A little more than a week after the chorus calling on a new and later date for the Georgia primary crescendoed, Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger (R) relented and shifted the primary back another three weeks. But the move was motivated less by pressure from some Georgia Republicans to move and more by Governor Kemp's (R) decision to extend the coronavirus-related state of emergency to May 13. That extension overlapped with early voting in the May 19 primary and forced the change.
That the primary ended up on June 9 and not June 23 like Speaker of the House Ralston (R) had suggested will save some heartache for the two political parties in the state. The former date will keep Georgia compliant with both national parties' rules on the timing of primaries and caucuses and save the parties from any penalties.
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The Georgia primary has been moved back to June 9 on the 2020 FHQ presidential primary calendar.
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Related Posts:
Chorus for an Even Later Georgia Presidential Primary Grows
Georgia House Speaker Calls for Another Presidential Primary Move in the Peach State
Georgia Postpones Presidential Primary, Consolidates with May Primaries
Georgia Will Send Absentee Request Forms to All Active Voters for May 19 Primary
Georgia House Speaker Calls for Another Presidential Primary Move in the Peach State
Showing posts with label secretary of state. Show all posts
Showing posts with label secretary of state. Show all posts
Thursday, April 9, 2020
Friday, June 21, 2019
Raffensperger Sets Georgia Presidential Primary Date for March 24
It marks just the second time since the 1980 cycle that Georgia has not held a presidential primary on the earliest date allowed by the national parties to hold primaries and caucuses. [2004 was the other.]
But while that departure from what has more often than not been the Georgia primary's traditional position on the calendar is noteworthy, some of the maneuvering behind the scenes of the presidential primary date being set is as well.
According to the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Raffensperger earlier this week suggested that a final decision on the primary date would not be made until after new voting machines for the state had been purchased. But this continued delay has drawn the ire of some local elections officials across Georgia who wanted more certainty about when the presidential primary would be scheduled.
And that is not out of the ordinary for elections officials. They crave certainty and as far in advance of an election as possible.
However, what is interesting about this is that the Georgia presidential primary dates for both 2012 and 2016 were not set by then-Secretary of State Brian Kemp (R) until September in the years before both election years. Granted, Kemp telegraphed the date of the 2016 primary as early as 2014 when he began the push to coordinate the SEC primary, a cluster of southern state primaries on the first Tuesday in March. But the 2012 Georgia primary date was not set until the very end of September. And there was speculation even the week leading up to that decision in September 2011 about when the primary would be scheduled.
But there was no reported backlash from elected officials in either cycle (but especially 2011).
One might counter that the added uncertainty of the new voting machines may be driving this response from local elections administrators. Yet, in the quotes gathered from elections administrators by the AJC, it was not the machines that were cited as the complicating factor. Instead, reserving polling locations, potential complications with early/absentee voting, and ballot printing schedules were cited as the reasons for the response to the lack of a presidential primary date.
At least Raffensperger did not wait until the statutory deadline to set the date: December 1.
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Why March 24?
Again, a late March date for the Georgia primary is unusual. Even in 2004, when last Georgia did not have a primary on the earliest date allowed by the national parties, the primary fell on the first Tuesday in March. The earliest allowed date that cycle was the first Tuesday in February. Georgia just did not move up into February with a handful of smaller states. That (move to February) did not happen until 2008 when, like the 2020 cycle, a lot of states were crowding onto the earliest date allowed.
March 24, then, is the latest a Georgia presidential primary has fallen on the calendar since the 1976 cycle that saw Georgian, Jimmy Carter, win the Democratic presidential nomination.
Why break from the norm?
Well, the AJC cites one reason: to maximize the influence. Historically, that has been the reasoning that led to a great deal of frontloading on the presidential primary calendar. As calendars became more crowded over time during the post-reform era, states continued to pile on to typically the earliest allowed date. But the calculus -- or perhaps the perception -- was different then. Maximizing influence meant holding a contest at a time on the calendar before the nomination race had resolved itself. And most states that opted to move reasoned that contests as early as possible guaranteed that influence. Even if it meant sharing a date on the calendar with 10 or 15 or 25 other states.
Better to share an early calendar spot and have some (diluted) influence than gamble with a later more isolated date that may fall after a presumptive nominee has emerged and have no influence.
But if the perception is that the nomination race may carry on a bit, then the date-setting calculus changes. Early dates continue to offer that same guarantee of some influence, but the gamble of a later date may not be as great.
Moreover, the 2011 change to Georgia law is an important piece to this puzzle. It was then that the Georgia legislature got out of the business of setting the presidential primary date and ceded that authority to the secretary of state. The biggest impact there was the timing of the decision. Whereas the Georgia General Assembly only had a window between January and early May of the year before a presidential election to make a decision on the primary date, the new law gave the secretary of state until December 1 of the year prior to the presidential election.
