Monday, January 25, 2016

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: IDAHO

Updated 3.8.16

 This is part twenty-two of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

IDAHO

Election type: primary
Date: March 8
Number of delegates: 32 [23 at-large, 6 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional
Threshold to qualify for delegates: 20% (statewide)
2012: proportional caucus

--
Changes since 2012
The date is much the same -- it amounts to the same first Tuesday after the first Monday in March date -- but the mode of delegate allocation is different in Idaho in 2016 than was the case in 2012. Republicans in the Gem state traded in their early caucus for an earlier presidential primary (moved from the traditional mid-May point where it was consolidated with the primaries for other offices).

Idaho Republicans also switched out some funky caucus allocation rules for a set of rules that is more in the mainstream of how other states are allocating delegates in 2016. Gone is the more or less instant runoff method that netted Mitt Romney a winner-take-all allocation. That has been replaced by a proportional allocation based on the statewide results of the March 8 presidential primary in Idaho. As has been witnessed in other states, though, what constitutes proportionality varies quite widely.


Thresholds
Much of that variation in the application of proportionality is attributable to a couple of factors. First, is the delegation pooled or separated for the purposes of allocation? The former typically means that a state will end up closer to a true proportional allocation of delegates than not. The latter opens the door to the bulk of the wild delegate allocation plans out there. Secondly, however, is there a threshold that the candidates must meet to qualify for delegates? With a threshold comes limitations in terms of how many candidates end up with delegates.

But that fact is tempered by the distinction raised in the first question. States that have separated allocation -- distinctions made between the allocation of at-large and congressional district delegates -- and a threshold have been the most complex. Many of the SEC primary states fit this description. Idaho fits somewhere in between states with that type of allocation and those with a proportional allocation of pooled delegates without a threshold.

It is that kind of allocation that ends up being perhaps the least complex. For example, then, Idaho Republicans will pool all of their delegates rather than invite complexity through a separate allocation of at-large delegates and the six delegates in just two congressional districts. The rationale is similar to the that of other small states. Power comes through allocating a small bloc (or blocs) of delegates rather than a much more decentralized proportional allocation.

Gem state Republicans will accomplish this through pooling their delegates but also by layering in a couple of thresholds. First, to qualify for any of the 32 delegates, a candidate must win at least 20% of the vote (before rounding) in the Idaho presidential primary. That will have the effect of limiting the number of candidates who receive delegates to likely four or fewer. If no candidate clears the 20% threshold, then the allocation would be carried out as if there was no threshold at all.

Not expressly prohibited by the rules is a backdoor to a winner-take-all allocation. While the "if no candidates clear the threshold" contingency is described, the "if only one candidate clears that qualifying threshold" is not. What that means is that there is a backdoor winner-take-all option on the table in Idaho. And since the delegates -- all 32 of them including the automatic delegates -- are pooled Idaho is the one state before March 15 where just one candidate surpassing the qualifying threshold could net that candidate all of the delegates from that state. The others to this point on the calendar that have allowed for a backdoor winner-take-all option, but the allocation was split into statewide/at-large and congressional district delegates. That makes Idaho a potentially powerful, pre-March 15 piece in the allocation puzzle. Things would have to fall right -- a crowded field with little winnowing or separation between the candidates, for example -- but a potential +32 coming out of Idaho could be more valuable to a campaign than a split of, say, the 155 delegates in Texas.

Finally, Idaho also has a true winner-take-all trigger as well. Should one candidate win a majority of the vote statewide, that candidate would also be entitled to all of the delegates from the state. This may or may not be likely in a less crowded field. The last two winners in Idaho received more than 50% of the vote.1


Delegate allocation (at-large, congressional district and automatic delegates)
The Idaho Republican delegates will be proportionally allocated to candidates based on the outcome of the March 8 primary in the Gem state. Based on the last poll conducted on the race in Idaho (the late August 2015 Dan Jones and Associates survey2), the allocation would look something like this3:
  • Trump (28%) -- 32 delegates 
  • Carson (15%) -- 0 delegates
  • Bush (7%) -- 0 delegates
  • Cruz (7%) -- 0 delegates
  • Rubio (6%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Paul (5%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Christie (4%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Fiorina (3%) -- 0 delegates
  • Kasich (2%) -- 0 delegates
This captures the perfect storm sort of scenario for a backdoor winner-take-all allocation of the Idaho delegation. Trump would barely get half of the total necessary to win a true winner-take-all victory, but because he is the only candidate over 20% (in this simulated allocation), he would win all of the delegates from the state; a backdoor to a winner-take-all allocation.

The arrival at such an outcome is a bit unconventional in Idaho. The allocation calculation calls for the candidate's share of the vote to be divided by the total statewide vote. That would mean that Trump, in the above example, would only receive a 28% share -- or 9 -- of the total number of delegates. That is not winner-take-all by any account. However, the rules also call for the unallocated delegates -- those not allocated to Trump above -- to "be apportioned proportionally among candidates who clear the 20 percent threshold." That would award the remaining 23 delegates to Trump, giving him the full allotment of delegates.

Were the backdoor winner-take-all allocation trigger not tripped multiple candidates crossed the 20% barrier -- or none did -- the Idaho Republican Party rules are not clear on how the rounding would be handled (though the allocation would be proportional without any threshold). The only reference to rounding is that a candidate must have 20% of the vote to qualify. 19.9%, for instance, would not round up to 20% and qualify any such candidate for delegates.

