Now that the Republican presidential primary process has entered March and hit hyperdrive, many are beginning to more closely examine the rules changes the Republican National Committee (and the Republican National Convention in Tampa) made for the 2016 cycle. At the core of that is a simple question: How have the rules impacted the progress of the race?
The answer to that simple question, however, is not so simple. Some have blamed the proportionality requirement at the beginning of the March part of the primary calendar. Others have pointed the finger at the newly compressed 2016 primary calendar for the results in the contests to date. The problem is that both of those explanations miss the mark by failing to take a deeper look at what has really changed with the rules for 2016 and how that has affected the actual delegate count. Both arguments basically hide behind the complexity of both changes without really offering an adequate answer to the original question.
There are at least two other explanations that better explain the differences in the delegate counts at similar points in the 2012 and 2016 cycles.
1) Texas
The Texas primary -- and its 155 delegates -- were in May in 2012. Think about that. That is 155 delegates that were virtually at the end of the 2012 process. In fact, it was those Texas delegates that pushed Mitt Romney past the 1144 delegates he needed to clinch the Republican nomination four years ago.
But the Texas primary was only scheduled for May because a redistricting dispute in the courts forced its delay. Originally, it was planned -- by state law -- for the first Tuesday in March. Just like this cycle (and every other one from 2008 back to 1988).1
With Texas back to normal in March for the 2016 cycle, those 155 delegates -- 12.5% of the number of delegates required to clinch the nomination -- ended up at a considerably earlier point on the calendar than had been the case since the 1988 Southern Super Tuesday. Not only was the Texas primary earlier for 2016, but the Lone Star state had a favorite son vying for the nomination. Without those 104 delegates, that favorite son -- Ted Cruz -- would not be in nearly the favorable position in the delegate count as he is at this point in early March on the calendar.
Cruz would lose 56 delegates to Donald Trump. That is the surplus he had over the real estate tycoon in the Texas delegate count. Furthermore, he would lose the 101 delegate advantage he had over Marco Rubio leaving Texas. Without an early Texas primary win, Cruz would not be as close to Trump in the delegate count and would be closer to Rubio and third place in the delegate count than Trump in first. In other words, Cruz would look a lot more like Gingrich and Santorum did relative to Romney in 2012.
It just cannot be understated how important that Texas win was for Cruz. And no, the position of the Texas primary on the 2016 calendar had nothing to do with the Republican rules changes in Tampa and thereafter.
2) Unbound delegates
While the Texas factor is not a rules-based change, there is one rules change that to this point has taken a back seat to other explanations; those arguing that the course of the 2016 Republican presidential nomination race is a function of proportional rules and/or a compressed calendar. The focus on those two changes is mostly misguided as the national party rules changes -- particularly with regard to proportional delegate allocation -- did not really yield that much change in the state-level rules. It has not to this point anyway.
The one thing that many are missing that has actually more directly affected (made things appear more competitive) the current delegate count relative to the one four years ago, is the new binding requirement the RNC instituted for the 2016 cycle. Gone is the fraction of automatic delegates who were more like superdelegates four years ago. Gone are the fantasy delegates from all those non-binding caucuses. Those delegates are mostly bound or will be bound in 2016. Iowa, Minnesota and Maine (and eventually Washington and Missouri) were all non-binding in 2012. Not in 2016. In the case of those first three, the delegates were allocated proportionally with either no or a very low threshold. That is making the delegate count more competitive. Delegates were allocated to a larger number of candidates in 2016 rather than being unbound as they were in 2012.
That is not necessarily affecting the gap between candidates in the current delegate count, but it is providing more delegates to more candidates instead of no candidates.
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What effect have those two changes had on the delegate count cycle over cycle from 2012 to 2016?
If one backs out the Texas delegates and the unbound delegates (based on the formerly non-binding caucus state that have conducted caucuses at this time) from the 2016 count, 2016 looks even more like 2012. Cruz is, perhaps, a stronger version of Santorum (each won/has won multiple states) and Rubio is a weaker Gingrich (still each has/had two wins). Kasich stands in as Ron Paul; not winning contests, but winning delegates. Here is what that comparison looks like:
2016 (25 states)
Trump: 391
Cruz: 221
Rubio: 126
Kasich: 51
Unbound: 17
2012 (26 binding states, 32 total)
Romney: 454 R
Santorum: 172 S
Gingrich: 138 G
Paul: 27 P
Unbound/Unpledged: 2922
Again, there has been no accounting for the calendar changes -- other than a non-rules-based shift of the Texas primary -- or proportionality rules in this. In this exercise, the Texas delegates have been removed from the 2016 total as have the formerly unbound delegates in now-binding Iowa, Maine and Minnesota. The picture that leaves is one where the delegate leaders are within about 50 delegates of each other. Perhaps that is attributable to a newly compressed calendar and/or (an admittedly smaller) proportionality window in 2016. But a strong argument could also be made that the differences in the leaders' totals at similar points on the calendars in 2012 and 2016 is explained by a weaker frontrunner in 2016 than in 2012. That seems to be demonstrated by what looks like a basically 50 delegate shift between first and second place in 2012 versus 2016.
This is a surface level exercise, but it is quite suggestive.
Blame the rules?
Not really. The rules in 2016 -- as has been the case for the rules of the Republican process in the past -- are still designed to aid frontrunners/winners; to ease the way to a presumptive nominee. That is still happening.
The bottom line is that the rules changes have had an effect, but not in the way that many think. Maybe the finger should be pointed not at the compressed calendar and the proportional rules, but somewhere else instead.
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1 Texas did shift from the second week in March to the first week in March in its law ahead of the 2004 cycle, but that change was delayed until 2008. From 1988-2004, then, Texas was on the second week in March on the calendar.
2 That this number is so much higher is a function of there being six more contests in 2012 than in 2016. Those non-binding contests drove up the total number of delegates.
Showing posts with label 2012 presidential election. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2012 presidential election. Show all posts
Friday, March 11, 2016
Thursday, November 19, 2015
A Request: Don't Use the RCP Delegate Interactive Tool as a Mobile Brokered Convention Production Unit
Over the last couple of days FHQ has been asked our thoughts on the Delegate Allocation Interactive Tool at Real Clear Politics.
It's great!
Sean Trende and David Byler have done yeoman's work in not only putting this thing together, but in putting it out there for public consumption. Having put a couple of delegate allocation models together during primary season in 2012, I can tell you that it is, at best, an imperfect science.1 Juggling all of the various factors embedded in the patchwork of delegate allocation rules across the entire country is no easy task. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't try.
However, it does mean that one has to make assumptions about certain factors of the system to model it properly/accurately (see for instance the variation in delegate rounding). And while those assumptions can potentially be fodder for criticism, FHQ would rather take the tool for what it is: an instrument to help us better understand the complexities of the rules, how they are differently implemented across states, and maybe what that means for the 2016 race.
[NOTE: And FHQ really cannot stress enough how open Sean and David are to any and all comments, feedback, perspectives and alternate approaches/assumptions about this thing. This is a first pass. And having spoken with them while they began putting this together, they are intent on improving it into and through primary season.]
