In lieu of rounding, then, what happens is a series of repeated proportional allocations of remainders. Let's look at this using the 2016 results that are now available to us.

The first thing is the allocation equation. Georgia uses a candidate's share of the statewide vote as the numerator and the total statewide vote -- not the qualifying vote of just those above the threshold -- as the denominator. Given Tuesday's results, that looks something like this:

Round 1
[34 at-large delegates]
(Allocated delegates in parentheses)

Trump: 34 X .388 = 13.196 delegates (13)
Rubio: 34 X .244 = 8.312 delegates (8)
Cruz: 34 X .236 = 8.024 delegates (8)

That allocates 29 of the 34 at-large delegates, leaving five leftover. Those five are then allocated using the same equation from above.

Round 2
[5 leftover at-large delegates]
(Allocated delegates in parentheses)

Trump: 5 X .388 =  delegates (2)
Rubio: 5 X .244 =  delegates (1)
Cruz: 5 X .236 =  delegates (1)

That leaves just two delegates to be split among three qualifying candidates. All that is left are fractional delegates as a result. Since the remaining delegates cannot be proportionally allocated without ending in fractional delegates, the remaining two delegates go to the statewide winner.

Final allocation
Trump: 13 + 2 + 1 = 16 delegates
Rubio: 8 + 1 = 9 delegates
Cruz: 8 + 1 = 9 delegates

According to the Georgia Republican Party general counsel's office, the three automatic delegates are included in the at-large allocation and are the first three delegates to fill in the first three allocated slots the statewide winner has been awarded.

***


Congressional district delegates
The bulk of the Georgia delegation -- as is the case the larger a state's population gets -- will be allocated at the congressional district level. Each of the 14 congressional districts in the Peach state is apportioned three delegates by the RNC. The state party has opted again in 2016 to allocate those three delegates in a Top Two manner. The district winner is allocated two delegates while each district runner-up is awarded the remaining one delegate. There is no threshold to qualify. Candidates simply have to get into the top two in the district vote count.

This roughly simulates the proportional allocation of three delegates, but does present the potential to hurt a third place finisher who is tightly clustered with the top two.  That third place candidate would likely be deprived of a delegate in that scenario; a delegate that goes to the winner of the district count. On the other hand, the top two method does eliminate the possibility of a candidate winning all the delegates in a district by clearing a low threshold (as is the case with at-large delegates).

Again, there is no threshold to qualify for congressional district delegates, but there is a threshold to qualify for all three of a district's delegates. Should a candidate win a majority of the vote in a district, then that candidate would be allocated all three delegates. Newt Gingrich was able to exercise this option in a handful of districts in his 2012 win in the Georgia primary.

The method is the same at the congressional district level in Georgia as it was in 2012.

Automatic delegates
The three party delegates are functionally at-large delegates in the Georgia delegate allocation plan. The party chairperson, the national committeeman and the national committeewoman are all allocated and bound to the statewide winner of the Georgia primary. As was the case with the congressional district delegates, the automatic delegates are allocated and bound in the same manner in which they were during the 2012 cycle.

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All Georgia delegates are bound through the first ballot of the national convention. Additionally, there is no explicit guidance in the bylaws concerning the release of delegates upon the suspension of a presidential campaign or candidate withdrawal from race. Those delegates would theoretically continue to be bound to the candidates throughout, assuming the contest is unresolved throughout. If it is not competitive, the fact that the Georgia delegation voted unanimously for Romney at the convention in Tampa in 2012 speaks to the ability of delegates to be released from those bindings.



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State allocation rules are archived here.


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1 If no candidate reaches the 20% threshold, the barrier is dropped to 15%. If no candidate reaches the 15% mark, the threshold is lowered to 10%.

2 Though the Ohio presidential primary is situated outside of the proportionality window on March 15 and is truly winner-take-all for 2016, Buckeye state Republicans used a modified winner-take-all by congressional district method in 2012. The statewide delegates were allocated proportionally, but the congressional district delegates were allocated in a winner-take-all fashion to the winner of each congressional district. That qualified as proportional in 2012, but does not in 2016. Georgia was ahead of the curve in 2012 and thus did not have to make many changes to its rules for 2016.

3 Now, the Rule 16F filing the Georgia Republican Party made with the RNC made indicate a totally winner-take-all scenario, but that is not something that is described in the state party rules.



