2016 Election Night

11/28/16 3:30pm:
The Michigan results are certified, handing the Great Lakes state to Trump.

11/14/16 5:30pm:
The Trump camp failed to request a recount in New Hampshire before the 5pm deadline. Clinton takes the Granite state's four electoral votes.

11/10/16 7:45pm:
Arizona added to Trump's column.

11/9/16 11:30am:
The AP calls Minnesota for Clinton. That is a narrow hold for Democrats.

11/9/16 2:40am:
Wisconsin puts Trump over the top; another flip for the Republican.

11/9/16 2:15am:
Alaska stays in the Republican column.

11/9/16 2:10am:
And the second congressional district in Nebraska is called for Trump.

11/9/16 2am:
The Maine call is in and we have the second electoral vote split in the Maine/Nebraska era. Maine's second congressional district follows Nebraska's second district in 2008 in going against the statewide result. Clinton wins the state and CD1 while Trump takes CD2.

11/9/16 1:40pm:
Pennsylvania flips to Trump. That 20 electoral votes puts Trump within range of 270 (and with some networks having called Wisconsin for him).

11/9/16 12:25am:
Clinton holds Nevada.

11:35pm:
Trump flips Iowa; something that has been in the cards since at least the conventions. Trump also holds Georgia after a lengthy wait.

11:25pm:
Utah goes for Trump. He will lag behind Romney there, but still take the Beehive state with relative ease.

11:15pm:
North Carolina is a Republican hold for Trump. Oregon is another non-Rust Belt leaner to stay with the Democrats.

11pm:
The next round of closings out west put California, Hawaii and Washington into the Clinton category. Trump takes Idaho. The close night in the Rust Belt extends to the electoral vote count for the time being.

10:55pm:
Florida follows Ohio as a Trump flip. Understatement alert: That is a big one.

10:40pm:
Colorado stays in the blue column. The outside the Rust Belt/midwest leaners are falling into place for Clinton. Those in that region are tighter.

10:25pm:
Ohio goes to Trump and Virginia to Clinton. One of those is bigger symbolically than the other.

10:10pm:
Missouri to Trump and New Mexico to Clinton.

10pm:
Closings in Arizona, Iowa, Nevada, and Utah. No calls. Montana to Trump.

9:30pm:
Arkansas and Louisiana turn red and Connecticut falls into Clinton's column.

9:00pm:
An extended radio hit pulled FHQ away. We will feel in the gaps in time. As for now a big jump for both candidates.

7:30pm:
West Virginia to Trump. North Carolina and Ohio are too close to call as of now.

7:00pm:
Wasting no time, Indiana and Kentucky go Trump and Vermont is added to Clinton's column.

6:00pm:
Let's color this thing in. FHQ will have maps and comments both here and on twitter (@FHQ) all evening.

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The Democrats' Unity Reform Commission

The members of the Democratic National Convention Rules Committee convened on Saturday, July 23 to consider the report the committee will present to the convention on its opening day in Philadelphia. After a lengthy primary season that highlighted procedural issues surrounding superdelegates, caucuses and the openness of participation in the Democratic nomination process, it was expected that those matters would dominate the proceedings.

Not surprisingly, they did.

Following a series of uncontentious votes -- on convention officers and convention procedure -- and a short recess, the committee began to consider amendments to the charter of the party and the rules of the nomination process. This began with a series of amendments with respect to the influence of superdelegates on the process. But in each instance, the same basic pattern emerged: any change to the current superdelegate system was voted down by a ratio of around 3:2. That happened first on an amendment to abolish superdelegates. It happened again on measures to reduce their influence (or number) on the nominating process.

It was at that point that committee members from both the Clinton and Sanders teams rose to call for a recess. What followed was an over three hour break that produced a unity amendment chartering a post-convention commission to examine not only the superdelegate process that had triggered a slew of amendment proposals, but the other perceived shortcomings of the process (chiefly, caucuses and participation).

The Unity Reform Commission, successor to the Democratic Change Commission of eight years ago, will have a specific mandate if the convention votes in favor of the Rules Committee report on the first day of the convention on Monday. What passed the Rules Committee on Saturday was this:

1. No more than 60 days after the election of the next chair of the Democratic National Committee early next year, the chair will establish the Unity Reform Commission (URC).
2. Its membership will include Clinton surrogate, Jennifer O'Malley Dillon, as commission chairwoman and Sanders proxy, Larry Cohen, as vice chair. Clinton will fill nine (9) additional slots and Sanders, seven (7). The DNC chair (see #1) will select three (3) additional members. 
3. Consistent with the timeline of the Democratic Change Commission, the 21 member Unity Reform Commission will meet during 2017 with the goal of producing a set of rules recommendations to the Democratic Rules and Bylaws Committee by January 1, 2018.
4. The normal procedure is for the Rules and Bylaws Committee to consider those commission recommendations before sending them -- potentially in an amended form -- to the full Democratic National Committee for a final vote. That procedure remains intact. However, the URC retains the ability to place their recommendations before the full DNC if the Rules and Bylaws Committee "fails to substantially adopt" any of them. [NOTE: How the commission arrives at a conclusion that the RBC has not met that requirement greatly depends on who the members of the commission are.]
5. Substantively, the unity amendment calls for another reconsideration of the caucus process. This was a Clinton campaign complaint after 2008 and is again in 2016. The question confronting the URC will be whether they come to a different conclusion than the Democratic Change Commission. The 2009 commission called for the development of a set of "best practices" for caucuses, but ultimately left the primary versus caucus matter up to the states (in order to best tailor a process at the state level). 
6. The amendment is less forceful on the parameters of discussion on participation in the nomination process. The commission's charter only calls for the development of recommendations that "encourage" increased involvement in the process. In the end, the directive on what essentially boils down to an open versus closed primary discussion is more passive. The Sanders proxies on the commission will likely push for something promoting more open primaries, but historically the DNC (and the RNC for that matter) have remained mostly hands-off on this matter, deferring to the states. [NOTE: This question is certainly more difficult to deal with considering both major national parties are being pulled in opposite directions on the matter. Sanders supporters are advocating for more open primaries, while the liberty faction within the Republican Party are aiming for a more closed process. That potentially mixed message will be more likely produce mixed results if and when either party moves more forcefully on any recommendations on this front.] 
7. While the open primaries mandate was passive, the part of the amendment devoted to superdelegates had more teeth to it. In any event, there was more clarity as to the specifics of the superdelegates mandate of the commission. While the group will broadly consider the superdelegates' role in the process, it will specifically recommend that elected officials -- Democratic members of Congress, governors and distinguished party leaders (presidents, vice presidents, etc.) -- remain as unpledged delegates. However, the second part of the recommendation shifts the remaining superdelegates (approximately two-thirds of them) out of the unpledged category and into a pledged territory (to be proportionally pledged/bound based on the results of primaries and caucuses). [NOTE A: Again, these are recommendations. The URC can go over the heads of the Rules and Bylaws Committee if it does not adopt any part of the commission's recommendations, but it cannot necessarily force the full DNC to adopt these rules. If the commission is near unanimous in its recommendations, that may make any inaction on the part of the RBC or DNC more difficult. And ultimately, that issue circles back around to the membership of the committee. If they are divided from the start, they will likely be somewhat divided at the end, issuing recommendations that are less clear and less likely to be ratified by the DNC.] [NOTE B: The specificity of this superdelegate section of the unity amendment presented to the Rules Committee moves in the direction of what the Sanders campaign wants: curbing the influence of the unpledged delegates. But while it hypothetically reduces their number, it does not address the core problem Sanders and his supporters had with superdelegates. The root complaint was that a significant number of superdelegates endorsed Clinton in 2015 before any primary and caucus votes had been cast. There are potentially fewer superdelegates after this, but the pre-primary endorsement problem is and will still be an issue. The commission is not confined to just this action on superdelegates though. It has to make that recommendation, but can go beyond that on the matter.]
8. There is an additional section to the amendment dealing with expanding the party nationally that echoes not only what Sanders has said over the last year, but also is reminiscent of the Dean DNC's 50 state strategy. 
9. The main perceived problems of 2016 are addressed in the amendment, but the scope of the commission's actions can expand beyond those areas at the discretion of the chair and vice chair of the commission. The group can look at other parts of the rules behind the presidential nomination process. 

One thing that is an interesting side note to all of this is something hinted at above. This Unity Reform Commission will be active simultaneous to the newly created study panel that came out of the Republican National Convention Rules Committee in Cleveland. Each group will most certainly have an eye on the actions of the other and that will undoubtedly affect the recommendations that come out of either. A similar separated, bipartisan consideration of rules occurred after 2008. That resulted in the Democratic Change Commission and (Republican) Temporary Delegate Selection Committee finding common ground on problems like the frontloading of primaries and caucuses and the January start to primary season. That sort of unofficial semi-coordination could repeat itself in 2017, but that outcome is dependent on the two groups seeing common ground. That was clear with the calendar after 2008, but may not be with open versus closed primaries and other issues following 2016. 

In any event, it will make for an eventful 2017 on the rules front.


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Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton and the 2016 Democratic Presidential Nomination

FHQ has neglected the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination process to this point. With such a logjam on the Republican side, it is hard not to. But in following along with the close of the Nevada legislative session in my Twitter feed last night (no action on the presidential primary bill, but fantastic work by Jon Ralston and Ray Hagar), there were a number of tweets interspersed about Bernie Sanders' crowds and poll position.¹ To FHQ's eye, many seem to be overstating what exactly Sanders' emergence means.

Let's take those indicators one at a time:

1. David Bernstein posed a question this morning about studies examining crowd size and the correlation that holds with success in early primaries. It is an interesting question, but no one on an ad hoc panel of three political scientists could come up with any research that had dug into the question. Anecdotally, it is reminiscent of the similar connection that was drawn from the level of Romney crowd enthusiasm during the home stretch of the 2012 presidential (general) election. It just does not seem to be a good indicator of success in (presidential) elections.

2. But why were there 3000 or more people there to greet Bernie Sanders on a Sunday afternoon in late May 2015 in Minneapolis of all places? That has to say something, right? Yes, it does. But let's look at what it means from a slightly different angle.



Political scientists will often tell you to "ignore those polls". And that is absolutely correct in the instance of presidential primary polls this far out from when the Iowa caucuses kick off the presidential primary season. However, there has been a consistency to the polling of the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination race. Clinton has been at or around the 60% mark since 2013. That is a few data points. One could obviously counter that that is just name recognition driving that. A large part of it probably is. Survey respondents know Clinton better than they know Sanders or O'Malley or Chaffee or Webb or whomever. Let's focus not on that 60% but instead zero in on the remaining 40%.

That is a pretty significant chunk of Democratic primary voters. A chunk that would prefer someone else to Hillary Clinton. A chunk that can be enthusiastic about that preference. But that could also be a faction of Democratic primary voters who still only comprise 40% of the total primary electorate. That may yield some primary or caucus victories -- if there is a clear alternative to Clinton behind whom that faction nearly unanimously backs -- but it still is not likely to win the Democratic nomination.

As FHQ and others have often pointed out, polling is but one indicator at which to look in the context of a presidential nomination battle. There are also fundraising and endorsements. FHQ has often drawn a parallel between Hillary Clinton in 2016 and Al Gore in 2000. It may be splitting hairs, but perhaps the better 2000 comparison is George W. Bush. Like Clinton in 2015, Bush had huge polling, fundraising and endorsement leads in 1999. Even with those advantages, Bush still lost a handful of early contests (New Hampshire, Michigan, Arizona in February and a handful of northeastern states on Super Tuesday in early March) to John McCain. An insurmountable lead does not necessarily prevent primary or caucus losses for the frontrunner, but it does present a very steep climb for any challenger for the nomination.