--
But it is that maybe above that is of some overall concern to FHQ. The reactions to this thing have been positive from what I have seen, but I do wonder how people will approach this thing. My fear is that it ends up overemphasizing or artificially inflating the odds (in terms of perceptions on the individual level) of the various contested convention scenarios out there (see for instance this). That overemphasis tends to be on the outcome rather than the input. By input I mean plugging in poll numbers that traditionally have not been predictive at this stage of past races and more importantly the role of winnowing in the process. And that latter option is available, but I wonder how often users will account for those effects. It is relatively easy to produce a contested convention outcome if you carry 14 candidates through the process or even five. But is that the likely path? FHQ does not know to be honest. However, past results point toward a sequential process -- like the one that is still in place for 2016 -- gradually winnowing the field like kids in Willy Wonka's chocolate factory.
This is FHQ's way of saying that this delegate allocation interactive tool is a very powerful one and its utility will be derived from how it is used. So rather than be critical, let's put the gadget to use in testing a hypothesis.
FHQ likes to talk about rules. Perhaps you have noticed. And there have been some changes to the delegate allocation rules employed by the Republican National Committee between 2012 and 2016. The gadget give us the chance to -- in a very rough way -- estimate the impact of those rules changes. The premise is simple: Take the 2012 primary results, plug them into the tool and see how the path/outcome differs.
There are a lot of questions that come out of this. Does the smaller proportionality window slow down Romney's march to the nomination? Does the tighter definition of proportionality come to the aid of his opponents? Do the winner-take-all states clustered on March 15-22 push Romney over the top? Are the SEC primary states winnowers and the northeastern states coalesced in late April the deciders as Trende and Byler hypothesize?
Before FHQ digs into that, a few notes. First, this, too, is an imperfect approach. The rules are different and so is the sequence of contests. That means that late 2012 states that are early in 2016 have lopsided results that favor Romney (see Arkansas, Kentucky, Texas and Utah). Similarly there are early 2012 states that are later in 2016 where results are likely imprecisely competitive during a likely less competitive part of the calendar (see Washington). There are also some of the warts in the tool's code in this early stage. For instance, the gadget allocates delegates from states like Colorado, North Dakota and Wyoming, where it will remain unknown for quite a while -- perhaps up to the convention -- just how many delegates are actually bound to what candidates (in the eyes of the RNC).
Still, there is some utility to be gained in gaming this out despite that.
Here's how this ends up looking:
Please note that Trump = Romney, Carson = Santorum, Rubio = Gingrich, Cruz = Ron Paul, Rand Paul = Perry and Bush = Hunstman.
So Romney still wins. The former Republican nominee would have received 1527 delegates given the caveats detailed above, but also without counting any of the 135 RNC/automatic delegates that are mostly left unbound through the RCP gadget. There are actually 168 of those automatic delegates. Approximately 40% of those delegates are actually bound based on primary or caucus results. The remainder would be unbound. But even without some of those bound automatic delegates, Romney still wins comfortably. His nearest competitor -- Santorum -- ends up with just a quarter of Romney's delegate total. Furthermore, Romney's total competition only amasses a little less than half of his delegate total together.
Well, sure, if a candidate wins 42 out of 56 contests, that candidate is probably going to win the nomination. There's no big surprise there.
The map is nice, but how does this look if we examine the pace with which the candidates accrue delegates over the course of primary season? As it was in 2012, Romney used a win in winner-take-all Florida to establish a lead in the delegate count that widened to roughly a 3:1 ratio after Super Tuesday on March 6, was more firmly established toward the end of March when 50% of the delegates had been allocated, and was solidified by the northeastern primaries in late April.
By the time 75% of the delegates had been allocated -- the week prior to the Texas primary -- Romney all but had the nomination clinched. Texas on May 29 put him over the top. The southern winnowers/northern deciders hypothesis Trende and Byler proffer is basically the 50-75 rule, but perhaps a less precise one, FHQ would argue. But that was basically what the system produced in 2012 under the 2012 rules.
How does this change when the 2016 rules (and calendar) are inserted and combined with the 2012 primary results?
The quick answer is not much. The longer version is it changes but only in a very subtle fashion. With no winner-take-all Florida, Romney would not have broken away from the pack in the same way. Sure, he had the advantage, pulling away from everyone else individually after what would have been the SEC primary. But if we shift our focus to the contested convention scenario, all of Romney competition combined were still neck and neck with Romney after the hypothetical March 1 contests.
That would change after the proportionality window closes and winner-take-all contests are introduced on March 15. Notice how Romney -- already apart from all the other candidates -- separates from even the combined "Anti-Romney" line (in purple). The former Republican nominee's lead only increases from there (after the 50% allocation point), jumping after the northeastern series of contests on April 19-26, but not clinching the nomination until the Oregon primary on May 17. That is about two weeks ahead of where Romney clinched in 2012 under the 2012 rules. Additionally, he does not arrive at that threshold until after the 75% allocation point that is crossed in the northeastern states.
Again, there are caveats to this, but the change in rules from 2012 to 2016 do not bring significant changes to either the outcome of the 2012 Republican nomination race or how the process arrived at its conclusion. What we can say is that the rules changes did not result in a contested convention.
But different inputs in 2016 may alter things. Still, use those winnowing buttons at RCP, folks.
--
1 You can find more details on those models here and here (WSJ).
It's great!
Sean Trende and David Byler have done yeoman's work in not only putting this thing together, but in putting it out there for public consumption. Having put a couple of delegate allocation models together during primary season in 2012, I can tell you that it is, at best, an imperfect science.1 Juggling all of the various factors embedded in the patchwork of delegate allocation rules across the entire country is no easy task. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't try.
However, it does mean that one has to make assumptions about certain factors of the system to model it properly/accurately (see for instance the variation in delegate rounding). And while those assumptions can potentially be fodder for criticism, FHQ would rather take the tool for what it is: an instrument to help us better understand the complexities of the rules, how they are differently implemented across states, and maybe what that means for the 2016 race.
[NOTE: And FHQ really cannot stress enough how open Sean and David are to any and all comments, feedback, perspectives and alternate approaches/assumptions about this thing. This is a first pass. And having spoken with them while they began putting this together, they are intent on improving it into and through primary season.]
--
But it is that maybe above that is of some overall concern to FHQ. The reactions to this thing have been positive from what I have seen, but I do wonder how people will approach this thing. My fear is that it ends up overemphasizing or artificially inflating the odds (in terms of perceptions on the individual level) of the various contested convention scenarios out there (see for instance this). That overemphasis tends to be on the outcome rather than the input. By input I mean plugging in poll numbers that traditionally have not been predictive at this stage of past races and more importantly the role of winnowing in the process. And that latter option is available, but I wonder how often users will account for those effects. It is relatively easy to produce a contested convention outcome if you carry 14 candidates through the process or even five. But is that the likely path? FHQ does not know to be honest. However, past results point toward a sequential process -- like the one that is still in place for 2016 -- gradually winnowing the field like kids in Willy Wonka's chocolate factory.
This is FHQ's way of saying that this delegate allocation interactive tool is a very powerful one and its utility will be derived from how it is used. So rather than be critical, let's put the gadget to use in testing a hypothesis.