It is not clear, then, if the rounding is always up to the next whole number or simply to the nearest whole number. Additionally, there is no outline for a sequence to the rounding procedure or a contingency for unallocated or over-allocated delegates. That contingency coming into play is a function of how many candidates clear the threshold. Anything more than two candidates raises the likelihood that there will be an under- or over-allocated delegate.

If, however, the threshold is lowered to 15% to include Ben Carson in the allocation, then Trump would round up to 9 delegates, Carson would round up to 5 and the remaining 18 delegates would be uncommitted. That is due to the allocation equation laid out in the Idaho Republican Party rules. Only candidates over the threshold qualify for delegates, but a candidate claims delegates based on their share of the statewide vote divided by the total statewide vote for all candidates, not just the qualifying candidates. If the threshold is lowered to 7% to pull in Bush and Cruz, then Trump and Carson would be allocated the same 9 and 5 delegates respectively and Bush and Cruz would both round down to 2 delegates each. 14 delegates would be unallocated and would remain uncommitted. While the rounding in Idaho retains some operational question marks, the combination of simple rounding rules -- rounding up above .5 and down below it -- and not allocating delegates for those under the 20% threshold simplifies things to some degree.


Binding
Though the party rules use pledged rather than bound, the intent is the same with regard to how the Idaho delegates act at the national convention. Delegates are bound to the candidate who "proposed them on their list" or were pledged to by the Idaho Republican Party Nominating Committee on the first ballot of the roll call voting at the national convention. Like Hawaii, the candidates have some say in who their Idaho delegates will be. Candidates submit a list delegate candidates  -- a slate essentially -- equal to 80% of the total delegation (26 delegates). Should a candidate win all of the delegates and/or fail to submit a list (or the requisite fee), then the Nominating Committee would select and pledge delegates to that candidate. In the event of a winner-take-all scenario, that would mean the remaining 20% of delegate slots not covered by the 80% slate. In the case of a candidate not filing a slate, that would mean how ever many delegates allocated to that candidate. In a straight proportional allocation of the delegates, the 80% slate is likely to contain enough delegates to cover the candidate. Again, that is 26 of the 32 delegates.

It is a little quirky, but it does highlight that the candidates would mostly retain some power over who their delegates are. That has implications for the national convention should it go beyond just one vote. Most of those delegates would be more loyal to the candidate than delegates selected and bound to a particular candidate but who prefer another.

Additionally, a candidate's withdrawal from the race or suspension of their campaign makes their delegates uncommitted. This is clear if the withdrawal/suspension occurs after the selection but before the convention. In that case, the Idaho Republican Party rules clearly release the delegates. However, if the withdrawal occurs before the selection process described above, then the Nominating Committee may fill those slots with as many uncommitted delegates as the withdrawing candidate was entitled to.


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State allocation rules are archived here.


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1 Granted, McCain had already wrapped up the nomination by the time Idaho voted in May 2008 and Romney benefitted from the aforementioned, quirky caucus allocation rules in 2012.

2 Though the 17% of respondents who fell into the "Don't Know"/undecided category in the Dan Jones poll would also not have qualified for delegates, distributing that fraction to other candidates in a primary could have pushed others over the 20% qualifying threshold.

3 This polling data is being used as an example of how delegates could be allocated under these rules in Idaho and not as a forecast of the outcome in the Gem state primary.



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Thursday, January 21, 2016

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: HAWAII

Updated 3.9.16

 This is part twenty-one of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

HAWAII

Election type: caucus
Date: March 8
Number of delegates: 19 [10 at-large, 6 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional (statewide and in congressional districts)
Threshold to qualify for delegates: No official threshold
2012: proportional caucus

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Changes since 2012
The Hawaii Republican Party rules for delegate allocation have not changed in any meaningful way as compared to the method the party operated under in 2012. The date -- the second Tuesday in March -- is the same and though Hawaii Republicans lost one at-large delegate from 2012, it is a change of just one delegate. But the small number of delegates at stake in the March 8 Hawaii Republican caucuses will be proportionally allocated based on the caucus results at both the state and congressional district level. Rather than pooling the 16 at-large and congressional district delegates, Hawaii Republicans will allocate both types separately. At-large delegates will be proportionally allocated based on the statewide results while the congressional district delegates will be awarded based on the outcome of the caucuses in each of the islands' two congressional districts.


Thresholds
There is no threshold in the Hawaii allocation process at either the state or congressional district level to qualify for delegates. However, the rounding method used by Republicans in the Aloha state both advantages the winner/top finishers and limits the number of candidates who will likely end up being allocated any delegates (see below for an illustration of this).


Delegate allocation (at-large delegates)
The Hawaii delegates will be proportionally allocated to candidates based on the outcome of the March 8 caucuses in the Aloha state. There has been no polling in the Hawaii race, but rather than make up numbers, FHQ will base the simulated allocation below on the data from ISideWith.com.1 Based on that data, the allocation of the 13 at-large and automatic delegates would look something like this2:
  • Trump (44%) -- 4.4 delegates [5 delegates]
  • Rubio (15%) -- 1.5 delegates [2 delegates]
  • Cruz (14%) -- 1.4 delegates [2 delegates]
  • Carson (10%) -- 1.0 delegates [1 delegate] 
  • Paul (5%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Bush (5%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Christie (4%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Fiorina (3%) -- 0 delegates
  • Kasich (2%) -- 0 delegates
This is where the rounding method is important. Fractional delegates always round up to the nearest whole number, but that means there is a threshold under which no one receives delegates and the last one over that barrier receives any leftover, unallocated delegates. That is because the rounding has a sequence, starting with the top votegetter and working downward through the list in the order of finish.