Clinton can and perhaps will lose a primary or caucus here and there during 2016. And if one wants to look at where enthusiastic crowds can or will matter look to the same group of contests that bedeviled the 2008 Clinton campaign: caucuses. In those lower turnout elections in states like Iowa, Minnesota, Colorado or Nevada (or Kansas, Maine and Nebraska), a small enthusiastic group might be able to overwhelm the process in a manner similar to the way the Obama campaign did in 2008 or the Paul campaigns have done in 2008, 2012 and hope to replicate in 2016.

There are a couple of things that run against that hypothesis for Clinton in 2016. First, the institutional memory within the Clinton campaign is not that short. They will, no doubt, work to prevent a similar caucuses collapse in 2016. Secondly (and perhaps because of the memories of 2008), those seven caucuses states listed above are the only caucuses states scheduled (or likely scheduled) before March 22. The remaining seven caucuses states begin the caucus/convention process on or after March 22. That is a point on the calendar where the field will have been significantly winnowed if not winnowed to just Clinton.

Look, ask anyone -- Democrat, Republican, independent or political junkie -- and they will tell you that they would rather see a real race for the Democratic nomination than something like 2012 when President Obama was seeking renomination or like 2000 when Vice President Gore easily handled a challenge from former New Jersey senator, Bill Bradley. But wanting the Democratic nomination to be competitive or as competitive as the Republican nomination race probably is is not realistic. There will likely be an attempt made to read a McCain in 2000 scenario into the 2016 Democratic nomination race, but what we may get is that scenario similar to the Romney/not-Romney dynamic in 2012.

...but with those, in this case, not-Clintons rising and falling during 2015 and peaking in the polls far below where Clinton is established. FHQ would urge folks not to jump to conclusions on all of this.

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¹ It seems that there is some effort to manufacture a contest on the Democratic side without really scrutinizing it in the same way that the Republican race is being covered. Is there any reason to suspect that Sanders would not enjoy the polling (and enthusiasm?) bumps, post-announcement, that some of the Republican candidates have seen after they threw their hats in the ring?

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Iowa. Still a Winnowing Contest. ...to Clinton and everyone else.

The news stories about the 2016 Iowa Democratic caucuses are less deja vu these days than they are like the constant, repetitive backgrounds in cartoon chase scenes. The pattern is pretty clear at this point:

1. Some combination of Hillary Clinton lost Iowa in 2008 and/or frontrunners often "stumble" there. 
2. Iowa is terrible at picking nominees/presidents.
3. A new poll is released showing Clinton up on any and all Democratic challengers.
4. Wash, rinse, repeat. 

Presumably, this will continue until Iowa in 2016. Maybe the cycle will begin anew for 2020 shortly thereafter.

Mark Z. Baraback has the latest fuel for the fire that powers this perpetual motion machine; cautioning a prospective Clinton campaign about what might lie ahead in the Hawkeye state.  The problem is that there is little caution in there. The problem from a political science perspective is that we're dealing with a small N problem. There are so few observations -- competitive nomination races in the post-reform era (1972 and after) -- that it is difficult to make generalizations in a sea of idiosyncratic presidential election cycles we can chalk up to the dynamics/fundamentals of any given year.

The point is that it is relatively easy to find examples of frontrunners losing (relative to expectations) in Iowa. [That game can be played with New Hampshire too!] Within that group there are two subgroups: 1) those frontrunners who "lose" Iowa and go on to win the nomination and 2) those frontrunners who "lose" in Iowa and lose the nomination. The latter group is fairly limited and often leads to the conclusion in #2 above. [More on that momentarily] There are, though, other groups of cycles that often get short shrift in this discussion. Most people remember recounts in 2000, but understandably forget the two (mostly) cakewalk nomination races that year. Many also fail to include the favorite (regional/state) son phenomenon that hit Iowa in the 1988-1992 period when Gephardt, Dole and Harkin won the caucuses.

So, there are exceptions. Regardless, frontrunners are typically successful in their quests for nominations no matter if you quantify that -- being a frontrunner -- as a mixture of poll position and funds raised (Mayer) or as a combination of those two and endorsements from party elites/insiders (Cohen, et al).

[And keep in mind that no one in Iowa wants to say that Hillary Clinton is inevitable. As Richard Skinner has noted in response to Peter Hamby's story from Iowa, it hurts their bottom line -- encouraging interest in the (competitive) Iowa caucuses. It is same there as it is in newsrooms where writing "Clinton is inevitable" stories gets old quite fast.]

The logical follow up is to ask why Iowa is first when it is so bad a choosing nominees/presidents. But please don't do that. That's just keeping Fred and Barney running past that doorway and potted plant. Iowa just does not derail front-running candidates with any level of regularity. It tends to winnow the field, leaving the determinative job to some subsequent state or series of state contests. That is the cycle we should be paying attention to.

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Hillary Clinton vs. John McCain

I spent a lot of time last week looking at the county-level 2008 v. 2004 map that The New York Times was running online (see below). It really is a fascinating feature, but if you've been around here long enough, this doesn't really come as any surprise. I like maps. [Incidentally, you can now compare 2008 to the past presidential elections back to 1992. Just click on "Voting Shifts."]

[Click Map to Enlarge]

Anyway, the more I looked at it, the more it looked like something I had remembered seeing somewhere before. In fact, it was right here at FHQ. One of the things that the early days of this election year allowed us was this wonderful three month period after John McCain had wrapped up the Republican nomination, but in which Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton were still actively competing for the Democratic nomination. The polling that was released during that period produced what FHQ liked to call the McCain margin.* The formula was simple: Subtract Hillary Clinton's margin against John McCain in head-to-head trial heat polls in each state from the similar margin between Obama and McCain.