FHQ likes to talk about rules. Perhaps you have noticed. And there have been some changes to the delegate allocation rules employed by the Republican National Committee between 2012 and 2016. The gadget give us the chance to -- in a very rough way -- estimate the impact of those rules changes. The premise is simple: Take the 2012 primary results, plug them into the tool and see how the path/outcome differs.
There are a lot of questions that come out of this. Does the smaller proportionality window slow down Romney's march to the nomination? Does the tighter definition of proportionality come to the aid of his opponents? Do the winner-take-all states clustered on March 15-22 push Romney over the top? Are the SEC primary states winnowers and the northeastern states coalesced in late April the deciders as Trende and Byler hypothesize?
Before FHQ digs into that, a few notes. First, this, too, is an imperfect approach. The rules are different and so is the sequence of contests. That means that late 2012 states that are early in 2016 have lopsided results that favor Romney (see Arkansas, Kentucky, Texas and Utah). Similarly there are early 2012 states that are later in 2016 where results are likely imprecisely competitive during a likely less competitive part of the calendar (see Washington). There are also some of the warts in the tool's code in this early stage. For instance, the gadget allocates delegates from states like Colorado, North Dakota and Wyoming, where it will remain unknown for quite a while -- perhaps up to the convention -- just how many delegates are actually bound to what candidates (in the eyes of the RNC).
Still, there is some utility to be gained in gaming this out despite that.
Here's how this ends up looking:
Please note that Trump = Romney, Carson = Santorum, Rubio = Gingrich, Cruz = Ron Paul, Rand Paul = Perry and Bush = Hunstman.
So Romney still wins. The former Republican nominee would have received 1527 delegates given the caveats detailed above, but also without counting any of the 135 RNC/automatic delegates that are mostly left unbound through the RCP gadget. There are actually 168 of those automatic delegates. Approximately 40% of those delegates are actually bound based on primary or caucus results. The remainder would be unbound. But even without some of those bound automatic delegates, Romney still wins comfortably. His nearest competitor -- Santorum -- ends up with just a quarter of Romney's delegate total. Furthermore, Romney's total competition only amasses a little less than half of his delegate total together.
Well, sure, if a candidate wins 42 out of 56 contests, that candidate is probably going to win the nomination. There's no big surprise there.
The map is nice, but how does this look if we examine the pace with which the candidates accrue delegates over the course of primary season? As it was in 2012, Romney used a win in winner-take-all Florida to establish a lead in the delegate count that widened to roughly a 3:1 ratio after Super Tuesday on March 6, was more firmly established toward the end of March when 50% of the delegates had been allocated, and was solidified by the northeastern primaries in late April.
By the time 75% of the delegates had been allocated -- the week prior to the Texas primary -- Romney all but had the nomination clinched. Texas on May 29 put him over the top. The southern winnowers/northern deciders hypothesis Trende and Byler proffer is basically the 50-75 rule, but perhaps a less precise one, FHQ would argue. But that was basically what the system produced in 2012 under the 2012 rules.
How does this change when the 2016 rules (and calendar) are inserted and combined with the 2012 primary results?
The quick answer is not much. The longer version is it changes but only in a very subtle fashion. With no winner-take-all Florida, Romney would not have broken away from the pack in the same way. Sure, he had the advantage, pulling away from everyone else individually after what would have been the SEC primary. But if we shift our focus to the contested convention scenario, all of Romney competition combined were still neck and neck with Romney after the hypothetical March 1 contests.
That would change after the proportionality window closes and winner-take-all contests are introduced on March 15. Notice how Romney -- already apart from all the other candidates -- separates from even the combined "Anti-Romney" line (in purple). The former Republican nominee's lead only increases from there (after the 50% allocation point), jumping after the northeastern series of contests on April 19-26, but not clinching the nomination until the Oregon primary on May 17. That is about two weeks ahead of where Romney clinched in 2012 under the 2012 rules. Additionally, he does not arrive at that threshold until after the 75% allocation point that is crossed in the northeastern states.
Again, there are caveats to this, but the change in rules from 2012 to 2016 do not bring significant changes to either the outcome of the 2012 Republican nomination race or how the process arrived at its conclusion. What we can say is that the rules changes did not result in a contested convention.
But different inputs in 2016 may alter things. Still, use those winnowing buttons at RCP, folks.
--
1 You can find more details on those models here and here (WSJ).
Wednesday, June 17, 2015
2012 Republican Delegate Allocation Rules by State
NOTES:
1. FHQ will not dive too far into all of this now. This is, more or less, a baseline to which the 2016 rules as they come more into focus can be compared.
2. This nicely highlights what FHQ said throughout the 2012 cycle: There just were not that many truly winner-take-contests. Though Idaho and Puerto Rico ended up allocating all of their delegates to the winner (in this case, Mitt Romney), those two were the only early (proportionality window) states that had conditional winner-take-all provisions that were triggered. The six truly winner-take-all states comprised only 9% of the total 2286 Republican delegates.
3. There could have been many more categories added to this, but FHQ erred on the side of simplicity. That "hybrid" group includes loophole primary states like Illinois where delegates are elected directly, winner-take-most (winner-take-all by congressional district) states like South Carolina and a host of other conditionally winner-take-all states. As FHQ mentioned in the rundown of 2016 proportionality rules changes, even if you reallocate delegates in states that fall in this category, the changes are not very much different than a proportional allocation. Again, this is a catch-all group of sorts, but with a tighter definition of proportionality for 2016, some of these states -- those in the proportionality window -- will likely drift over into the proportional category. Others with contests that fall on or after March 15 may end up in the winner-take-all category (see possibly Ohio).
4. While that "hybrid" group is still something of a mystery, the wild card in 2016 will be what happens with the bulk of the caucuses states; those with no formal rules binding delegates to candidates. Given the changes to the national party rules -- There is now a requirement that delegates be bound based on the results of the primaries or caucuses (with some caveats). -- the previously non-binding caucus states will have to devise rules for allocating delegates. As most have to start and complete the caucus/convention process between March and early June, most of the first steps in the process will be early. Whether those states fall in the proportionality window remains undetermined. But that does have an impact on the types of delegate allocation rules those states will be able to adopt. But in 2012, there were more delegates available in the "no formal rules" states than there were in truly winner-take-all states.
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Links to state-level delegate allocation rules (click to see details of each state's plan):
Wednesday, January 21, 2015
Primary Movement, 2015 v. 2011
2015 is not 2011.
Aside from a steady stream of light chatter throughout the late summer and fall about the proposed SEC primary, there just has not been much talk or, for that matter, action on the presidential primary movement front. Granted, while most state legislatures have convened for 2015 sessions, many have not settled in for the business-as-usual legislative work. Still, at this point four years ago, there was slightly more activity on the state-level to tweak the calendar positions of a number of presidential primaries. In mid-January 2011, there were bills that had been introduced to shift the dates on which presidential primaries would be held in 2012 in California, New Jersey, Texas and Virginia and other primary-date-related legislation in Washington.
From a numbers standpoint, things are not altogether different in 2015. The stream is more a trickle with only Arizona and Oklahoma proposing primary moves thus far.1 One reaction is that it is simply too early to tell any significant difference between the two cycles. Yes, we are talking about a 50% decrease from 2011 to 2015, but substantively that represents only a subtle drop from four to two bills across cycles. That may not be enough to warrant even a meh.