All of the candidates, then, round up to the next whole number despite, for example, Carson having a remainder less than .5. That leaves just one delegate left for Rand Paul by the time the sequence gets to him. Now, the junior Kentucky senator would have been allocated one delegate anyway based on pulling in 5% of the statewide vote. However, that is not the proper way of thinking about the Hawaii allocation because of the sequential rounding. Once the sequence gets to Paul, there is just one delegate left. It would be his.

Such a sequential method when coupled with always rounding up means that while there is no official threshold in Hawaii, an unofficial one will force itself into the allocation of the at-large delegates. Some candidate will be the last to be allocated delegates in the sequence and those behind that candidate will be left out of the allocation process. In this example then, that threshold is at 5%, but again, not officially.

Four years ago, all 11 at-large delegates were allocated to the top three candidates and Newt Gingrich, despite winning more than 10% of the vote had nothing to show for it. The unofficial threshold to win any delegates, then, was higher in 2012 -- around the 19% that Ron Paul received.

The main point here is not so much this threshold idea, but rather to point out that though there is no official threshold, there are limitations to who and how many candidates receive any delegates. And it should be noted that part of that is a function too of there being so few delegates in the first place.


Delegate allocation (congressional district delegates)
The same type of principle used in the allocation of the at-large delegates impacts the congressional district delegate allocation as well. There is no threshold, but as FHQ has said numerous times, there are only so many ways to proportionally allocate the three delegates the RNC apportions to each of a state's congressional districts.

The key to the allocation of the Hawaii congressional district delegates is in the rounding. Just as above, fractional delegates will be rounded up to the nearest whole number. If a candidate receives more than one-third of the vote in a congressional district, then that candidate will round up to two delegates in that district. The remaining delegate would be left to the candidate in second place in that district. If no candidate clears that 33.3% threshold in a congressional district, however, then the top three candidates would all be allocated one delegate.

This is a firmer threshold than the one discussed in the at-large example above. It is akin to some of the winner-take-all thresholds that exist in other states, but this one is specific to the allocation of two versus one delegate to the congressional district winner. To receive all three delegates -- to round up to all of them in a congressional district -- a winner would have to clear the roughly 67% barrier. That seems unlikely even with a winnowed field.


Delegate allocation
(automatic delegates)
Due to the new guidance from the RNC on the allocation and binding of the three automatic delegates, the Hawaii Republican Party could no longer leave them unbound. Rather than included them in the at-large pool of delegates as other states have done, the HIGOP has opted to separately allocated those three delegates based on the statewide results.


Given the above data from the simulation, Trump would receive two delegates and Rubio one.


Binding
Hawaii Republican delegates are bound by party rule Section 216 to candidates on the first roll call ballot at the national convention. However, those same party rules allow the candidates/campaigns some discretion in the delegate selection process. Delegates, then, may not be bound after the first ballot, but would likely remain loyal to their candidate in any subsequent vote. They would be pledged but not bound unless or until their candidate pulls his or her name from consideration.


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State allocation rules are archived here.


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1 I have no idea about the methodology at ISideWith. Again, this is just an exercise in how the allocation might look, but probably will not. Using their numbers is perhaps marginally better than me creating results. And yes, they sum to 102.

2 This data is being used as an example of how delegates could be allocated under these rules in Hawaii and not as a forecast of the outcome in the Aloha state caucuses.




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Tuesday, January 19, 2016

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: LOUISIANA

Updated 3.5.16

 This is part twenty of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

LOUISIANA

Election type: primary
Date: March 5
Number of delegates: 46 [25 at-large, 18 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional
Threshold to qualify for delegates: 20%1
2012: primary/caucus

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Changes since 2012
Digging down, there are a number of changes to the Louisiana Republican Party delegate allocation rules for 2016. First, the state legislature in the Pelican state moved the presidential primary up a couple of weeks to early March back in 2014. That shift preceded the regional push to form the SEC primary. Still, the Louisiana presidential primary will fall just a few days later, the weekend after a number of southern states hold contests on March 1.

Secondly, delegates will be more clearly allocated through the presidential primary election. Four years ago, the at-large delegates were allocated based on the statewide vote in the primary while the congressional district delegates remained officially unbound (after having been selected in district caucuses). Unlike four years ago, then, Louisiana Republicans have linked the allocation of delegates -- both at-large and congressional district -- to the results of the presidential primary. There are still district caucuses, but the voting there will in part select the delegates ultimately allocated and bound to candidates based on the primary results.


Thresholds
Another change is in the qualifying threshold. In 2012, a candidate had to receive 25% of the statewide vote to qualify for any of the at-large delegates at stake in Louisiana. For 2016, just 20% is necessary. That is the maximum qualifying threshold allowed by the RNC. [Truth be told, that was true in 2012 as well. Louisiana exceeded it.]