[Click Map to Enlarge]

Above is the final McCain Margin map from June 3; the day of the final primaries in Montana and South Dakota. Now what you see isn't anything groundbreaking, but the areas in green (those where Clinton was doing better against McCain than Obama was) overlap to a large degree with the Times map above. It is that same swath of land from Oklahoma eastward and north into Appalachia. Now, Massachusetts and New York would have given their votes to either Democrat, and neither ever seemed terribly viable in those Appalachian states, but at the time Florida, Missouri and Pennsylvania lent some validity to that Clinton campaign argument that the New York senator would fare better in the electoral college against John McCain than would her senate colleague from Illinois. As it turned out, Obama won two of those three anyway.

While things changed for Barack Obama after the economic crisis hit (and even before that, for that matter), the same areas that vexed him during the primaries, ended up going against him on November 4. But they would have gone against either Democrat, right? Well, I'm not so sure Hillary Clinton (and by extension Bill Clinton) wouldn't have made things interesting in Arkansas, Tennessee and West Virginia. I could see a scenario where she exchanged the 16 electoral votes from North Carolina and Nebraska's 2nd district for the 22 from the three states above. That could have drastically recolored that Times map (...with North Carolina being much lighter blue and Arkansas, Tennessee and West Virginia turning blue in the process.).

That would have given Clinton 371 electoral votes (to McCain's 167). Where else would Clinton have potentially been more successful? More vulnerable?


*In 2012 the McCain Margin will be redubbed the Obama Margin because, unless Obama fails over the course of the next four years, the president-elect will run unopposed for the Democratic nomination. Translation: we get to compare the various Republican candidates against how they are doing versus President Obama in each of the states. And we probably won't have to wait until 2012. There will likely be some state level polling done in some of the more competitive states in 2011. [And I'm sure we'll start seeing national level trial heats as soon as the 2010 midterm elections are complete.]


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Now It Was the Calendar that Brought Clinton Down?

"If states had not moved up or “frontloaded” the date of their primaries and caucuses, under the misimpression that doing so would give them a greater voice in the 2008 nomination, Clinton might be the Democratic nominee."
--Michael P. McDonald, The Brookings Institution/Professor of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University

So now it was the calendar that knocked Clinton out in the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination race? State governments and state parties were deciding where to position their primaries and caucuses for 2008 during the time between March of 2005, when Arkansas became the first state to move and December of 2007, when Michigan's unsanctioned move was given the green light by the courts (over the access to voter information from the contests). Was it really a "misimpression" that 2008 would be like 2004 or 2000 or 1996 (etc.)? If 2008 had been like 2004, those states would have made "wise" decisions. They may have been lost in the shuffle among other, bigger states, but they at least would have held their contests on or before the time at which the nominee emerged. That had been the mark of most of the frontloaded system's races prior to 2008. Sure, in retrospect, those frontloading decisions may have been off the mark, but expecting states to have foreseen that is about as realistic as expecting pundits and experts to have predicted the race that just completed.

For the record, sequence did matter in 2008. But sequence has always played a role in these things. Florida's position in 1976 helped Jimmy Carter eliminate George Wallace. In 1988 the Souther Super Tuesday pushed George H.W. Bush out in front of the pack of Republicans. 1992 saw Georgia's position just after New Hampshire assist Bill Clinton in the comeback that began in the Granite state.

Sequence matters and it did in 2008 as well. That's just part of the nomination process, but it isn't the only factor. Obama's organizational prowess in the caucus states and micro-targeting of districts in state's where he did not win built the delegate advantages that he carried into the final weeks of primary season. The Clinton camp's inability to quickly devise a plan B after their Super Tuesday or bust strategy failed was the real cause of her downfall. The calendar was the same for everyone and was a known quantity (with the exception of Michigan) from early fall 2007 until Iowan kicked things off on January 3. Obama planned ahead; Clinton didn't. That is the story.

Look, I'm a staunch believer in the rules playing a decisive role in politics. Rules and rules changes form the basis of my academic pursuits and this particular set of rules (those applying to the scheduling and sequencing of presidential nominating contests) are the root of the dissertation I'm currently writing. I'm also something of a defender of/realist about the current system. Is it ideal? No. But it will be extremely difficult to get the national and state parties, Democrats and Republicans, and national and state governments on the same page to make a significant change. There are simply too many competing (not to mention, contradictory) interests involved. So now that primary season is over, it apparently is open season for frontloading bashing. The reexamination of the current system is a discussion that needs to be had, but a dose of reality is an important component of that discussion. Reform may be nice, but will be tough to come by. Rotating regional primaries may be nice, but a national primary, or something close to it, will be what we end up with.

Thanks to the good folks at Ballot Box (via The Election Law Blog) for the link.

Related: Michigan: What Would Have Happened? (from Fivethirtyeight.com)


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Clinton in 2012: The Caucus Quandary

Let's assume for a moment that Obama wins the Democratic nomination, but goes on to lose to John McCain in the general election. Let us also assume that Hillary Clinton is true to her word and campaigns vigorously and wholeheartedly for Obama ahead of said general election. Finally, let's assume that the rules governing the selection of national convention delegates is not altered in any significant way. Iowa and New Hampshire still get to go first, and the rest of the states inch ever closer to a national primary.

Would the Democratic Party automatically unite behind Clinton on November 5 following an Obama loss the day before (...or for that matter between then and the beginning of the 2012 cycle)? Whether the party does or doesn't is inconsequential because a challenger (or challengers) would emerge regardless. With Iowa set to lead off the process again (given no change in the rules), would Clinton have a problem in 2012? There has been an awful lot of talk about the caucus process during 2008. But because Clinton's performance was less than stellar in caucus states and because she and her surrogates have questioned the level of democracy inherent in them, would she have a problem in the first and most visible caucus? The Hawkeye takes pride in being the first caucus in the nation; a distinction that allows them to go before New Hampshire each cycle.