It is early, but there is reason to think that there will be far less primary movement in 2015 than there was in 2011. The bills aren't there, but neither is the chatter. There is no talk of what Florida might do. The Sunshine state pulled back from the 2016 precipice in 2013. The constant "will they or won't they" drumbeat about Florida in 2011 reverberated, affecting decision-making in other states (notably the carve-out states, but others as well).
The most striking difference between 2011 and 2015, though, is based on the rules. Both the DNC and RNC informally agreed to a calendar structure that had the four carve-out states with February contests and all other states following in March or later. That intention has carried over to the 2016 cycle as well. The baseline, starting point calendar was different in 2011 than it is in 2015. FHQ touched on this last week (see map), but it bears repeating if not some accentuation. In January 2011, there were 18 primary states with laws in place calling for February primaries. That is, there were 18 states that were non-compliant with the delegate selection rules of both national parties. Those states had to change to avoid sanctions.
That is missing in 2015.
There is far less urgency on the state level to comply with the national parties' rules. Only Michigan, New York and North Carolina are in direct violation of those rules. Even then, Michigan and New York are likely to move into compliance.2 Other states could be early and non-compliant, but have options built into state laws that provide them with some flexibility (see Colorado, Minnesota and Utah).
The transition from 2012 to 2016 -- from a primary movement perspective -- is a lot like the one from 2004 to 2008, but in reverse. Republicans had allowed some February contests beyond the carve-outs in 1996 and 2000, but that was limited because the DNC still set the first Tuesday in March as the earliest date on which states other than Iowa and New Hampshire could conduct delegate selection events. For the 2004 cycle, the DNC changed course, allowing February contests by pushing that "earliest date" from the first Tuesday in March to the first Tuesday in February. The state-level reaction was not a tidal wave of movement forward for 2004. Some states moved up to that earliest compliant position -- Arizona, North Dakota and Oklahoma among them -- but the significant movement did not occur until the 2008 cycle when both parties had the prospect of active and competitive nomination races.
The change in rules in both national parties for 2012 was intended to eliminate the February issue. But as was the case from 2000-2008, reversing course can and usually does take multiple cycles. That is how it is in this iterative and sequential process. The national parties devise delegate selection rules often to fight the last war and the states react. Most react in accordance with those rules changes, but some do not. Those laggards are the ones the national parties target with rules changes in the next round; the next cycle.
That 2016 is about cleaning up the stragglers from the national parties' perspectives instead of affecting some wholesale change in state behavior is why 2015 is not 2011.
...and we probably won't get a repeat of this.
--
1 Oregon and South Carolina both have primary-related bills, but neither piece of legislation directly affects the date on which the presidential primaries will be conducted.
2 Michigan Republicans have endorsed a later date and New York shifted back from February to April for 2012 (but placed a sunset provision on the change). The primary is back in February, but unlikely to stay there.
Recent Posts:
State Legislatures Move Most Presidential Primaries. ...But They Have to Change State Law First
Oklahoma Bill Would Move Presidential Primary Back Three Weeks
Oregon Bill Would Split Presidential, Other Primaries
Are you following FHQ on Twitter, Google+ and Facebook? Click on the links to join in.
Aside from a steady stream of light chatter throughout the late summer and fall about the proposed SEC primary, there just has not been much talk or, for that matter, action on the presidential primary movement front. Granted, while most state legislatures have convened for 2015 sessions, many have not settled in for the business-as-usual legislative work. Still, at this point four years ago, there was slightly more activity on the state-level to tweak the calendar positions of a number of presidential primaries. In mid-January 2011, there were bills that had been introduced to shift the dates on which presidential primaries would be held in 2012 in California, New Jersey, Texas and Virginia and other primary-date-related legislation in Washington.
From a numbers standpoint, things are not altogether different in 2015. The stream is more a trickle with only Arizona and Oklahoma proposing primary moves thus far.1 One reaction is that it is simply too early to tell any significant difference between the two cycles. Yes, we are talking about a 50% decrease from 2011 to 2015, but substantively that represents only a subtle drop from four to two bills across cycles. That may not be enough to warrant even a meh.
It is early, but there is reason to think that there will be far less primary movement in 2015 than there was in 2011. The bills aren't there, but neither is the chatter. There is no talk of what Florida might do. The Sunshine state pulled back from the 2016 precipice in 2013. The constant "will they or won't they" drumbeat about Florida in 2011 reverberated, affecting decision-making in other states (notably the carve-out states, but others as well).
The most striking difference between 2011 and 2015, though, is based on the rules. Both the DNC and RNC informally agreed to a calendar structure that had the four carve-out states with February contests and all other states following in March or later. That intention has carried over to the 2016 cycle as well. The baseline, starting point calendar was different in 2011 than it is in 2015. FHQ touched on this last week (see map), but it bears repeating if not some accentuation. In January 2011, there were 18 primary states with laws in place calling for February primaries. That is, there were 18 states that were non-compliant with the delegate selection rules of both national parties. Those states had to change to avoid sanctions.
That is missing in 2015.
There is far less urgency on the state level to comply with the national parties' rules. Only Michigan, New York and North Carolina are in direct violation of those rules. Even then, Michigan and New York are likely to move into compliance.2 Other states could be early and non-compliant, but have options built into state laws that provide them with some flexibility (see Colorado, Minnesota and Utah).
The transition from 2012 to 2016 -- from a primary movement perspective -- is a lot like the one from 2004 to 2008, but in reverse. Republicans had allowed some February contests beyond the carve-outs in 1996 and 2000, but that was limited because the DNC still set the first Tuesday in March as the earliest date on which states other than Iowa and New Hampshire could conduct delegate selection events. For the 2004 cycle, the DNC changed course, allowing February contests by pushing that "earliest date" from the first Tuesday in March to the first Tuesday in February. The state-level reaction was not a tidal wave of movement forward for 2004. Some states moved up to that earliest compliant position -- Arizona, North Dakota and Oklahoma among them -- but the significant movement did not occur until the 2008 cycle when both parties had the prospect of active and competitive nomination races.
The change in rules in both national parties for 2012 was intended to eliminate the February issue. But as was the case from 2000-2008, reversing course can and usually does take multiple cycles. That is how it is in this iterative and sequential process. The national parties devise delegate selection rules often to fight the last war and the states react. Most react in accordance with those rules changes, but some do not. Those laggards are the ones the national parties target with rules changes in the next round; the next cycle.
That 2016 is about cleaning up the stragglers from the national parties' perspectives instead of affecting some wholesale change in state behavior is why 2015 is not 2011.
...and we probably won't get a repeat of this.
--
1 Oregon and South Carolina both have primary-related bills, but neither piece of legislation directly affects the date on which the presidential primaries will be conducted.
2 Michigan Republicans have endorsed a later date and New York shifted back from February to April for 2012 (but placed a sunset provision on the change). The primary is back in February, but unlikely to stay there.