As has been witnessed in other states, that 20% barrier has a limiting effect on who and how many candidates actually qualify for delegates. In a crowded field, fewer candidates would likely cross the line. As the field winnows, however, that number increases, but only to a point. Only as many as five candidates could qualify and that is only in the event that all five tie at the top with exactly 20%. In other words, somewhere between one and four candidates are likely to be allocated any of the at-large delegates.

There is no similar threshold conditioning the allocation of congressional district delegates. Unless one candidate runs away from the rest in a congressional district, then functionally, the top three finishers in a district vote will be allocated one delegate each.

Additionally, Louisiana Republicans have not put a winner-take-all threshold in place. Even if a candidate were to win a majority of the vote either statewide or on the congressional district level, it would not trigger an allocation of all of the (unit-specific) delegates to that candidate. It is always proportional (by RNC rules) with some caveats.


Delegate allocation (at-large and automatic delegates)
The Louisiana delegates will be proportionally allocated to candidates based on the outcome of the March 5 primary in the Pelican state. Based on an earlier poll conducted on the race in Louisiana (the late September 2015 WWL-TV/Clarus survey), the allocation would look something like this2:
  • Carson (23%) -- 28 delegates
  • Trump (19%) -- 0 delegates
  • Bush (10%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Rubio (9%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Fiorina (7%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Cruz (6%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Huckabee (4%) -- 0 delegates 
  • Jindal (3%) -- 0 delegates
  • Kasich (3%) -- 0 delegates
  • Christie (2%) -- 0 delegates
The above allocation seems quite cut and dry: Ben Carson, using these numbers in Louisiana, would be the only candidate to qualify for at-large delegates. The retired neurosurgeon would be the only candidate north of the 20% threshold that Louisiana Republicans have in place to guide the delegate allocation there.

Appearance, however, might not match reality here because there is a lot left unsaid in the Louisiana delegate allocation rules. Yes, a candidate must receive at least 20% of the statewide vote to qualify for any of the 28 at-large and automatic delegates. Yet, the above simulated allocation -- a backdoor winner-take-all scenario statewide -- is not be how the allocation works in practice.

There is no contingency specified in the event that only one candidate surpasses the threshold.3 And that, in turn, leaves some of this to interpretation. The way FHQ has treated other states in similar situations is that if only one candidate clears the threshold, then that candidate claims all of those delegates -- either at-large and/or congressional district -- unless explicitly prohibited by the state party rules.

Well, there is no such prohibition in Louisiana. In fact, the language of the rule is pretty important here (Rule 4c).
...each Republican candidate for President who has qualified for the 2016 Presidential Preference Primary Election may submit a list of 46 potential at-large delegates and alternate delegates. Presidential candidates receiving more than 20% of the statewide vote on Primary Election Day will be allocated the same proportion, rounded by the Executive Committee, of all 23 at-large delegates and alternate delegates...
That actually indirectly prohibits a backdoor winner-take-all allocation to Ben Carson in the simulation above. Carson would only be allocated his raw percentage of the at-large delegates (using the statewide vote rather than the qualifying vote as the denominator in the allocation equation). In other words, rather than receiving all 28 of the at-large delegates (for being the only qualifying candidate), Carson would only net 23% of those 28 delegates. That is just 6.44 delegates, a far cry from the 28 above.

The catch is that the Louisiana Republican Party Executive Committee has the ambiguous discretion of rounding the delegate totals. That and the above fact about raw percentages matter whether there is just one candidate above the 20% qualifying threshold or multiple candidates (as is likely the case with a March 5 contest). Without adjusting the denominator in the allocation equation from the total votes cast to just the votes of the qualifying candidates, the Louisiana Republican Party has quietly and within the RNC rules, mind you, created a group of unbound delegates.

In the above example, Carson would get 6 or 7 at-large delegates depending on how the Executive Committee rounds that 6.44. Again, the committee has the latitude to set that allocation. But it is based on the "same proportion" of the vote that Carson received statewide. That leaves 21 or 22 unallocated delegates. Those would theoretically be delegates selected and sent to the national convention unbound (but not necessarily unpledged).

Now, that leaves a couple of items to note. First, this is quite reminiscent of the 2012 Louisiana delegate allocation rules with regard to at-large delegates. The congressional district delegates were unbound in Louisiana four years ago. But second, there likely will not be such a large number of unallocated delegates. Again, by March 5 there is likely to have been some winnowing of the field. With that shrinking of the field, the chances of a smaller group of candidates qualifying for delegates -- more than one but fewer than five -- increases.

But even if that threshold is relaxed to 10% -- so that both Trump and Bush, using the polling data above, qualify for delegates -- the three of them only add to 52% of the vote. That means that, depending on the rounding by the LAGOP Executive Committee, approximately 48% of the at-large delegates (13 delegates of 28) would be unallocated to candidates and thus unbound for the national convention.

Is that hugely consequential? In the grand scheme of things -- the race to 1237 -- probably not. However, this is yet another little wildcard to file away for when the process gets to Louisiana. But the bottom line is that this seemingly was a move by the Louisiana Republican Party to comply with the RNC rules, but retain something similar to the way the party had allocated delegates in the past. Then again, perhaps LAGOP was not that sophisticated.