I don't doubt that Clinton would be more organized in caucus states if she were to run in 2012, but could her stance on caucuses in 2008 give an opponent, say (Sen.?) Mark Warner, an opening in Iowa? As Barack Obama proved, getting off to a good start and proving the viability of your candidacy can be hugely important. Yes, Warner's record and experience speak for themselves and he would potentially be an attractive candidate anyway, but could he (or any challenger) effectively use Clinton's late 2008 caucus position against her? If the economy has rebounded and the Iraq situation has calmed somewhat, then perhaps. But if that is the case, McCain would have a strong case to take to the American electorate and any Democrat (Clinton included) would find it difficult to topple him. If those issues are still the issues of 2012 and if the major Democratic candidates have largely similar methods of dealing with them (sound familiar?), then the caucus quandary could rear its head in Iowa.

The big issue for challengers to overcome would be the idea that 2012 is Clinton's turn. Undoubtedly, that would be a tough mountain to climb. But it looked like a tough mountain to climb in 2008 as well. And then Iowa launched Obama's candidacy. Barring any changes to the rules, though, Iowa will still have the first caucus in 2012.


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Rules Matter...but Luck Does Too

The Providence Journal's, Froma Harrop, ran a column of Clinton talking points this morning. In all the talk (both from her and separately from the Clinton campaign) of all the different metrics of nomination success, Florida and Michigan voter disenfranchisement and the undemocratic nature of caucuses, one thing continues to be underdiscussed in this Democratic nomination battle.

The bottom line is that RULES MATTER. We see the effects of those rules in a close race, but also see how adaptable each candidate's campaign is to those rules. Obama's campaign was better at foreseeing how the race would progress. PERIOD. Was that by design? Yes, but to a large degree there is some luck involved there. He had to have all the chips fall in just the right place for that plan to work. So while there may have been discussions within an Obama campaign still in its infancy then about a caucus strategy as early as last summer, they still needed Iowa or New Hampshire or Nevada or South Carolina to help even get his campaign to that point (the caucus phase between Super Tuesday and Wyoming a month later on March 8). Those Obama successes in Iowa, Nevada and South Carolina were anything but given even at the outset of the 2008 calendar year.

Foresight and luck are the marks of a long shot winning the nomination. Arguably Obama is not, in 2008, the long shot that Jimmy Carter was in 1976. Both, however, were effective at navigating through the rules of the game. And things worked out the way both campaigns expected; both by design and through some luck. Carter needed early success in Iowa and New Hampshire to set him up for an elimination contest against George Wallace in Florida. He needed that elimination to claim the mantle as the southern (albeit more moderate) candidate in the race for the Democratic nomination.

In 2008, Obama needed a win, any win, among the early states to be seen as viable in the overall contest and heading into Super Tuesday on February 5. That he got a win in mostly white Iowa was certainly better than having broken through in South Carolina, where African Americans made up over half of the primary electorate. But his win in Iowa signaled to African Americans that he was viable to an audience broader than simply African Americans. Without that signal, the race may not have played out the way it did in South Carolina. The polls in the state prior to Obama's Iowa win showed a tight race between Clinton and Obama. And even then the endorsement of the influential, Rep. Jim Clyburn (D-SC), was still sought after by Clinton, Edwards and Obama to put any one of them over the top. But it was just before It wasn't until after South Carolina that the strained relations between the Clintons and the black community began to appear. Obama's campaign emerged from both state victorious and proved their knowledge of the rules by gaining one more delegate than Clinton in Nevada, despite losing the popular vote (That knowledge of the rules extended to subsequent steps in the Nevada process as well.). Obama's path, then, was not necessarily a clear one.

On the other hand, at the outset of the contests, Clinton's path to the nomination was the clearer one. But luck runs both ways and Clinton had some bad luck. Her campaign leaned way too heavily on the approaches to the presidential primary process of the past. But we all did. Why wouldn't both parties' nominations be settled by Super Tuesday? That's the way it had been in most nomination contests since 1988. [Of course, the Clinton campaign didn't fall back on those approaches enough to take her name off the ballot in Michigan for that state's non-sanctioned primary. That decision was curious at the time given her status as front-runner.] The Super Tuesday or bust strategy was fine, in and of itself, but they never had a Plan B in place if the states that held contests on February 5 didn't hand her enough delegates for the nomination. And they certainly didn't foresee Obama building a firewall in caucus states.

The message, as always, is that rules matter. And if your knowledge of them is anything less than full, then you are vulnerable to defeat. The discussion, then, is not one of whether caucuses are democratic, or popular votes should be the metric by which a nominee is determined, or of Florida or Michigan. That's a discussion that can be had by both parties when and if they seek to reform the process between now and 2012. The discussion is about a campaign that thought primary season would go one way and later discovered (the hard way) that they had guessed wrong.



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Did the Debate Change Anything?

Rob Shewfelt and I have started an exchange on the debate in the comments to yesterday's electoral college post, and while I included some debate commentary there, the events of last night deserve their own post. The question of the day remains to what extent, if any, did the debate change things in the Democratic battle in Pennsylvania and/or the broader race for the nomination?

In a footnote to yesterday's post I wrote:
"Two things are certain to come up at some point in the ABC debate: Obama's comments and
the Clinton trust poll numbers (since they were from ABC News). I don't know that those two equate, but they will both have something negative to address during this evening's proceedings. Strategically, Obama, in Clinton-esque fashion, has attempted to turn a weakness into a strength by welcoming a debate with John McCain over who is most out of touch. He will more than likely continue with that line of argument tonight. Clinton, on the other hand, may not be able to make the same reversal. Is she on firm enough ground arguing that either Obama or McCain can be trusted less? We will have to wait until tonight to see."

After the debate Rob had this to say:
"She got the question you predicted (on trust) and one of the ones I mentioned (on guns), but she can't complain that he is being pampered by the media. It seems to me that Stephanopolous had a conflict of interest. For years we have heard about the revolving door between government (particularly civil servants) and industry leading to favorable treatment of big business. I think it is time to look at the revolving door between Congress and the Executive branch and network news. It is one thing to be a pundit on election night or a talk show, but it is entirely different being a questioner in a debate. I understand that the frontrunner gets more scrutiny than the runerup, but I think this was the most slanted questioning of a candidate in a debate I can recall.