Recent Posts:
State Legislatures Move Most Presidential Primaries. ...But They Have to Change State Law First
Oklahoma Bill Would Move Presidential Primary Back Three Weeks
Oregon Bill Would Split Presidential, Other Primaries
Are you following FHQ on Twitter, Google+ and Facebook? Click on the links to join in.
Wednesday, August 28, 2013
North Carolina is the New Missouri
...or How the 2015-16 North Carolina presidential primary process could look like Missouri's in 2011-12.
Now that North Carolina has jumped up the calendar and out of compliance with at least the Republican National Committee rules for 2016, it sets in motion the now-quadrennial dance between the national parties and would-be rogue states. North Carolina is now firmly lodged in that "rogue" area. And FHQ has mentioned several times in reaction to the 2016 presidential primary calendar provocation out of North Carolina recently that the move may result -- depending on how the process within North Carolina goes between now and 2015-16 -- in North Carolina Republicans (and perhaps even Democrats) being forced into utilizing caucuses as a means of allocating delegates.
That point came up again in the recent AP look at the aftermath and ramifications of the North Carolina presidential primary move. The caucus route is still a potential end point for one or both parties in North Carolina in 2016, but it is one of several options:
But how is North Carolina potentially staring down a switch to caucuses in 2016? How is North Carolina like Missouri?
First of all, suffice it to say, there is a lot of time between now and 2015, much less 2016. In other words, much can and will happen between now and then. That said, there are echoes of what happened in Missouri in 2011 in the North Carolina discussion.1 Rep. Lewis, for instance, isn't the only member of the General Assembly with an opinion on the matter. Granted, he is a powerful voice given his position on the Republican National Committee, but he is not the only voice.
Over in the state Senate, Andrew Brock (R-34th -- Davie, Iredell and Rowan), who has brought up bills to move the North Carolina presidential primary for years, seemed/seems less willing to move the election. More importantly, Sen. Brock appears prepared to take on any delegate penalty in exchange for influence over the process (via the AP):
The question, though, is whether either side -- move back or stay early -- has enough support to serve as veto point on the other. Though there has been enough support to push a move through in Missouri during the regular session of the legislature, there wasn't in the decisive special session. The idea of being early -- the lure of it -- was too strong.
But does that sort of division exist in the North Carolina situation?
We shall see. The North Carolina presidential primary is now early and noncompliant with RNC rules. Are the penalties enough to right the ship (...triggering either options #3 or #4 above)? Is there a compromise position that can be met in the meantime (...like the second of the two options in #4 above)? If the answer is no to either of those and a veto point in the coordination problem that is setting the primary date exists in the process then the "do nothing" part of option #1 becomes much more likely. That also, in turn, likely means the North Carolina Republican Party steps in to avoid penalties by switching to caucuses.
But there are hints of Missouri in what is happening so far since North Carolina moved. Whether they are there in the future -- and to what extent -- is a question for 2014 when the North Carolina General Assembly reconvenes.
--
1 To quickly recap, the Missouri General Assembly voted during its regular session in 2011 to move the presidential primary from February to March and back into compliance with both national parties' delegate selection rules. That bill was vetoed by Governor Jay Nixon because it also contained a provision that would have limited gubernatorial power in filling vacancies to various statewide offices. Even the initial regular session passage was not without fanfare. Some -- particularly in the Missouri Senate -- wanted to keep the primary early despite the penalties. That same division -- mostly occurring along line separating the two chambers of the Missouri General Assembly -- emerged again with the presidential primary issue was raised at during the 2011 special session that was called. In the context of that session the division became gridlock and the bill, after passing the House, went nowhere in the Senate. That meant no move for Missouri. Even steps after that in the special session to eliminate the presidential primary -- to save the state money -- failed. And in the midst of all of that -- and out of fear of the penalties from the RNC -- the Missouri Republican Party chose to hold caucuses for allocating their convention delegates.
Now that North Carolina has jumped up the calendar and out of compliance with at least the Republican National Committee rules for 2016, it sets in motion the now-quadrennial dance between the national parties and would-be rogue states. North Carolina is now firmly lodged in that "rogue" area. And FHQ has mentioned several times in reaction to the 2016 presidential primary calendar provocation out of North Carolina recently that the move may result -- depending on how the process within North Carolina goes between now and 2015-16 -- in North Carolina Republicans (and perhaps even Democrats) being forced into utilizing caucuses as a means of allocating delegates.
That point came up again in the recent AP look at the aftermath and ramifications of the North Carolina presidential primary move. The caucus route is still a potential end point for one or both parties in North Carolina in 2016, but it is one of several options:
- North Carolina does nothing, takes the penalty and heads to the 2016 Republican National Convention with 12 delegates and a reduced number on the Democratic side as well.
- The North Carolina General Assembly does nothing, but one or more of the state parties opts for a later and compliant caucus to avoid penalty from either or both of the national parties. Call this the Missouri Route.
- The North Carolina General Assembly could reverse that part of the new law and move the primary back to May where it started.
- The North Carolina General Assembly could keep the separate presidential primary, but move it back to, say, March 1 -- the first date on which non-carve-out states can schedule delegate selection events -- or consolidate all the primaries again, but hold them in March and not May.
But how is North Carolina potentially staring down a switch to caucuses in 2016? How is North Carolina like Missouri?
First of all, suffice it to say, there is a lot of time between now and 2015, much less 2016. In other words, much can and will happen between now and then. That said, there are echoes of what happened in Missouri in 2011 in the North Carolina discussion.1 Rep. Lewis, for instance, isn't the only member of the General Assembly with an opinion on the matter. Granted, he is a powerful voice given his position on the Republican National Committee, but he is not the only voice.
Over in the state Senate, Andrew Brock (R-34th -- Davie, Iredell and Rowan), who has brought up bills to move the North Carolina presidential primary for years, seemed/seems less willing to move the election. More importantly, Sen. Brock appears prepared to take on any delegate penalty in exchange for influence over the process (via the AP):
"I would gladly exchange my position as a delegate in exchange for having more North Carolinians in the presidential process."Now, it may be a leap to say that a difference of opinion among two members of the North Carolina General Assembly will or could derail any move to avoid national party penalty, but those sorts of differences did just that in Missouri in 2011. It helps the comparison that there was division among the two legislative chambers in Missouri and we have different ideas about the North Carolina primary represented by members in North Carolina; one from the state Senate, the other from the state House.
The question, though, is whether either side -- move back or stay early -- has enough support to serve as veto point on the other. Though there has been enough support to push a move through in Missouri during the regular session of the legislature, there wasn't in the decisive special session. The idea of being early -- the lure of it -- was too strong.
But does that sort of division exist in the North Carolina situation?
We shall see. The North Carolina presidential primary is now early and noncompliant with RNC rules. Are the penalties enough to right the ship (...triggering either options #3 or #4 above)? Is there a compromise position that can be met in the meantime (...like the second of the two options in #4 above)? If the answer is no to either of those and a veto point in the coordination problem that is setting the primary date exists in the process then the "do nothing" part of option #1 becomes much more likely. That also, in turn, likely means the North Carolina Republican Party steps in to avoid penalties by switching to caucuses.
But there are hints of Missouri in what is happening so far since North Carolina moved. Whether they are there in the future -- and to what extent -- is a question for 2014 when the North Carolina General Assembly reconvenes.