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Wednesday, December 9, 2015

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: COLORADO

This is part seven of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

COLORADO

Election type: caucus/convention
Date: March 1 
Number of delegates: 37 [13 at-large, 21 congressional district, 3 automatic (unbound)]
Allocation method: determined by state and/or congressional district convention(s) or left unbound
Threshold to qualify for delegates: n/a
2012: non-binding caucuses

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FHQ often says that sequence matters.

It does. But we typically talk about sequence in meta-terms: how each state and their respective primaries and caucuses collectively line up on the presidential primary calendar.

Sequence, however, also matters in the delegate allocation or selection process within states. That is definitely true with regard to the unconventional method of delegate allocation/selection the Colorado Republican Party has opted to use during the 2016 presidential nomination cycle.

As has previously been discussed in this space, Colorado Republicans have decided to skip the presidential preference vote at its March 1 precinct caucuses. Now, that decision could be chalked up to a desire to skirt the new-for-2016 national party delegate binding requirements, a misunderstanding of the national party rules, or division within the state party organization. In reality, it is a little bit of all three. Practically though, the "how Colorado came to this point" question is less important than the "what effect the decision will have" one.

First, it is likely to turn the March 1 precinct caucuses into a non-event.1 With no preference vote, there is no real or easy way to gauge the winner of the caucuses. Since there is no presidential preference poll conducted at the precinct caucuses their is nothing on which to base any subsequent delegate allocation. And even the back up option -- counting the number of delegates that advance to the county assemblies aligned with particular candidates -- is compromised to some degree. Typically in caucuses, those who attend, meet and select folks from among their ranks at one step to move on to the next step in the process. That process continues to the congressional district level and/or the state convention level where national convention delegates are chosen from among those who are left from the whittled down group of original precinct caucusgoers.

That may yet be the case in Colorado, but it will be a bit atypical and messy getting there.

Candidates for delegate must file an intent to run form with the Colorado Republican Party chair no later than 13 days prior to the convention at which they would be elected (Rule XIII.A.5.a). For statewide, at-large delegates, that would mean 13 days before the April 9 state convention, and for congressional district delegates, 13 days before the congressional district conventions that meet between March 29 and April 9 (a filing deadline range from March 16-25).

To be eligible to run, a delegate candidate must:
  • have been eligible to participate in the precinct caucuses
  • have been a registered Republican in the state/district at the time of the precinct caucuses and remain so through the relevant convention (depending on which delegate position is sought, at-large or congressional district)
  • have been a delegate, alternate or qualified voting member at the county assemblies
  • be a delegate to the district or state convention (depending on which delegate position is sought, at-large or congressional district)
It is that third one that is perhaps most important. To take part in the county assemblies, one has to have been elected/selected at the precinct caucuses to move on to the next step in the process. That means that the national convention delegates will emerge from the participants in the March 1 precinct caucuses; the ones without a preference vote. And while there is no preference vote at the precinct caucuses, the intent to run form delegate candidates must file with the party chair after that point on the calendar (after March 1) gives those delegate candidates the option of aligning with/pledging to a presidential candidate.

That pledge is much more important than is being discussed.

Colorado has been talked about as a state that will send an unbound delegation to the national convention. That would only be the case if all the delegate candidates who file intent to run forms opted to remain unaffiliated with any presidential campaign. If those delegate candidates pledge to a presidential candidate and are ultimately elected to one of the 34 delegate slots (not counting the party/automatic delegates), then they are functionally locked in with that candidate if that candidate is still in the race for the Republican nomination.

They would be bound to those candidates at the national convention because the Colorado Republican Party bylaws instruct the party chair to cast the delegation's votes at the national convention "in accordance with the pledge of support made by each National Delegate on their notice of intent to run". Anywhere from 0 to 34 delegates could end up bound from the Colorado delegation to the Republican National Convention.

That is a real wildcard in the delegate count in Colorado and nationally.

--
But let's return to sequence for a moment.

The precinct caucuses are on March 1. Intent to run forms are due no later than mid-to-late March, following at the very least the other primaries and caucuses held on or before March 15. The first puts a premium on organizing -- turning out as many supporters as possible for the precinct caucuses and then getting those supporters through to the county assemblies. It is only that group of county assembly participants who are eligible to be national convention delegates. Showing strength there is everything in the delegate allocation process in Colorado in 2016.

But we will not have an answer to that right away necessarily; not unless those that make it through to the county assemblies immediately submit intent to run delegate candidate forms (and the Colorado Republican Party actually reports those results). Regardless of the reporting from the state party, if a campaign is able to corner the market and move through to the next step a bunch of its supporters, that candidate will have a decided advantage in the delegate allocation process. They would dominate the pool of potential candidates and maximize the number of delegates the campaign eventually wins.