"Clinton clearly won the debate. Obama looked bad. Clinton looked good when she answered the questions asked, but she may have overplayed her hand when she piled on after Obama stumbled. It will be interesting to see if the debate makes any difference in PA. The trend this year has been the person that gets beat up is the person who does best in the next primary. We'll know more next Wednesday morning."

One thing is for sure in both these comments: We're both taking a "wait and see approach" to this. And given the way this race has gone thus far that's pretty wise. If the 2000 general election hadn't proven most experts' predictions wrong, I'd dub this the "election in which predictions were made to be broken." Maybe I'll settle for the "primary season in which predictions were made to be broken". Nah, too long.

Anyway, here are my first reactions to Rob and the debate:
"I don't know, Rob. Yes, Clinton "won" the debate*, but Obama survived without digging a deeper hole for himself. He is in a position now with his argument of changing the "politics of distraction" that Clinton has been in playing the gender card and crying. He can't overuse it (whether he thinks its the right angle to take or not).

"And while Clinton won, she has to do more than that; she has to change the outlook of the race. And it remains to be seen whether she went beyond just winning last night. My take is that she didn't. Her solid performance was in the policy arena and voters expect her to be good there. Chris Cillizza over at The Fix brought this up in his post-debate reaction. He cites the LA Time/Bloomberg poll of PA, NC and IN voters who perceive Clinton to be the better candidate on policy, but opt for Obama anyway.

"*These proceedings are really wins for McCain. The more time the Democrats spend answering questions about guns, lapel pins and members of the Weather Underground, the more ammunition they willingly hand over to McCain and the "Republican attack machine". Both Obama and Clinton seem to be aware of this, but the fight continues."

Other thoughts? The comments section is open, so have at it FHQ readers and UGA Campaign Discussion Group regulars.

10 is the Magic Number?

In a campaign season rife with various numbers of some significance to the race, why not make room for one more. We've had 2025 and 1191 for the number of delegates necessary to win the Democratic and Republican nominations respectively. For a while there during the post-Super Tuesday Obama streak, 100 delegates was the margin under which Hillary Clinton had to get to make an argument to superdelegates. As the reality of not being able to get the delegate count under that number though, the focus of the Clinton team has shifted. And with it, the decision making calculus of the superdelegates has changed as well.

In an earlier set of posts (here and here), I laid out the parts of that process in terms of knowns and unknowns. What we know is the electablility factor and the number of contests won. The number of contests is easy enough. Obama has already won over half the states. Of course the Clinton camp is focusing on what types of states those are (red) and contending that they won't be won by a Democrat anyway. On the electability scorecard, both Clinton and Obama seem electable enough, but the more the rancorous tone of March continues, the less able the two candidates and the Democratic party will be to bridge the divide and heal the wounds in a timely enough manner for the general election.

The superdelegates who remain undecided know that though, and that was added to the decision making calculus (ver. 2.0). They feel the pressure to wrap the nomination up, but also feel the countervailing force to not choose incorrectly. That pressure figures into the unknowns of upward ambition and a superdelegate's relationship with or personal feelings for each of the candidates vying for the nomination.

With the remaining contests looking to be split fairly evenly between Obama and Clinton and with Clinton, as a result, being unable to cut significantly into Obama's delegate lead, the superdelegates are once again viewed as decisive. A post this morning by Jim Geraghty on the National Review Online hints at one remaining consideration for the undecided superdelegates to factor into their decision: taking cues from the remaining big time superdelegates.

The new magic number then, is ten. These ten superdelegates are the ones who hold enough clout within the party to tip the scale in one direction or the other as the contest phase of the nomination season draws to a close.
1. Al Gore
2. Jimmy Carter
3. Nancy Pelosi
4. Harry Reid
5. Joe Biden
6. Steny Hoyer
7. Jim Clyburn
8. Jim Webb
9. Red State House Dems up for re-election
10. Donna Brazile

With the exception of red state Democrats (a group likely to remain undecided until everyone else has weighed in--Why choose when you can use the "The party chose them" excuse with constituents?), this list makes sense. If a majority of these folks opts for one candidate over the other then either Obama is looking good or the Democratic party is likely headed for a messy convention pitting party elites against the rank-and-file membership. Given Jimmy Carter's 1980 experience, you'd think he'd weigh in to attempt to avoid a repeat of the post-convention chasm between Carter and Kennedy factions that year. None of these ten (nor the rest of the superdelegates) wants to be on the wrong side though. And that means most will wait for the chips to fall before making a decision. In other words, maybe this superdelegate convention, Tennessee governor, Phil Bresden is pushing has some validity to it.

[For a long discussion of each of these decision making factors see the earlier posts linked above.]

The Caucus Question

During the last (pre-hiatus) discussion group meeting, Paul [Gurian] brought up the idea that in typical (Super Tuesday era) nomination campaigns, caucus winners usually gain support as the number of steps in the process increase. There are a few issues at work here:

1) Some (or all) of the candidates, who won support initially, have dropped out of the race. By the time the second step rolls around, those free agents move over to the leader (or presumptive nominee).

2) If the nomination is still in doubt as subsequent caucus steps begin, the first step winner's supporters use that original plurality/majority to tweak the numbers for the next step even further in their direction. In a competitive environment then, this majority builds a modest level of momentum throughout the process, giving the original winner a delegate total greater than the projection following the first step.

As best Paul and I can ascertain, there really isn't any literature addressing this question directly, only anecdotal evidence from campaigns past. In the Super Tuesday era though, this hasn't been an issue because the field had been winnowed significantly ahead of any second step caucus meetings. This anecdotal evidence then would come from the elections after reform but prior to 1984 or 1988. In other words, the Carter vs. the field in 1976, Carter/Kennedy and Mondale/Hart match ups. Carter was a steady force throughout the 1976 nomination phase. After doing well early in 1980, Carter's support faded down the stretch as Kennedy made gains. Mondale, after having lost in early caucus rounds to Hart in 1984, gained delegates in subsequent rounds to take a significant pledged delegate lead into that year's convention.