--
1 To quickly recap, the Missouri General Assembly voted during its regular session in 2011 to move the presidential primary from February to March and back into compliance with both national parties' delegate selection rules. That bill was vetoed by Governor Jay Nixon because it also contained a provision that would have limited gubernatorial power in filling vacancies to various statewide offices. Even the initial regular session passage was not without fanfare. Some -- particularly in the Missouri Senate -- wanted to keep the primary early despite the penalties. That same division -- mostly occurring along line separating the two chambers of the Missouri General Assembly -- emerged again with the presidential primary issue was raised at during the 2011 special session that was called. In the context of that session the division became gridlock and the bill, after passing the House, went nowhere in the Senate. That meant no move for Missouri. Even steps after that in the special session to eliminate the presidential primary -- to save the state money -- failed. And in the midst of all of that -- and out of fear of the penalties from the RNC -- the Missouri Republican Party chose to hold caucuses for allocating their convention delegates.
Friday, November 16, 2012
2012 Electoral College Wrap Up, Part 2
FHQ will have much more on this later, but we wanted to get the final results through the lens of our map and the Electoral College Spectrum up before too much time passed.
Final FHQ projection.
| The 2012 Electoral College Spectrum1 | ||||
| HI-4 (7)2 | IL-20 (163) | IA-6 (243) | IN-11 (154) | KS-6 (59) |
| VT-3 (10) | ME-4 (167) | PA-20 (263) | SC-9 (143) | AL-9 (53) |
| RI-4 (14) | WA-12 (179) | CO-93 (272/275) | MS-6 (134) | KY-8 (44) |
| NY-29 (43) | OR-7 (186) | VA-13 (285/266) | AK-3 (128) | NE-5 (36) |
| MD-10 (53) | NM-5 (191) | OH-18 (303/253) | MT-3 (125) | AR-6 (31) |
| MA-11 (64) | MI-16 (207) | FL-29 (332/235) | TX-38 (122) | WV-5 (25) |
| CA-55 (119) | MN-10 (217) | NC-15 (347/206) | LA-8 (84) | ID-4 (20) |
| DE-3 (122) | WI-10 (227) | GA-16 (191) | SD-3 (76) | OK-7 (16) |
| CT-7 (129) | NV-6 (233) | MO-10 (175) | ND-3 (73) | WY-3 (9) |
| NJ-14 (143) | NH-4 (237) | AZ-11 (165) | TN-11 (70) | UT-6 (6) |
| 1Follow the link for a detailed explanation on how to read the Electoral College Spectrum. 2The numbers in the parentheses refer to the number of electoral votes a candidate would have if he won all the states ranked prior to that state. If, for example, Romney had won all the states up to and including Colorado (all Obama's toss up states), he would have gained 275 electoral votes. Romney's numbers are only totaled through the states he would have needed in order to get to 270. In those cases, Obama's number is on the left and Romney's is on the right in italics. 3Colorado is the state where Obama crossed the 270 electoral vote threshold to win the presidential election. That line is referred to as the victory line. | ||||
Final FHQ projection.
Monday, November 12, 2012
2012 Electoral College Wrap Up, Part 1
This is the first part in a two part look at how FHQ's weighted average stacked up in examining the 2012 electoral college. We'll first take a global look at FHQ in the context of the other models out there. Part two will take a micro view of the FHQ model in relation to the electoral college results.
Now that we are nearly a week removed from the re-election of President Obama, FHQ thought it would circle back around and take a look back at how we did in examining the state of play within the electoral college. The answer is not too bad. What was 49 out of 51 correct state-level projections based on our simple weighted average in 2008 morphed into a perfect 51 out of 51 score in 2012.
FHQ was not alone. Drew Linzer (Emory) at Votamatic and Simon Jackman (Stanford) blogging for the Huffington Post and Sam Wang (Princeton) at the Princeton Election Consortium all were either right on or in Wang's case cautiously calling a tie in Florida. [And truth be told, Florida was a tie, but one that consistently -- around FHQ anyway -- ever so slightly favored the president. Again, we're talking about a decreasing fraction of a point as election day approached.] Oh, and Nate Silver of FiveThirtyEight fame pegged it at 332-206, too. This was a great thing for the so-called "quants".
Despite that, there are a couple of notes that are floating around out there and are worth mentioning.
1) FHQ won't take any victory laps because of this.1 Don't get me wrong. It is nice to be a dart and not, say, the board itself, but this actually has very little to do with what FHQ was doing under the hood -- or what any of the above folks were doing, for that matter. If we were all making sausage, then FHQ and the others were merely turning the crank on our various sausage making apparati. The filling -- the polls -- was what really nailed the election projection on the state level.2 Drew first published his model in June. FHQ followed in July. The polls, even through our different lenses. told the story then. 332-206. Over the course of the summer and into the fall, that changed very little. For FHQ, Florida got as close as 0.04 points in favor of the president, but then took a turn back toward Obama. That was it. The Sunshine state was always the only state that ever truly threatened to jump what FHQ calls the partisan line into the Romney group of states. The polls were not only right on the money, but they were overall, pretty consistent. Jim Campbell's argument/observation that the September polls are a better predictor of November election outcomes came to pass. What we got in October was just noise before state-level polling reverted or began reverting to those post-convention, pre-October numbers.
As FHQ asked throughout October, were we witnessing a movement toward Romney in the polls or the typical sort of narrowing (Campbell 2008) that tends to mark the late campaign polls. The latter may not have been the true answer but it was closer than simply talking about Romney's momentum. Tom Holbrook's (1996) equilibrium theory of candidate support through the polls seems to have been the correct lens through which to view the dynamics of the race as election day drew nearer.
Score this one for the polls, then.
2) But where does that leave the models? After all, the sausage maker has some utility, too. Well, FHQ's natural inclination is to piggyback on the above point and state the obvious. The polls were right on and you didn't really need a statistical model -- complex or otherwise -- to accurately project the electoral college. In true self-deprecating fashion (Bear with me. I'll get there.) -- something FHQ is good at -- our little ol' weighted average was accurate enough to get all but two states right in 2008 and every last one in 2012. Again, it was the polls. In fact, if you removed the weighting and took the raw average of all the publicly available polls released on and before election day in all of 2012 you would come up with the same thing: 332-206. As I told Drew over the summer in a brief Twitter exchange, my hope was at that point just after the conventions that the race would tighten up so that we could, in fact, get a true measure of the utility of the more complex statistical models projecting the electoral college. As it stood then -- and how it ended up even with some narrowing -- there was a lot of overlap between the Bayesian models and the more pedestrian averages.
Mind you, I'm not saying that there is no place for these models. Boy, is there. I'm with John Sides on this one: The more models we have, the better off we all are on this sort of thing. Rather, my point is to suggest that the simple averages are a decent baseline. As November 6 approached and the FHQ numbers did not budge in the face of changing information following the Denver debate, I began to think of the FHQ weighted average like the Gary Jacobson measure of congressional candidate quality. Now sure, there have been herculean efforts littering the political science literature to construct multi-point indices of candidate quality, but they don't often perform all that better than Jacobson's simple test. "Has challenger/candidate X held elective office?" That simple, binary variable explains most of the variation in the levels of success that various candidates -- whether challenging an incumbent or vying for an open seat -- have enjoyed across a great number of elections. The multi-point indices only slightly improve the explanatory power.