Delegate allocation (congressional district delegates)
Where the state party lost some discretion on that score is in the allocation of congressional district delegates. Four years ago, those delegates were elected in congressional district caucuses and were left unbound heading into the national convention in Tampa. For 2016, those delegates will selected at the state convention based on the results of the March 5 primary in each of the six congressional districts in the Pelican state.

The same 20% threshold to qualify for at-large delegates does not apply to the allocation of congressional district delegates. Instead, there is no qualifying threshold. Again, as has been mentioned elsewhere, there are only so many ways to proportionally allocate three congressional district delegates. Even with no threshold, then, this type of allocation tends to function as if it was a top three system: the top three candidates all are allocated one delegate. The exception is if one candidate wins a majority of the vote within a congressional district. In that case, such a candidate would round up and qualify for two delegates.4 Whether a candidate reaches that majority threshold, though, greatly depends on the extent to which the field has winnowed ahead of the Louisiana primary.


Binding
At-large and congressional district delegates who are bound to candidates will be bound to them only on the first ballot of the roll call nomination vote in Cleveland (see Rule 4f). Furthermore, delegates of candidates who have suspended their campaign are no longer bound to those candidates on that initial roll call vote.


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State allocation rules are archived here.


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1 The 20% threshold is used by the Louisiana Republican Party to determine which candidates qualify for the statewide, at-large delegates. Though the party rules state that there are just 23 at-large delegates, citing Rule 14, there are 25 at-large delegates apportioned to the state by virtue of the RNC rules. The congressional district delegates are allocated to candidates based on the vote within those districts but with no threshold.

2 This poll is being used as an example of how delegates could be allocated under these new rules in Louisiana and not as a forecast of the outcome in the Pelican state primary.

3 More alarming, perhaps, is that there is no provision spelling out the allocation process if no candidate clears 20%.

4 That is something of a leap in reasoning considering that the rounding rules are unspecified. If the rounding is always up, regardless of the fraction, then a candidate could round up to two delegates with just a little less than 34% of the vote in a congressional district. All that is known for sure is that the Executive Committee does not explicitly have the same latitude in the rounding of congressional district delegates as it does in at-large delegates.



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Wednesday, January 13, 2016

Bill Has Nebraska Mulling an Earlier Presidential Primary

...for 2020.

Earlier this week, Nebraska state Senator John Murante (49th, Gretna) introduced legislation -- LB 871 -- that would create a new presidential primary election in the Cornhusker state, separating it from the mid-May, consolidated primary.1 The proposal would move the separate presidential primary to the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March.

This is not all that unusual. Yes, it is a bit more forward looking than is typically the case. Bills shifting the dates of presidential primaries pop up every year, but they most heavily populate the introduced bills lists in the year before a presidential election. Still, there are always a handful of bills that appear as the primaries themselves are ongoing; during a presidential election year. But over the course of the last three cycles -- 2004, 2008 and 2012 -- nothing has passed.2 In most cases, actors on the state level take a wait and see approach; waiting to see how the current cycle goes before making a decision on a future one.

What is more interesting, though equally forward thinking, is how legislators across the country will react to 2016 in 2017 but especially in 2019. The SEC primary may or may not have proven successful in 2016. If it is, other states and regions may scramble to the front without the southern states moving back, creating a more robust Super Tuesday that resembles a national primary (see 2008). But the SEC primary may fall flat and organically cause actors in some of those states (and others outside the region) to reconsider their positioning or consider what spot on the calendar maximizes their voters' voices in the process.

...something the Nebraska bill's sponsor mentioned as a reason for proposing the change.

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1 The move is expected to cost the state $1.5 million if the bill is passed and signed into law.

2 Unless you count Idaho eliminating the presidential primary portion of their May consolidated primary because both parties were caucusing instead.


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Saturday, January 9, 2016

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: KENTUCKY

Updated 3.5.16

 This is part nineteen of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

KENTUCKY

Election type: caucus
Date: March 5
Number of delegates: 46 [25 at-large, 18 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional
Threshold to qualify for delegates: 5%
2012: proportional primary

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Changes since 2012
The big-ticket allocation rules changes for Kentucky Republicans in 2016 are that the party abandoned its typical mid- to late May primary for early March caucuses. If that was not enough, the party also chose to continue allocating its national convention delegates in a proportionate fashion  but dropped its threshold for qualifying for delegates from 15% of the statewide vote to 5%.

The changes mean that the process in the Bluegrass state will function differently in 2016 than it has in the past. A later primary, despite being proportional, often ended up featuring a winner-take-all allocation because a presumptive Republican nominee had emerged and no other candidate received more than 15% of the statewide vote (in order to qualify for delegates). But by moving their delegate selection event up to a spot on the calendar -- on the heels of the SEC primary four days prior -- Kentucky Republicans have shifted into a much more competitive portion of the process. And by dropping the threshold to just 5%, the party has constructed a set of rules likely to allocate delegates to more than one candidate.


Thresholds
Mathematically, all eleven candidates who qualified for the caucus ballot in Kentucky could win delegates with or without the 5% threshold. Realistically though, over a month into the primary calendar, the field is likely to have winnowed, separating viable candidates -- and perhaps favorite son, Rand Paul -- from the rest. But while that may limit the number of candidates who ultimately qualify for delegates, that number will almost certainly be more than one as the Kentucky primary allocation has often been toward the end of the primary calendar. And that number of candidates is much more likely to be higher with a 5% threshold than the 15% threshold utilized by the Republican Party of Kentucky in the past or the maximum 20% threshold used by some states before Kentucky on the calendar.