Rather than being a state with no preference vote that no one pays attention to, Colorado becomes a real delegate prize for the campaigns who are able to organize there. Those that gain an organizational advantage -- and that is much more likely in a low turnout election without the incentive of a presidential preference vote -- have a real opportunity to get something out of the Centennial state. It will not necessarily entail candidates coming into the state over the course March and into April (because forcing delegate candidates through to the county assembly level is the true mark of winning there), but it may make the media outlets pay continued attention to Colorado as the process there resolves itself. And since there is no preference vote guiding the delegate allocation process from step to step, a candidate could dominate in Colorado and come out on April 9 with a significant majority of delegates.

This rules set up means Colorado could go a lot of ways, but like some of the other states with, say, vote thresholds to qualify for delegates, the method in Colorado is likely to favor a limited number of candidates.

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Colorado delegates will be bound to the candidates to whom they have pledged on the first ballot at the national convention. The exceptions are 1) if the delegate candidate filed as uncommitted and 2) if a presidential candidate has withdrawn from the race (thus releasing any delegates). In both cases, those delegates would be free to choose from among the candidates still in the race. Left unsaid is how those votes are cast at the convention. If all delegates end up bound, the chairperson of the party casts the votes of the delegation according to the pledges in the intent to run forms. However, in the event that there is a faction of uncommitted and/or released delegates, then it is the delegates themselves who cast their own ballots.


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State allocation rules are archived here.


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1 In the conventional sense, candidates will not necessarily come to Colorado to drive up support for a March 1 vote that will not happen. That is doubly true in light of the fact that Colorado shares its precinct caucuses date with primaries and caucuses in 13 other states. Functionally though, with delegates potentially on the line, Colorado is certainly not a non-event.


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Thursday, November 19, 2015

A Request: Don't Use the RCP Delegate Interactive Tool as a Mobile Brokered Convention Production Unit

Over the last couple of days FHQ has been asked our thoughts on the Delegate Allocation Interactive Tool at Real Clear Politics.

It's great!

Sean Trende and David Byler have done yeoman's work in not only putting this thing together, but in putting it out there for public consumption. Having put a couple of delegate allocation models together during primary season in 2012, I can tell you that it is, at best, an imperfect science.1 Juggling all of the various factors embedded in the patchwork of delegate allocation rules across the entire country is no easy task. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't try.

However, it does mean that one has to make assumptions about certain factors of the system to model it properly/accurately (see for instance the variation in delegate rounding). And while those assumptions can potentially be fodder for criticism, FHQ would rather take the tool for what it is: an instrument to help us better understand the complexities of the rules, how they are differently implemented across states, and maybe what that means for the 2016 race.

[NOTE: And FHQ really cannot stress enough how open Sean and David are to any and all comments, feedback, perspectives and alternate approaches/assumptions about this thing. This is a first pass. And having spoken with them while they began putting this together, they are intent on improving it into and through primary season.]

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But it is that maybe above that is of some overall concern to FHQ. The reactions to this thing have been positive from what I have seen, but I do wonder how people will approach this thing. My fear is that it ends up overemphasizing or artificially inflating the odds (in terms of perceptions on the individual level) of the various contested convention scenarios out there (see for instance this). That overemphasis tends to be on the outcome rather than the input. By input I mean plugging in poll numbers that traditionally have not been predictive at this stage of past races and more importantly the role of winnowing in the process. And that latter option is available, but I wonder how often users will account for those effects. It is relatively easy to produce a contested convention outcome if you carry 14 candidates through the process or even five. But is that the likely path? FHQ does not know to be honest. However, past results point toward a sequential process -- like the one that is still in place for 2016 -- gradually winnowing the field like kids in Willy Wonka's chocolate factory.

This is FHQ's way of saying that this delegate allocation interactive tool is a very powerful one and its utility will be derived from how it is used. So rather than be critical, let's put the gadget to use in testing a hypothesis.

FHQ likes to talk about rules. Perhaps you have noticed. And there have been some changes to the delegate allocation rules employed by the Republican National Committee between 2012 and 2016. The gadget give us the chance to -- in a very rough way -- estimate the impact of those rules changes. The premise is simple: Take the 2012 primary results, plug them into the tool and see how the path/outcome differs.