Now, lord knows, I'm not trying to draw definitive comparisons between the work here at FHQ and Jacobson's oft-cited body of work. Are there parallels? Yes, and I'll leave it at that. Sometimes the best models are the simplest ones. Parsimony counts and to some extent that is what FHQ provides with these electoral college analyses. And again, the reason I was hoping that the polls would tighten as we got closer to election day was to demonstrate just exactly how much better the more complex models were. My expectation was that there would be a noticeable difference between the two. But there wasn't; not in terms of projecting which states would go to which candidates. By other measures, the more complex models wiped the floor with FHQ (as, admittedly, they should have).3
--
The tie that binds all of these models -- if you really want to call the pre-algebra that FHQ does a model -- is a reliance on polling. And that raises a different question as we shift from reviewing 2012 to looking at 2016 and beyond. The quants "won" this one. But it was not without a wide-ranging -- and fruitful, I think -- discussion about the accuracy of polling. The one question that will continue to be worth asking is whether the seemingly perpetually dropping rates of response to public opinion polls continue to drop and what impact that will have. If that continues, then there would almost certainly have to be a tipping point where phone-based polls begin to more consistently miss the mark. The good news moving forward is that the online polls -- whether YouGov, or Google Consumer Surveys or Angus-Reid -- performed quite well in 2012; offering a ray of hope for something beyond phone polls in a time when cell phones are hard to reach and landlines are disappearing.
Still, we are now at a point where pollsters are talking about the "art of polling" as a means of differentiating from other pollsters instead of the overarching science of polling. That has implications. If all pollsters guess wrong about the underlying demographics of the electorate, all the polls are wrong. Of course, the incentive structure is such that pollsters want to find something of a niche that not only separates them from the competition to some extent but helps them crack the code of the true demographic breakdown of the electorate. [Then they can all herd at the end.]
The bottom line remains: these projections are only as good as the polling that serves as the sausage filling. If garbage goes in, then garbage is more likely to come out. On the other hand, if the polling is accurate, then so too are the projections.
--
1 I won't take any victory laps, but I will extend to all of those who have been both loyal and happenstance readers alike a very sincere thank you for spending some or all of election season with us. And yeah, that stretches back to late 2010. Thank you.
2 This is something Harry Enten of the Guardian mentioned via Twitter on Saturday and AAOPR more or less confirmed today.
3 One factor that should be noted here that may separate FHQ from the more involved models is polling variability. 2008 was witness to a great deal of polling variability. The margins in that open seat presidential election jumped around quite a bit more than in 2012 when an incumbent was involved. 2016, in some respects is shaping up as a repeat of 2008. That is even more true if both Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden pass on runs for the Democratic nomination. Both races would be -- at least from our vantage point here three years out -- wide open and influence the polling that is conducted across firms and across states. Yet, even with that unique situation, FHQ lagged just one correctly predicted state -- North Carolina -- behind FiveThirtyEight.
Now that we are nearly a week removed from the re-election of President Obama, FHQ thought it would circle back around and take a look back at how we did in examining the state of play within the electoral college. The answer is not too bad. What was 49 out of 51 correct state-level projections based on our simple weighted average in 2008 morphed into a perfect 51 out of 51 score in 2012.
FHQ was not alone. Drew Linzer (Emory) at Votamatic and Simon Jackman (Stanford) blogging for the Huffington Post and Sam Wang (Princeton) at the Princeton Election Consortium all were either right on or in Wang's case cautiously calling a tie in Florida. [And truth be told, Florida was a tie, but one that consistently -- around FHQ anyway -- ever so slightly favored the president. Again, we're talking about a decreasing fraction of a point as election day approached.] Oh, and Nate Silver of FiveThirtyEight fame pegged it at 332-206, too. This was a great thing for the so-called "quants".
Despite that, there are a couple of notes that are floating around out there and are worth mentioning.
1) FHQ won't take any victory laps because of this.1 Don't get me wrong. It is nice to be a dart and not, say, the board itself, but this actually has very little to do with what FHQ was doing under the hood -- or what any of the above folks were doing, for that matter. If we were all making sausage, then FHQ and the others were merely turning the crank on our various sausage making apparati. The filling -- the polls -- was what really nailed the election projection on the state level.2 Drew first published his model in June. FHQ followed in July. The polls, even through our different lenses. told the story then. 332-206. Over the course of the summer and into the fall, that changed very little. For FHQ, Florida got as close as 0.04 points in favor of the president, but then took a turn back toward Obama. That was it. The Sunshine state was always the only state that ever truly threatened to jump what FHQ calls the partisan line into the Romney group of states. The polls were not only right on the money, but they were overall, pretty consistent. Jim Campbell's argument/observation that the September polls are a better predictor of November election outcomes came to pass. What we got in October was just noise before state-level polling reverted or began reverting to those post-convention, pre-October numbers.
As FHQ asked throughout October, were we witnessing a movement toward Romney in the polls or the typical sort of narrowing (Campbell 2008) that tends to mark the late campaign polls. The latter may not have been the true answer but it was closer than simply talking about Romney's momentum. Tom Holbrook's (1996) equilibrium theory of candidate support through the polls seems to have been the correct lens through which to view the dynamics of the race as election day drew nearer.
Score this one for the polls, then.
2) But where does that leave the models? After all, the sausage maker has some utility, too. Well, FHQ's natural inclination is to piggyback on the above point and state the obvious. The polls were right on and you didn't really need a statistical model -- complex or otherwise -- to accurately project the electoral college. In true self-deprecating fashion (Bear with me. I'll get there.) -- something FHQ is good at -- our little ol' weighted average was accurate enough to get all but two states right in 2008 and every last one in 2012. Again, it was the polls. In fact, if you removed the weighting and took the raw average of all the publicly available polls released on and before election day in all of 2012 you would come up with the same thing: 332-206. As I told Drew over the summer in a brief Twitter exchange, my hope was at that point just after the conventions that the race would tighten up so that we could, in fact, get a true measure of the utility of the more complex statistical models projecting the electoral college. As it stood then -- and how it ended up even with some narrowing -- there was a lot of overlap between the Bayesian models and the more pedestrian averages.
Mind you, I'm not saying that there is no place for these models. Boy, is there. I'm with John Sides on this one: The more models we have, the better off we all are on this sort of thing. Rather, my point is to suggest that the simple averages are a decent baseline. As November 6 approached and the FHQ numbers did not budge in the face of changing information following the Denver debate, I began to think of the FHQ weighted average like the Gary Jacobson measure of congressional candidate quality. Now sure, there have been herculean efforts littering the political science literature to construct multi-point indices of candidate quality, but they don't often perform all that better than Jacobson's simple test. "Has challenger/candidate X held elective office?" That simple, binary variable explains most of the variation in the levels of success that various candidates -- whether challenging an incumbent or vying for an open seat -- have enjoyed across a great number of elections. The multi-point indices only slightly improve the explanatory power.