There are two hypotheses that emerges from this:
1) The winner of the first step gains delegates in subsequent steps.
2) The frontrunner (but not necessarily the winner) gains delegates as to process progresses.
Both require controlling for either the level of competition or the amount of candidate winnowing that has taken place. And in the frontloaded era, that winnowing has been rapid enough that the second steps fell after the point at which a presumptive nominee had been determined.

[The question then becomes one of data collection and this is the tricky part, simply because the transparency of the caucus process is less than that of a primary election. The reporting just isn't the same.]

The 2008 campaign though, fits the pre-Super Tuesday era model in that the competition has extended beyond the massive, early clustering of state contests. Given Obama's success in the caucuses then, it stands to reason that he would gain even more ground in the delegate count over Clinton as the next steps are held. However, there may actually be some evidence to the contrary: that Clinton has made some gains in the lead up to the second step caucuses. The Monkey Cage (via Enik Rising) has shown that in Colorado, the post-caucus numbers have fluctuated some in the time after the precinct caucuses were held on February 5. This whole thing is speculative, but it is a means through which the Clinton campaign could make strides in the delegate disparity between the two Democratic candidates. In one state, flipping a delegate or two won't make that much of a difference in the grand scheme of things, but if this is happening across all the caucus states, then those changes could become significant.

How then does this fit in with the research question posed above? Well, it adds another layer to consider. Things get more complicated as a factor like specific candidate strategy to protect or steal delegates as the process progresses. Much of this would depend again on the competitiveness of the race and how each candidate is positioned in relation to the other. That we have witnessed a virtual tie in the 2008 Democratic race is something of an anomaly compared to races past (even competitive nomination races). And that is where the extra layer--the possibility of delegate shifting--originates. If it is perceived that the options are still open, then delegates are as a result more likely to entertain the idea of shifting. Whereas, if the race was signaling the emergence of one candidate over the other (no matter how small that lead), delegates would be less likely to move.

This is an interesting question that even just a case study of how the 2008 race (in caucuses) would provide some enlightening answers.

The Clinton End Game Strategy

If you haven't caught this story yet, be sure and pop over to The New York Times and check out the end game scenario from the Clinton camp. You have got to love a discussion of primary states in a general election (almost electoral vote) context:

"Campaign advisers said they believed Kentucky and West Virginia could ultimately be in play."

Is Clinton Back? Delegates, delegates, delegates

And the race goes on. As James Carville said on Meet the Press on Sunday--speculating about what Clinton wins in Ohio and Texas would mean for the race--it helps her rewrite the narrative. And it does. Whether it was the ads or backlash against Obama or sympathy for Clinton doesn't matter. What last night's results mean is that the Democratic primary voters are still almost evenly divided as to who their presidential nominee should be. The Obama campaign's contention is that it still maintains a sizable lead in the delegate count and that the results from the four primaries last night do not significantly affect that lead. However, with the wins she managed yesterday, Clinton now has something to back up the argument that all Obama does is win in small and/or red states. All the while she's winning the states that are important to the Democrats in November.

The race now shifts to Wyoming this weekend and Mississippi on next Tuesday. On paper, both look like Obama territory. Wyoming is a caucus state and Mississippi has a high African American population on par with other states Obama has won (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and South Carolina). But there is a catch. And for Clinton, it easily extends this race to Pennsylvania. [Well, I suppose the press is largely discounting Wyoming and Mississippi anyway; already having shifted the focus to the April 22 contest in the Keystone state.] Those are states and the fact that Obama should win them fits the newly crafted narrative of this race. He wins caucuses, small states and red states. She wins the big prizes. And that can't be welcome news for the Obama camp. If Wyoming and Mississippi are discounted, then his chances of shifting the tenor of this race [again!?!] are diminished in the process. So while Obama may have the delegate lead still, his campaign is now on the defensive.

Oh, and I suppose the supedelegates come into the picture at some point. If the contests between now and next Tuesday can't help Obama, then the report that surfaced yesterday that some number of superdelegates may break for him in the near future might. That becomes a contest of its own; one (and maybe only) that may possibly assist Obama in countering the Clinton wins from last night.

All the while, this race has devolved to certain point of negativity and is unlikely to return. And that brings us back to divisive primaries. If this Democratic race continues the slide into negativity, that affects the party's ability to heal those divisions before the convention and in the time between then and the general election. So McCain sits back and smiles, having wrapped things up officially last night. And who can blame him? The longer the Democratic race strings out, the better his chances in November seem to become.


RESULTS:

Ohio

Rhode Island

Texas

Vermont

I'll be back later with a look ahead to the rules in Wyoming, Mississippi and Pennsylvania. I'm still trying to wrap my mind around the idea of looking at polls of Wyoming Democrats.

It's Official: Debates are No Substitute for Actual Contests

The consensus emerging today (and even last night as I came to the realization when MSNBC's online feed of the debate forced me to call it a night earlier than I had expected) is that last night's debate did little to change the course of the race for the Democratic nomination. Clinton did what folks who are not the frontrunner do: she attacked. Obama, on the other hand, filled the frontrunner role and played it safe, hovering above the attacks being levied against him. The movement toward Obama in the polls (via Real Clear Politics) in both Ohio and Texas back up that role assignment. In Texas the polls show a tie, if not a small Obama lead. Ohio's numbers show that what was once a double digit lead is now down to about six points. If that continues, then Tuesday night could provide some drama, especially after last night proved that a debate can only somewhat fill the void left by the absence of real contests. If only New Jersey has not switched primary dates a second time.

I'll keep it light for the rest of the post. There are some interesting links that have popped up recently that may be of some interest to the group.