There are a lot of questions that come out of this. Does the smaller proportionality window slow down Romney's march to the nomination? Does the tighter definition of proportionality come to the aid of his opponents? Do the winner-take-all states clustered on March 15-22 push Romney over the top? Are the SEC primary states winnowers and the northeastern states coalesced in late April the deciders as Trende and Byler hypothesize?

Before FHQ digs into that, a few notes. First, this, too, is an imperfect approach. The rules are different and so is the sequence of contests. That means that late 2012 states that are early in 2016 have lopsided results that favor Romney (see Arkansas, Kentucky, Texas and Utah). Similarly there are early 2012 states that are later in 2016 where results are likely imprecisely competitive during a likely less competitive part of the calendar (see Washington). There are also some of the warts in the tool's code in this early stage. For instance, the gadget allocates delegates from states like Colorado, North Dakota and Wyoming, where it will remain unknown for quite a while -- perhaps up to the convention -- just how many delegates are actually bound to what candidates (in the eyes of the RNC).

Still, there is some utility to be gained in gaming this out despite that.

Here's how this ends up looking:

Please note that Trump = Romney, Carson = Santorum, Rubio = Gingrich, Cruz = Ron Paul, Rand Paul = Perry and Bush = Hunstman.


So Romney still wins. The former Republican nominee would have received 1527 delegates given the caveats detailed above, but also without counting any of the 135 RNC/automatic delegates that are mostly left unbound through the RCP gadget. There are actually 168 of those automatic delegates. Approximately 40% of those delegates are actually bound based on primary or caucus results. The remainder would be unbound. But even without some of those bound automatic delegates, Romney still wins comfortably. His nearest competitor -- Santorum -- ends up with just a quarter of Romney's delegate total. Furthermore, Romney's total competition only amasses a little less than half of his delegate total together.

Well, sure, if a candidate wins 42 out of 56 contests, that candidate is probably going to win the nomination. There's no big surprise there.

The map is nice, but how does this look if we examine the pace with which the candidates accrue delegates over the course of primary season? As it was in 2012, Romney used a win in winner-take-all Florida to establish a lead in the delegate count that widened to roughly a 3:1 ratio after Super Tuesday on March 6, was more firmly established toward the end of March when 50% of the delegates had been allocated, and was solidified by the northeastern primaries in late April.

By the time 75% of the delegates had been allocated -- the week prior to the Texas primary -- Romney all but had the nomination clinched. Texas on May 29 put him over the top. The southern winnowers/northern deciders hypothesis Trende and Byler proffer is basically the 50-75 rule, but perhaps a less precise one, FHQ would argue. But that was basically what the system produced in 2012 under the 2012 rules.

How does this change when the 2016 rules (and calendar) are inserted and combined with the 2012 primary results?




The quick answer is not much. The longer version is it changes but only in a very subtle fashion. With no winner-take-all Florida, Romney would not have broken away from the pack in the same way. Sure, he had the advantage, pulling away from everyone else individually after what would have been the SEC primary. But if we shift our focus to the contested convention scenario, all of Romney competition combined were still neck and neck with Romney after the hypothetical March 1 contests.

That would change after the proportionality window closes and winner-take-all contests are introduced on March 15. Notice how Romney -- already apart from all the other candidates -- separates from even the combined "Anti-Romney" line (in purple). The former Republican nominee's lead only increases from there (after the 50% allocation point), jumping after the northeastern series of contests on April 19-26, but not clinching the nomination until the Oregon primary on May 17. That is about two weeks ahead of where Romney clinched in 2012 under the 2012 rules. Additionally, he does not arrive at that threshold until after the 75% allocation point that is crossed in the northeastern states.

Again, there are caveats to this, but the change in rules from 2012 to 2016 do not bring significant changes to either the outcome of the 2012 Republican nomination race or how the process arrived at its conclusion. What we can say is that the rules changes did not result in a contested convention.

But different inputs in 2016 may alter things. Still, use those winnowing buttons at RCP, folks.

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1 You can find more details on those models here and here (WSJ).



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Saturday, November 14, 2015

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: ARKANSAS

Updated: 3.3.16

This is part six of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

ARKANSAS

Election type: primary
Date: March 1 
Number of delegates: 40 [25 at-large, 12 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional
Threshold to qualify for delegates: 15%
2012: proportional primary

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Arkansas is a quirky one. That was true in 2012 and is true in 2016 as well.

Though the Republican Party in the Natural state arrives at proportionality differently than almost any state -- in or out of the proportionality window -- that method has not really changed in the four years since 2012. What has changed most noticeably is that the Arkansas primary is much earlier in 2016 than it was in 2012. The state legislature uprooted the usual May primaries -- presidential and those for statewide and congressional offices -- and moved them to March to coincide with a number of other states in the SEC primary coalition.