Delegate allocation (at-large, congressional district and automatic delegates)
The Kentucky delegates will be proportionally allocated to candidates based on the outcome of the March 5 caucuses across the Bluegrass state. Based on an earlier poll conducted on the race in Kentucky (the mid-June 2015 Public Policy Polling survey), the allocation would look something like this1:
  • Paul (19%) -- 10.659 delegates (11 delegates)
  • Bush (13%) -- 7.293 delegates (7 delegates)
  • Trump (12%) -- 6.732 delegates (7 delegates)
  • Walker (11%) -- 6.171 delegates (6 delegates)
  • Rubio (10%) -- 5.610 delegates (6 delegates)
  • Huckabee (10%) -- 5.610 delegates (6 delegates)
  • Carson (7%) -- 3.927 delegates (4 delegates)
  • Cruz (4%) -- 0 delegates
  • Fiorina (4%) -- 0 delegates
The allocation above uses the total number of votes cast for qualifying candidates -- those above 5% of the caucus vote -- as its denominator. That allocates all 46 delegates to seven candidates. Actually, it over-allocates those delegates. After that rounding, 47 delegates have been awarded to the qualifying candidates. In the event of such a situation, the superfluous delegate is taken away from the candidate who is furthest from the (.5) rounding threshold. In this simulation, that would be Walker, who has a remainder of .171.2

In the case of an unallocated delegate, the candidate closest to the rounding threshold would receive that left over last delegate. One would assume that means closest to but not over the rounding threshold, but that is not made clear in the current Republican Party of Kentucky (RPK) rules. If both conditions are necessary -- closest to and under the rounding threshold -- then Bush would claim a hypothetical 47th delegate given the data above (and if there was an unallocated delegate).

This rounding scheme most closely resembles the one used by Virginia Republicans. Unlike others -- see Kansas for instance -- the rounding method is not one that favors the winner or the top votegetters.


Binding
Kentucky delegates to the Republican National Convention will be bound to their respective candidates based on the March 5 caucus results through the first roll call vote on the presidential nomination.

Those delegates bound by the caucus results to candidates who subsequently withdraw from the race initially become uncommitted (unbound). However, at the call of the delegation chairman at the national convention, the delegates (both bound and "released"/uncommitted) will convene a meeting, hold a secret ballot vote and bind those "released"/uncommitted delegates to a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination. Basically, this is a vote among the Kentucky delegates to reallocate those uncommitted delegates. The reallocation of that N number of uncommitted delegates is done in proportion to the secret ballot vote.

It should be noted that delegates can vote for any candidate in this intra-delegation vote and not necessarily the candidate to whom they are bound for the presidential nomination roll call vote. If, for example, Rand Paul drops out of the presidential race, then those 10 delegates would first become uncommitted and then reallocated and bound by the Kentucky delegation. Those delegates would be allocated to some number of the six remaining candidates if all of them were still in the race. In the event that just one candidate remains, the delegation would likely vote to deliver all of the delegate votes to the remaining candidate. If all six were involved still, then Bush-bound delegates, for instance, would not have to cast their votes in the secret ballot vote for Bush. They could vote for any remaining candidate.

And it should be noted that the newly uncommitted delegates (in that state because of a candidate withdrawal) take part in that vote. That makes that bloc important; particularly if it votes as a bloc. In other words, they have some say in the candidate to whom some of them would end up bound.


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State allocation rules are archived here.


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1 This poll is being used as an example of how delegates could be allocated under these new rules in Kentucky and not as a forecast of the outcome in the Bluegrass state caucuses.

2 There is no contingency plan in place that is readily apparent in the RPK rules for breaking any ties like the one between Rubio and Huckabee here.


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Thursday, January 7, 2016

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: KANSAS

This is part eighteen of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

KANSAS

Election type: caucus
Date: March 5
Number of delegates: 40 [25 at-large, 12 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional
Threshold to qualify for delegates: 10% (both statewide and within the congressional districts)
2012: proportional caucuses

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Changes since 2012
The Kansas Republican Party delegate selection rules for 2016 only subtly differ from the rules used four years ago. For the most part, the change is a function of the national party change to the definition of "proportional". Just as in 2012, the Kansas caucuses will fall within the proportionality window, but to be proportional in 2016, Sunflower state Republicans had to make some changes. Again, it was subtle.

Just as in 2012, the allocation of the 25 at-large delegates will be proportional based on the statewide vote. Unlike four years ago, however, Kansas Republicans can no longer allocate congressional district delegates in a winner-take-all fashion and remain proportional. That was allowed in 2012 so long as the at-large delegates were awarded in a proportionate manner. The big change for Kansas, then, is that the three congressional district delegates in each of the four districts will be divvied up between qualifying candidates in 2016.


Thresholds
Another change is in the threshold that candidates must meet in order to qualify for delegates. In 2012, the Kansas Republican Party set that at the maximum 20%. Again, the congressional district delegates were winner-take-all, but to receive any of those 25 at-large delegates in 2012, a candidate had to receive at least 20% of the vote. Only winner, Rick Santorum, and runner-up, Mitt Romney, made the cut.