1) If you have Google Earth installed on your PC, Mac or Linux box (Hey, the 1% of the population that uses Linux counts too!), be sure to check out the superdelegates layer that has been developed. Yes, the same thing is available on Google Maps, but you can't beat the animation that comes with Google Earth. Most of this can be linked to through Superdelegates.org (The .kml file that is necessary to run the script in GEarth there if you click on, "view the info on Google Maps and Google Earth" here or on that page.). The Monkey Cage (moderated by several of the faculty at George Washington University) has a link to the GMaps version.

2) It is a good day for The Monkey Cage here at FHQ. They also have a post linking to Thomas Holbrook's (of Do Campaigns Matter? fame) new Election08Data blog. There's some good stuff there already.

3) And while we're at it, and since they linked to my post on the Texas primary/caucus last week, here's the link to Election Updates, which lists Michael Alvarez, Paul Gronke, Thad Hall, Robert Krimmer and Melissa Slemin as contributors.

Better Late than Never: Maine Results and A New Clinton Campaign Manager

Dissertations sometimes get in the way (and if I want a job in this field it better). Yesterday was one of those days. However, that didn't prevent there from being any fewer interesting stories from the campaign trail.

Obama make it a clean sweep of the weekend contests with a surprising victory in the Maine caucuses yesterday. Yes, surprising. Given the Illinois senator's caucus prowess thus far, surprising may not be an apt description of events on the ground. However, Clinton was expected to do well in a state that fit her better demographically and in which she had secured a number of top endorsements. It wasn't the two to one victory margin of Washington or Nebraska, but a twenty point win is a twenty point win.

Sure you can argue that it was just a caucus, but that argument seems less valid in this contest in this cycle. Most of the Democratic primaries have been evenly divided with a fairly even distribution of delegates emerging for both candidates. Obama though gives himself a cushion with these decisive caucus victories. Instead of a one or two delegates difference between the candidates in some of these primaries, we larger delegates margins in the recent (February 5 and on) caucus states. That's a nice counter to the superdelegate lead that Clinton has built.

Is that enough to put him over the top? Well, that is the question. And one that is difficult to answer since the majority of these caucuses are the first of two or three steps in allocating delegates (the last of which will do the delegate allocating). Iowa, for example, has its Democratic county conventions on March 15 and that is followed by district conventions on April 26 and then a state convention on June 14. That is when the delegates to the national convention are actually allocated. Will Obama lose delegates in the coming caucus steps? Probably not since he has proven to have the superior grassroots organizations in the caucus states. I made the comment earlier that Obama's established grassroots efforts would trump Clinton's on-the-fly grassroots efforts. If that is the direction the Clinton camp is taking with a new campaign manager (more on that in a moment), then these second and third caucus steps could potentially be the place to reverse the Obama caucus trend through grassroots means. Is that far-fetched? Perhaps, but let us not forget all the bartering and side-switching that went on during Iowa caucus night.

In other news over the weekend, Clinton and her campaign manager, Patricia Solis Doyle, parted ways. The Fix and The Caucus chose to call it "stepping down" while Fox News opted for the slightly more negative "replaces" to describe what had transpired. Either way you slice it, this coming on the heels of the personal loan to her campaign last week, does not make for a positive combination of stories...especially after to failing to break through in any of the weekend contests. So it remains to be seen how much impact this campaign shake up (Doyle for Maggie Williams) will have. Howard Dean dropped Joe Trippi either just before or just after Super Tuesday and John Kerry had some internal staff shifts in 2004 as did Al Gore in 2000. In case this fact slipped anyone's mind, none of those men became president. An omen for Clinton? Perhaps. One thing is for sure, something needs to be done to stem the Obama tide in these next few contests or we could be dusting off the "big mo'" before too long. Dare I say momentum? In this race? I won't yet, but that moment could be coming.

Clinton and Romney claim Nevada Victories and SC polls just closed

Former Massachusetts governor, Mitt Romney made it two in a row with an easy win in the Nevada GOP caucus this morning to go along with his win in the Michigan primary on Tuesday. Taking a winning streak into an off week won't hurt him either with Florida voters now having just less than two weeks to consider what still remains an open race on the Republican side. While Romney's camp made a last minute decision to focus on Nevada every other candidate (well, almost every other one--Giuliani is still in Florida) was putting in time in South Carolina. The polls just closed in the Palmetto state and early exit polls indicate the economy and immigration (see 7:09pm post) were on the minds of South Carolina's Republican primary voters; a clear advantage for Huckabee. TRACKING...

7:41pm: Very early but with one percent of precincts in, McCain has a 38-23 lead over Huckabee (Look, I said it was early.).

8:05pm: Just to show you that 1% isn't representative of the entire state of South Carolina on the GOP side: McCain 34, Huckabee 30 with 12% in. This one could be fun. Third place seems like a real battle between Thompson and Romney with hovering around 14%.

9:29pm: The New York Times is calling the race for McCain. When you look at that 15% that Thompson got you can't help but wonder how much that hurt Huckabee's chances at a win in SC. He (Huckabee) has a tough row to hoe now.

Meanwhile the Democrats had a caucus in Nevada as well, where Hillary Clinton continued a streak of her own. She has now run her streak of victories to two (three if you want to count Michigan and the DNC isn't) after an initial setback in Iowa's caucuses. And boy were the polls from earlier in the week wrong. What looked like a tight three-way race for the Silver state turned into a tight two-way race as former North Carolina senator, John Edwards managed a meager four percent of the vote. Clinton and Obama split the remaining 96%, 51-45. Obama didn't seem to get the support he was hoping for from the endorsement of the Culinary Workers union. While the union's endorsement was seen as a big deal, it didn't prove influential among the rank and file members as some strayed into the Clinton camp.

While the GOP is off until Florida on January 29, the Democrats have their own primary in South Carolina next Saturday where the support of African Americans will be key to which ever candidate claims victory there.

Nevada results.