And the the Republicans in the state brought their unique delegate allocation formula with them.

As the Arkansas primary fits firmly within the March 1-14 proportionality window on the Republican presidential primary calendar, the method has to be proportional. Again, it is in 2016 as was the case in 2012 (despite not being in the proportionality window four years ago). But how the Arkansas GOP arrives at proportionality is different.

The first consideration in the Arkansas allocation is what it takes to qualify for delegates. And, depending on the level -- statewide or congressional district -- the threshold is different.

At-large/automatic delegates
To receive any of the 28 statewide, at-large and automatic delegates a candidate must clear the 15% threshold. There is no rounding up from, say, 14.5%. A candidate must have a minimum of 15% of the statewide vote be allocated any delegates. However, the resultant allocation of those delegates to candidates is not strictly proportional.

First, each candidate over 15% is awarded one delegate. If one candidate receives a majority of the vote statewide, then that candidate is allocated the remaining at-large/automatic delegates. So, if four candidates clear the 15% barrier and one of those won more than 50% of the vote, then candidates 2-4 each receive one delegate and the top finisher statewide receives the other 25 at-large delegates (1 delegate for clearing 15% and 24 additional delegates for winning a majority statewide). That the other three candidates get any delegates out of this makes the majority trigger here a winner-take-most rather than winner-take-all trigger.

If, however, none of the four candidates in the above scenario wins a statewide majority, then the allocation is more proportional. More proportional, but not strictly proportional. The first step, allocating one delegate to those over 15%, would still have happened. All four candidates would have one delegate. The remaining 21 at-large delegates would be proportionally allocated by rule to the top three finishers statewide. In other words, the candidate finishing fourth statewide -- over 15% in this scenario -- would be stuck on the one delegate and frozen out of any additional delegates.

Let's assume the statewide vote looks something like this1:
Trump -- 30.1%
Carson -- 18.9%
Rubio -- 15.3%
Cruz -- 15.0%

Again, each candidate would receive one delegate to start for clearing the 15% threshold. The remaining 24 at-large/automatic delegates would be proportionally allocated among the top three. Those top three -- Trump, Carson and Rubio -- would have the following, what FHQ will call "real allocation percentages"2:
Trump -- 46.8%
Carson -- 29.4%
Rubio -- 23.8%

That translates to an allocation of those 24 delegates that looks like this:
Trump -- 11.232
Carson -- 7.056
Rubio -- 5.712

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It is at this point that the language of the allocation rules gets a bit murky:
The remaining at-large delegates and alternates shall be allocated among the three candidates receiving the greatest vote statewide in proportion to their votes with any fractional proportion of a delegate/alternate being rounded up for the candidate receiving the greater number of votes statewide.
Now, if that said greatest rather than greater, then Trump would be the beneficiary of any and all fractional delegates. Rubio would receive 5 delegates and Carson 7. That would bump Trump up to 12 delegates  plus the one for having cleared 15%. But saying greater instead makes that less clear. At most, though, it means the transference of one delegate. In a true "round any fraction above .5 up" scenario, Rubio would have 6 delegates. However, if all the fractional delegates go to the top votergetter, then Rubio would have 5 delegates with that sizable fraction (.712) heading to Trump.

Regardless, the statewide allocation would end up approximating something like the following:
Trump -- 13
Carson -- 8
Rubio -- 6
Cruz -- 1

What we can take away from this is that the Arkansas rules are designed to benefit those at the top. First, anyone over 15%, but then the top three and then seemingly the winner when it comes to the method of rounding. This is even clearer when one considers that fewer scenarios are laid out in the Arkansas plan than is true in some other delegate allocation plans out there. What FHQ means by that is that there are no specific rules put forth describing the allocation if only one candidate clears the 15% threshold statewide. Should just one candidate receive more than 15% statewide, then that candidate would, absent any rules describing alternatives, receive all 28 at-large and automatic delegates. Like Alabama, the Arkansas plan potentially takes a chaotic primary process -- one with a lot of candidates -- and translates that into a less chaotic allocation of the delegates.
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UPDATE:
Between July when the above rules were given the green light by the Arkansas Republican Party State Committee and September when they were approved by the Executive Committee, the discrepancy above -- the greater/greatest rounding rule -- was cleaned up and removed. Simpler language replaced it calling for the rounding of fractional at-large to the nearest whole number.