Now, lord knows, I'm not trying to draw definitive comparisons between the work here at FHQ and Jacobson's oft-cited body of work. Are there parallels? Yes, and I'll leave it at that. Sometimes the best models are the simplest ones. Parsimony counts and to some extent that is what FHQ provides with these electoral college analyses. And again, the reason I was hoping that the polls would tighten as we got closer to election day was to demonstrate just exactly how much better the more complex models were. My expectation was that there would be a noticeable difference between the two. But there wasn't; not in terms of projecting which states would go to which candidates. By other measures, the more complex models wiped the floor with FHQ (as, admittedly, they should have).3
--
The tie that binds all of these models -- if you really want to call the pre-algebra that FHQ does a model -- is a reliance on polling. And that raises a different question as we shift from reviewing 2012 to looking at 2016 and beyond. The quants "won" this one. But it was not without a wide-ranging -- and fruitful, I think -- discussion about the accuracy of polling. The one question that will continue to be worth asking is whether the seemingly perpetually dropping rates of response to public opinion polls continue to drop and what impact that will have. If that continues, then there would almost certainly have to be a tipping point where phone-based polls begin to more consistently miss the mark. The good news moving forward is that the online polls -- whether YouGov, or Google Consumer Surveys or Angus-Reid -- performed quite well in 2012; offering a ray of hope for something beyond phone polls in a time when cell phones are hard to reach and landlines are disappearing.
Still, we are now at a point where pollsters are talking about the "art of polling" as a means of differentiating from other pollsters instead of the overarching science of polling. That has implications. If all pollsters guess wrong about the underlying demographics of the electorate, all the polls are wrong. Of course, the incentive structure is such that pollsters want to find something of a niche that not only separates them from the competition to some extent but helps them crack the code of the true demographic breakdown of the electorate. [Then they can all herd at the end.]
The bottom line remains: these projections are only as good as the polling that serves as the sausage filling. If garbage goes in, then garbage is more likely to come out. On the other hand, if the polling is accurate, then so too are the projections.
--
1 I won't take any victory laps, but I will extend to all of those who have been both loyal and happenstance readers alike a very sincere thank you for spending some or all of election season with us. And yeah, that stretches back to late 2010. Thank you.
2 This is something Harry Enten of the Guardian mentioned via Twitter on Saturday and AAOPR more or less confirmed today.
3 One factor that should be noted here that may separate FHQ from the more involved models is polling variability. 2008 was witness to a great deal of polling variability. The margins in that open seat presidential election jumped around quite a bit more than in 2012 when an incumbent was involved. 2016, in some respects is shaping up as a repeat of 2008. That is even more true if both Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden pass on runs for the Democratic nomination. Both races would be -- at least from our vantage point here three years out -- wide open and influence the polling that is conducted across firms and across states. Yet, even with that unique situation, FHQ lagged just one correctly predicted state -- North Carolina -- behind FiveThirtyEight.
Thursday, November 8, 2012
Tuesday, November 6, 2012
2012 Election Night Live Blog
12:30am: Waiting on speeches from the candidates and "537 votes close" Florida to wrap this thing up.
12:11am: Virginia to Obama.
12:00am: Alaska to Romney.
11:49: Obama wins Colorado.
11:43pm: Nevada to Obama.
11:17pm: Missouri to Romney.
11:16pm: Networks start calling Ohio for Obama. That's all folks.
11:15pm: Oregon is Obama's.
11:10pm: Iowa to Obama.
11:04pm: North Carolina held out this long. As I said earlier, the longer the Tarheel state played out -- no matter who won -- the better it would be for the president.
11:00pm: California, Hawaii and Washington are all Obama states as we hit the West Coast. Idaho is Romney territory.
10:50pm: Minnesota to Obama. Another Lean Obama domino falls toward the president.
10:42pm: Arizona to Romney according to NBC. Montana has moved that way too. New Mexico is blue.
10:00pm: And Utah slips into the Romney column.
9:52pm: New Hampshire to Obama. The path is squeezing down to nothing.
9:39pm: Pennsylvania is also big. The paths to 270 are increasing for Obama; decreasing for Romney. Romney is going to need to carry North Carolina, Florida, Virginia, Ohio and either Iowa or Colorado to take this.
9:31pm: Wisconsin to Obama is a biggie.
9:00pm: That Michigan call is pretty big.
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and Texas all are in for Romney.
New York, New Jersey, and Michigan all go to Obama.
8:41pm: Alabama is Romney's.
8:31pm: Arkansas and Tennessee move into the Republican column.
8:14pm: Georgia to Romney.
8:00pm: Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Illinois Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine (3) and Rhode Island all go to Obama at the 8pm hour. Oklahoma goes to Romney. Obama 64, Romney 40.
7:41pm: South Carolina to Romney. Romney 33, Obama 3.
7:30pm: West Virginia is in Romney's column as the 7:30 states close. I'll take this opportunity to remind everyone that it was just a few cycles ago that the Mountain state was reliably Democratic.
7:23pm: Indiana to Romney. My, what a difference four year makes. Regression to the mean in the Hoosier state.
7:02pm: Kentucky to Romney. Vermont to Obama. Just like four years ago. ...and every year before that.
7:00pm: Here we go.
12:11am: Virginia to Obama.
12:00am: Alaska to Romney.
11:49: Obama wins Colorado.
11:43pm: Nevada to Obama.
11:17pm: Missouri to Romney.
11:16pm: Networks start calling Ohio for Obama. That's all folks.
11:15pm: Oregon is Obama's.
11:10pm: Iowa to Obama.
11:04pm: North Carolina held out this long. As I said earlier, the longer the Tarheel state played out -- no matter who won -- the better it would be for the president.
11:00pm: California, Hawaii and Washington are all Obama states as we hit the West Coast. Idaho is Romney territory.
10:50pm: Minnesota to Obama. Another Lean Obama domino falls toward the president.
10:42pm: Arizona to Romney according to NBC. Montana has moved that way too. New Mexico is blue.
10:00pm: And Utah slips into the Romney column.
9:52pm: New Hampshire to Obama. The path is squeezing down to nothing.
9:39pm: Pennsylvania is also big. The paths to 270 are increasing for Obama; decreasing for Romney. Romney is going to need to carry North Carolina, Florida, Virginia, Ohio and either Iowa or Colorado to take this.
9:31pm: Wisconsin to Obama is a biggie.
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and Texas all are in for Romney.
New York, New Jersey, and Michigan all go to Obama.
8:41pm: Alabama is Romney's.
8:31pm: Arkansas and Tennessee move into the Republican column.
8:14pm: Georgia to Romney.
8:00pm: Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Illinois Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine (3) and Rhode Island all go to Obama at the 8pm hour. Oklahoma goes to Romney. Obama 64, Romney 40.
7:41pm: South Carolina to Romney. Romney 33, Obama 3.
7:30pm: West Virginia is in Romney's column as the 7:30 states close. I'll take this opportunity to remind everyone that it was just a few cycles ago that the Mountain state was reliably Democratic.
7:23pm: Indiana to Romney. My, what a difference four year makes. Regression to the mean in the Hoosier state.
7:02pm: Kentucky to Romney. Vermont to Obama. Just like four years ago. ...and every year before that.
7:00pm: Here we go.
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