That qualifying share of the vote has been cut in half for 2016. Had the threshold been set at 10% in 2012, then both Newt Gingrich and Ron Paul would have joined Santorum and Romney in qualifying for at-large delegates.

Additionally, that 10% threshold applies to not only the allocation of at-large delegates, but congressional district delegates as well. There is no winner-take-all trigger at either level, nor is there the possibility of a backdoor winner-take-all scenario. Should only one candidate or no candidates clear the 10% threshold, then the allocation functions as if there is no threshold. Kansas Republicans have more clearly than some other states -- see many of the SEC primary states on March 1 -- written a backdoor winner-take-all prohibition into their rules.


Delegate allocation (at-large delegates)
The at-large delegates -- 25 delegates in total -- will be proportionally allocated to candidates based on the outcome of the March 5 caucuses across Kansas. Based on the last poll conducted on the race in Kansas (the late September 2014 USA Today/Suffolk poll), the allocation would look something like this1:
  • Bush (15%) -- 13 delegates
  • Huckabee (14%) -- 12 delegates
  • Christie (9%) -- 0 delegates
  • Cruz (8%) -- 0 delegates
  • Perry (7%) -- 0 delegates
  • Paul (6%) -- 0 delegates
  • Rubio (6%) -- 0 delegates
  • Ryan (6%) -- 0 delegates
  • Walker (4%) -- 0 delegates
  • Santorum (2%) -- 0 delegates
  • Jindal (1%) -- 0 delegates
Only Bush and Huckabee surpass the 10% barrier, and are thus the only candidates to qualify for any of the 25 at-large delegates. Bush would round up to 13 delegates and Huckabee would take the remainder. The rounding scheme the Kansas Republican Party uses always rounds up and then works in a downward sequence based on how the candidates placed in the vote count. Even in a situation in which Bush received just one more vote than Huckabee (and assuming they were still the only two candidates to qualify), that small fractional advantage would always round Bush up to the next whole number. This is made slightly easier by an odd number of at-large delegates.

It goes without saying, perhaps, that this method of rounding gives advantages to the top votegetter(s). Whoever ends up as the last remaining qualifying candidate often will get the short end of the stick, receiving only the delegate leftovers by the time the allocation sequence gets to them.


Delegate allocation (congressional district delegates)
Counter to the Republican National Committee summary of the Kansas Republican Party delegate rules, the congressional district delegates are allocated in the same manner as the at-large delegates, but based on the vote count in the congressional districts rather than statewide. Candidates qualify for congressional district delegates if clear 10% of the vote within a district. If only one candidate or no candidates have more than 10% of the vote, then allocation is done as if there was no threshold. If the above poll numbers are extended to the congressional district level that would mean Bush would be allocated two delegates and Huckabee the remaining delegate from a district.

That same 2:1, Bush to Huckabee allocation ratio would hold even if Chris Christie, for instance, received 10% of the vote and qualified for delegates. Under that scenario, Christie would qualify for delegates, but due to the rounding scheme be left out. Again, the rounding is always up to the nearest whole number starting with the top finisher and working sequentially downward. Bush would round up to two delegates and Huckabee would take the remaining delegate. This would be true at the congressional district level in all cases except for one where the top three are exactly tied. Functionally, then, the allocation of Kansas delegates at the congressional district follows the top two method being used in states like Alabama and Georgia.

As with the at-large delegates statewide, there is no route to a backdoor winner-take-all allocation at the congressional district level. The Kansas rules expressly prohibit the winner-take-all scenario in which only one candidate clears the qualifying threshold.


Delegate allocation (automatic delegates)
The automatic delegates -- state party chair, national committeeman and national committeewoman -- from the Kansas Republican Party delegation are allocated and bound to the statewide winner of the caucuses on March 5. In the scenario above, those three delegates would be awarded to Jeb Bush. This is yet another advantage the winner accrues embedded in the Kansas Republican delegate selection rules.


Binding
The Kansas delegation will be bound to the candidates who qualified for delegates based on the results of the March 5 caucuses. That binding holds until a candidate releases their delegates. That could occur during primary season after the Kansas caucuses or through several ballots at the national convention in Cleveland. Unlike most other states, Kansas Republicans have not set a specific number of roll call ballots after which Sunflower state delegates will be relieved of their binding. Instead, that release is left to the discretion the candidate.


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State allocation rules are archived here.


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1 This admittedly outdated poll is being used as an example of how delegates could be allocated under these new rules in Kansas and not as a forecast of the outcome in the Sunflower state caucuses.



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Monday, January 4, 2016

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: NORTH DAKOTA

This is part seventeen of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

 NORTH DAKOTA

Election type: caucus/convention
Date: by March 11

Number of delegates: 28 [22 at-large, 3 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: determined by state convention
Threshold to qualify for delegates: n/a
2012: non-binding caucuses

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Changes since 2012
Like Colorado and Wyoming, Republicans in North Dakota will skip the caucus-level preference vote that had in the past been part and parcel of the standard delegate selection procedure in those states. But in 2016, such straw polls, under RNC rules, would bind those states' national convention delegates. That was not the case in 2012 or before. So whereas in 2012, Colorado, North Dakota and Wyoming all held a preference vote at some juncture in their respective delegate selection processes, the delegates were not bound to any particular candidate (at least not in a way that corresponded with outcome of the straw poll).