FHQ pulled and posted the July rules that were still posted on the Arkansas Republican Party website in mid-November. The September update was not posted there until after that point.

Congressional district delegates
The rules for allocating the delegates in each of Arkansas' four congressional districts (12 total) are less complex. There is only one threshold; a ceiling threshold. If a candidate wins a majority in a district, then that candidate would be allocated all three delegates from that district. That is a winner-take-all trigger. However, if no candidate wins a majority then the top two candidates split the three delegates in the district. The winner receives two delegates and the runner-up the other remaining delegate. This qualifies as proportional under the Republican National Committee rules, if only by default. At the end of the day, there are only so many ways to proportionally allocate three delegates.

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While the plan described above paints a picture of a process that takes chaos and converts it to order via the allocation of delegates to a limited number of competitors, there is a more chaotic caveat to also consider. The delegate slots are only reserved for a candidate to a certain extent. Candidates will only hold those delegate slots as long as there are delegate candidates in the district and state meetings where they are elected to fill them. If a candidate does not have enough delegate candidates to fill his or her available spots, then the unfilled positions go to the candidate with the highest number of votes -- either in the district or statewide -- and available delegate candidates to fill the void.

There are two things to consider when looking at this. The first is that such a process provides for the orderly transference of delegate slots from a candidate who is going to or has dropped out of the race. Presumably, a low finishing candidate drops out and those delegate slots get transferred to the winning candidate.

Yet, one would surely want to think about the variation in organization across the campaigns in this scenario as well. It is a system that seemingly rewards the winners, but could also reward organization too. In the event, then, that none of the top finishers drops out there is still a scenario where delegate positions could move around depending on organization. And this would not necessarily always benefit the winner either statewide or in the congressional districts.

Take our example from above; the one where Trump, Carson, Rubio and Cruz win some statewide delegates. Trump did pretty well in the vote and won 12 hypothetical delegates. But assume for a moment that Trump does not have 13 Trump-aligned delegate candidates ready to roll. Let's say he only has 8 to run for those 13 slots. In that case, there would be five slots that would move on to another candidate. If Carson had not only 8 delegate candidates to run for the statewide slots he won, but 20 (or even just 12), then those four unfilled Trump slots would move to him. If Carson did not have any extras or not enough extra delegate candidates, then those slots would be transferred to the next highest votegetter with a surplus of delegate candidates.

Winning or getting into the top five or six in Arkansas is one thing, then, but there is a premium placed on organizing enough delegate candidates -- an unofficial slate of them really -- to actually fill the delegate slots allocated based on the primary results.

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After all of that is settled, the Arkansas delegates are bound to their particular candidates for the first ballot at the national convention (or if the candidate to whom they are bound drops out after the selection process).


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State allocation rules are archived here.



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1 These numbers are taken from the Huffington Post Pollster national averages (set to "less smoothing") on November 14, 2015. To stay true to the four candidate scenario described above, we will add 2.7 percentage points to Ted Cruz's total to get the Texas senator to 15%. The numbers other than having four candidates over 15% are inconsequential. The intent is to simulate the allocation in Arkansas.

2 That is the proportion of the vote each candidate received, but calculating the percentage as if only those three candidates (and the votes they received) were involved in the primary.



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Thursday, November 12, 2015

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: ALASKA

Updated 2.29.16

This is part five of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

ALASKA

Election type: caucuses
Date: March 1 
Number of delegates: 28 [22 at-large, 3 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional
Threshold to qualify for delegates: 13%
2012: proportional caucuses (with no official threshold)

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The method the Alaska Republican Party is using in 2016 to allocate its 28 delegates to the national convention in Cleveland looks a lot like it did four years ago. The party is still holding caucuses. Those caucuses will be continue to be scheduled for the earliest date allowed by national party rules (March 1). And the delegates will be proportionally allocated to candidates based on the results in the presidential preference poll conducted at those caucuses.

Unlike 2012, however, the Republican Party in the Last Frontier will include a threshold that candidates must meet to qualify for any delegates. And it is a somewhat odd threshold: 13% of the statewide vote in the caucuses. Why 13%? FHQ does not have a really good answer to that question. Yet, if one looks back to the results of the last two competitive Republican caucuses -- caucuses in which there was more than just an incumbent president seeking reelection -- 13% is roughly the point that separated those candidates who received delegates and those who did not.

One could look at those results in 2008 and 2012 and come to the conclusion that that sort of threshold would limit the number of candidates qualifying for delegates, specifically limiting to four that group of candidates. That may or may not be the case in 2016. That four candidates were allocated delegates speaks more toward the impact of winnowing in those cycles than anything else. And yes, Alaska is similarly positioned on the 2016 calendar compared to both 2008 and 2012; the earliest allowed date.

But think of that limit of four as something of a floor when considering delegate allocation in Alaska. Mathematically, up to seven candidates could receive delegates in the caucuses based on how the allocation rules are worded. A candidate has to receive at least 13% of the vote to qualify for delegates. It is, then, a hard threshold. One could not get 12.5% of the vote, for example, and be able to round up to 13%.1

What the new threshold, combined with past results, tells us is that there are likely to be anywhere from four to seven candidates who will take delegates away from the Alaska caucuses. Whether the allocation ends up closer to the floor or ceiling there, depends on how the field winnows between now or Iowa and March 1.

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Interestingly, if a candidate who has won delegates drops out of the presidential race, those delegates/delegate slots do not become free agents as is the case in other states. Instead, the allocation will be recalculated as if the remaining qualified candidates had been the only candidates to initially qualify following the preference vote in the caucuses.

Let's use the 2012 results as an example.
After the caucuses:
Romney (32.4%) -- 8 delegates
Santorum (29.2%) -- 7 delegates
Paul (24.0%) -- 6 delegates
Gingrich (14.1%) -- 3 delegates 
But now, let's assume that Gingrich drops out:
Romney (37.85%) -- 9 delegates
Santorum (34.10%) -- 8 delegates
Paul (28.05%) -- 7 delegates
The recalculation drops the Gingrich votes from consideration and allocates the delegates to the remaining three candidates as if they had been the only three to qualify (using on the votes that those three received). Basically, the three Gingrich delegates end up even distributed among the remaining candidates.

This is all fine if the candidate withdrawals occur prior to the Alaska Republican state convention in late April next year. The recalculation would be done and delegates would be elected at the state convention and bound to candidates to which they are already pledged.

However, if the withdrawal happens after the delegates have been elected, the delegates aligned with the withdrawing candidate are given the option of switching allegiance to one of the remaining candidates. If they opt not to align with another active candidate or to not align with candidates based on who has available slots, then the party will select delegate candidates who will align with that candidate.

For example, let's assume that Gingrich in the above allocation example dropped out after the state convention and the selection of delegates to fill his three delegate slots has occurred. Those three delegates would not have the option to all go to Romney, for example. The three delegates would have to go -- one each -- to the remaining active candidates as called for in the recalculation. If they opt not to or cannot agree to who they will each re-pledge, then the party has the power to select replacements.

Is this likely to occur? Probably not. By the time the Alaska state convention rolls around, the point on the calendar at which 75% of the delegates will have been allocated will have passed. That has been -- over the last few cycles anyway -- the point at which a presumptive nominee has emerged. If that is again clear by late April 2016, then the delegates will all likely end up allocated to that presumptive nominee anyway. If not, then they are very likely to be allocated to a significantly winnowed field of candidates. At that point in a sequential process, that is likely to be two candidates.


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State allocation rules are archived here.



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1 Under that rounding scenario, eight candidates could tie at 12.5% of the vote and all qualify for three delegates.



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Tuesday, November 10, 2015

The Extent of Jeb Bush's Alabama "Problem"

This story that the Jeb Bush campaign and its supporters failed to line up a full slate of delegate candidates littered the FHQ Twitter stream last night and has picked up some steam this morning. Let's be real here: It is certainly something of a problem, but the degree of that problem is being overstated. Much of the reporting thus far on the matter -- on the heels of the Alabama filing deadline late last week -- is missing quite a bit of context. And, really, much of it has missed the real story.

But first, Jeb.

Alabama Republicans will send 50 delegates to the national convention in Cleveland next year. Three of those are automatic delegates (the state party chair, the national committeeman and the national committeewoman) which leaves 47 other delegate slots that candidates, their campaigns and supporters have to fill by filing to run. Of those 47 spots, Bush has 32 delegate candidates covering 29 vacancies. That is short of the more than full slates that candidates like Donald Trump, Ben Carson, Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio had filing in support of them.

Looks bad, right?

It is. If a campaign touts its strength in filing a full slate of delegate candidates in Tennessee -- as the Bush campaign has done and others have reported -- then it says something that the campaign has missed the mark further south in Alabama. It says something about organization in an area of the country -- SEC primary territory -- where Bush has spent some time this fall. It says something more that, compared to the other candidates, Bush ranks sixth in terms of the number of Alabama delegate candidates that filed pledged to the former Florida governor.