That the ultimate delegate selection and allocation did not line up with the original vote in the precinct/district/county caucuses led to some variation in how those states were treated in the 2012 delegate count. Too often those delegate slots were prematurely allocated to particular candidates before the delegates were actually selected at a congressional district or state convention. That discrepancy and the resultant chase for these fantasy delegates (in part) prompted the Republican National Committee to include in the rules package the 2012 national convention in Tampa voted through a provision that tethered the allocation of delegates to any statewide vote in a primary or caucus.

But there was no requirement in the RNC rules for states to actually hold a preference vote; only an assumption that states would have one.

The biggest change for North Dakota, then, is that Republicans in the Peace Garden state have opted to join Colorado, Wyoming, the American Samoa and Guam in not conducting a preference vote in 2016.


Delegate allocation/Binding 
North Dakota Republicans, though, are a bit different than their counterparts in Colorado and Wyoming. No, none of the three will have a presidential preference vote at any point in the caucus/convention process, but only North Dakota will have a truly unbound delegation. That is a function of how delegate candidates file to run as delegates. Part of the filing paperwork for potential delegates in Colorado and Wyoming is a section asking the delegate candidate the presidential candidate to whom they are or will be pledged. The Republican National Committee is binding those delegates selected in Colorado and Wyoming to the candidates to whom they are pledged. The only way to circumvent that stipulation is for a delegate to either refuse to pledge (or to run as uncommitted) or to have the candidate they were pledged to withdraw from the race (as is the case in other states).

Again, though, North Dakota Republicans operate under a different set of rules.2 There is no delegate filing process in North Dakota similar to the paperwork delegate candidates file in Colorado or Wyoming. Rather, the North Dakota Republican Party Committee on Permanent Organization (NDGOP CPO) will put forth a slate of delegates to be voted on at the April state convention. The governor and any members of Congress from North Dakota -- if Republican -- are automatically presented on the slate.

Otherwise, delegates can apply with the NDGOP CPO prior to the convention to be on the slate or be nominated from the floor. The catch to that latter route -- nomination from the floor of the state convention -- is that a delegate candidate nominated from the floor must have applied with the NDGOP CPO but not included in the slate presented by the committee.

That places a premium on having applied to the committee in the first place. However, that also highlights the fact that applying does not mean inclusion on the slate.

Let's try to lay this out a bit more clearly. There were more than 800 delegates and attendees at the 2014 North Dakota Republican state convention. We'll use that number. If we assume that all 800 state convention delegates apply with the NDGOP CPO to be national convention delegates, then there is a pool of 800 candidates (plus any Republican governor and members of Congress) to be included in that original slate of 25 presented to the convention. 3 Once that 25 delegate slate is presented to the state convention additions can be made from the floor from the remaining 775 potential delegate candidates who originally applied with the NDGOP CPO. If half of those -- or any number for that matter -- are nominated from the floor, those names will be added to the ballot the convention will vote on. Furthermore, those names will be added to the ballot in order of nomination and after the slate of 25 delegate candidates who were presented to the convention by the NDGOP CPO.

If a lot of names are added -- say the 400 mentioned above -- then those first 25 from the original slate and those delegate candidates with better name recognition among the state convention delegates will stand a better chance of making it through the vote. Only the top 25 in the vote count would be elected national convention delegates.

This would be slightly more complicated if there was an organized rival slate put forth to challenge the slate presented by the state party through the NDGOP CPO. That would theoretically limit the number of potential delegate candidates appearing on the ballot, making it easier for sides to marshal their supporters behind certain slates.

FHQ raises this issue -- the importance of the slate and the parameters behind its selection -- because the 2012 North Dakota Republican state convention was rather contentious. The slate that was presented to the state convention did not align with the vote in the precinct caucuses that had taken place a month prior. Instead of a slate that favored Santorum and Paul to Romney, the slate was weighted more toward elected officials, donors and volunteers, delegate candidates more likely to favor the eventual nominee and former Massachusetts governor.

This footnote from the 2012 Republican presidential nomination process is worth raising in 2016. First, though they are not bound, the delegates to ultimately be chosen at the North Dakota Republican state convention are most likely to be pledged to some candidate. That pledge means some measure of loyalty to a candidate, but also some freedom at a national convention.

Under normal circumstances that process tends to function in a similar fashion to how delegates accrued by candidates and subsequently released do: They vote for the presumptive nominee at the national convention. But in a more contested environment, both an unbound but pledged group of North Dakota delegates and an unbound group of released delegates from any number of other states will be free to vote for whichever candidate they choose on the first roll call ballot at the national convention.

In the meantime, district conventions will be occurring across North Dakota between now and March 1 to select delegates to attend the state convention in April. That group of state convention delegates will make the decision on who comprises the national convention delegation. Both the membership of the state convention and the state of the overall race for the Republican nomination in early April will have a bearing on who those delegates are and more importantly with whom they are aligned.



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State allocation rules are archived here.


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1 By state party rules, district conventions to select delegates to attend the state convention are to be held between January 1 and March 1 in the year of a presidential election. The North Dakota Republican (Endorsing) state convention that will choose the national delegate slate will fall on April 1-3, 2016.

2 Here are the relevant sections of Rule 11 of the North Dakota Republican Party Rules (as revised on June 6, 2015):

3 That is 28 total delegates minus the three automatic delegates.



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