There are, however, a couple of matters that have gone unsaid and/or underreported in this story. One is that the above it just one comparison. The second is that the process in Alabama -- the rules -- are being overlooked. Both factors when not considered help to overstate the extent of the problem for Bush in Alabama.

2012
Sure, when we look at the 32 delegate candidates that filed on Jeb Bush's behalf compared to the 76 potential delegates that aligned with Carson and Cruz, it looks kind of ominous. Again, it is. FHQ does not want to understate that. In the invisible primary, that is a signal that organizationally, Bush is lagging behind his competitors. Think of this as a straw poll of activists in Alabama, which it functionally is. Jeb Bush just came in sixth. That's winnowing territory.

Yet, look back four years and you will see that all four candidates who made the Alabama presidential primary ballot -- Gingrich, Paul, Romney and Santorum -- all had gaps in the delegate slates that appeared on the ballot next to their names. And yes, that is more an excuse from the Bush perspective than anything else. 2016 is not 2012. However, if FHQ had asked you before the Alabama filing deadline -- so absent this revelation about delegate slates there -- whether Bush would get more or less than 12 delegates (of 47 total), I suspect most would have taken the under given the crowded field of candidates.

Why 12 delegates?

That is the number of delegates Mitt Romney won after the March 13 Alabama presidential primary in 2012. If Bush is a stand-in for 2012 Romney, then those 32 delegate candidates covering 29 slots do not really look all that bad. They cover the bases. Romney won 8 delegates statewide. Bush has 14 at-large delegate candidates covering 13 (of 26) slots. Romney won the first congressional district in 2012 but with less than a majority (two delegates) and was runner up in the fifth and sixth districts (one delegate each). Bush has at least two delegate candidates in each of those three districts.

The delegates slots that Bush is most likely to win, then, are covered. The harder part, perhaps, is getting to the 20% of the vote statewide and in the congressional districts to qualify for those delegates. That strikes FHQ as a much larger Alabama problem at the moment.

Process
Well, what if the at this moment problem is not a problem after the March 1 primary in the Yellowhammer state? What happens if Bush actually exceeds expectations and wins more delegates than his campaign has delegate candidates to cover?

First of all, Bush would still likely have enough delegate candidates to cover his bases even given a winnowed field. But on the offhand chance that Bush really exceeds expectations, and he wins, say, 35 delegates, what happens?

The Alabama Republican Party allocation rules state that voters cannot vote for Jeb Bush and then vote for delegate candidates aligned another candidate to fill in blanks left by Bush. There is no procedure to discard ballots for conflicts (i.e.: voting for Bush and then voting for a Rubio delegate where there is no Bush delegate), but the comments of the Alabama Republican Party seem to indicate that the topline, presidential preference vote has precedence over the delegate votes.1 The candidate is going to get their delegates in other words.

But how?

Well, if a voter cannot vote for Bush and then a delegate candidate not aligned with Bush, then that means that Bush is winning the top line vote. However, that also means those delegate slots are not being filled. Those slots are vacant.

The first step in filling those vacancies is through the alternate delegate process. The alternate delegates are not elected directly on the ballot. Instead, the state party executive committee selects alternates for the statewide at-large delegates while alternates for congressional district delegate slots are selected by the congressional district committees. There could theoretically be some jockeying on these committees to stack the alternate slates, but recall that these decisions are being made after the vote in the presidential primary. And again, the state party has said that the candidates will receive their rightful share of the delegates based on the vote in the primary.

And in the event there are any shenanigans based on one candidate exceeding expectations -- at least as measured by a comparison to how well their campaign did in lining up delegate candidates -- then the state executive committee will fill those slots.

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Is all this a black eye for Jeb Bush and his campaign during a downward trend for them? Sure, but is it the end of the world? No. Bush seems to have his bases covered for even a reasonable result for him in Alabama. But even if he exceeds even the 2012 Romney baseline, the Alabama rules provide cover.

...and that is true for the other candidates who played the delegate filing game even worse than Bush as well.


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1 Those comments from Reed Phillips at ALGOP (via Daniel Malloy at the Atlanta Journal-Constitution):
A candidate that wins enough of the vote to be allocated any delegates, will still receive the number of delegates that they won in the primary. If there are any vacancies in delegate slots then the delegates that did qualify will vote to fill those vacancies for that candidate. If a candidate didn’t have anyone qualify as a delegate for them but wins enough of the vote to have delegates, then the state executive committee will vote to fill those slots.


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