That January-May window can be a busy one not just internally for all the business of a state legislature, but externally for all the primary movement -- proposed or fully realized -- happening in state legislatures across the country. In other words, Georgia was always at a disadvantage because of its early legislative adjournment date. Georgia could move its primary only to see other states choose to join it on an early date, diluting the Peach state's influence on that date.
Allowing the secretary of state to make the date-setting decision and giving that office until December 1 to do that flips the tables in Georgia's favor. Now, instead of changing dates only to find later that it gets crowded, the Georgia secretary of state can wait, assess the state of any upcoming nomination race (particularly its potential longevity) and pick a position that most benefits the state.
So if it looks like a race with a large field of candidates may not winnow down to one before an open week fairly early in the calendar, then why not opt for that date? Well, that is exactly what Raffensperger has done. March 24 has been wide open on the calendar for a while now and at this late date is unlikely to see any other states reschedule for that date.
It is not a guarantee of influence, but if the nomination race continues to that point, then it could mean a great deal of influence.
Finally, there is one other factor that may have played a role in this decision other than the open date Georgia has seemingly secured for itself alone. It is something that FHQ mentioned back in January in a post about Republican state party rules changes for 2020 to help Trump:
If a state is viewed now as a strong Trump state in the nomination phase of the process, then why not move it to a point on the calendar where the number of Trump delegates could be maximized? Take Georgia. Traditionally the Peach state has been a Super Tuesday mainstay. And it may still be in 2020. However, the newly elected Republican secretary of state there may hear from the Trump campaign. So might the Georgia Republican Party. The former could set the date of the Georgia primary for some point after March 15 and that would allow the latter to set the allocation method for winner-take-all (without penalty).Yes, the Democratic Party has the active nomination race, but that does not mean that there is not maneuvering on the Republican side. And Secretary Raffensperger is a Republican who may or may not be making this move to help Democrats in the state. He may instead be choosing a primary date that maximizes Georgia's influence on the Republican process, handing the president a guaranteed cache of delegates that may help the president secure the nomination more quickly through winner-take-all delegate allocation rules.
But that is a question for the Georgia Republican Party. It will have to make that decision before October 1.
The Georgia presidential primary date change has been added to the 2020 FHQ presidential primary calendar.
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Wednesday, February 11, 2015
Vermont Bill Would Move Presidential Primary to Same Date as New Hampshire's
Legislation was introduced in the Vermont state Senate on Tuesday, February 10 to move the Green Mountain state presidential primary in line with the first in the nation primary in New Hampshire.
State Senator Anthony Pollina (PD-28th, North Middlesex)1 introduced S 76 to not only schedule the Vermont presidential primary for the same date as the New Hampshire primary, but to also leave that date setting power to the Vermont secretary of state. This would not only tether the Vermont primary to its counterpart in neighboring New Hampshire, but it also mimics the New Hampshire presidential primary law to some degree by ceding the date-setting power to the secretary of state.
Now, FHQ says to some degree. The New Hampshire law sets the Granite state primary for the second Tuesday in March. If, however, other states opt to go earlier than that point on the calendar -- an outcome that is a given in the post-reform era -- the New Hampshire secretary of state has the ability/requirement to move the presidential primary to a spot on the calendar seven days before any other similar election. The Vermont bill does not really provide its secretary of state with such power. The bill calls for the primary date to be the same as New Hampshire's and would require the secretary of state to set that date once New Hampshire's date is settled.
That is not the same as the New Hampshire law. But that is not the key point here. The important thing is that we have witnessed all of this before. New Hampshire and Secretary of State Bill Gardner in particular has been adept at playing this waiting game; not setting a date for New Hampshire until the dust has either completely settled or has all but reached that state (see 2011 for examples here, here and here). Adept is an apt description, but seasoned would be accurate as well. Gardner and New Hampshire have been through this before. His office has the ability to wait other states out and in turn the state's election administration apparatus has to be able to respond quickly and hold an essentially snap election just weeks later (a less than two month turnaround in 2008 and 2012).
But this potential Vermont challenge is slightly different than the normal threat to New Hampshire's first in the nation status. This is similar to the North Carolina threat to South Carolina. This is not a situation where a state has drawn a specific line in the sand (see Texas) that only requires New Hampshire to jump to an earlier date. Rather, Vermont -- like North Carolina -- has tethered the date of its contest to that of another state. In other words, there is no escaping the challenging state.
Nevertheless, this tethering is not unusual territory for New Hampshire and Secretary Gardner. Delaware coupled its primary to New Hampshire's in 1996 and 2000; the Saturday after New Hampshire. Wyoming Republicans in 2007 initially scheduled their caucuses for the same date as New Hampshire for 2008 before opting to go before the Granite state. In both instances, New Hampshire escaped. In the Delaware case, the candidates were basically blackballed by the parties in New Hampshire if they campaigned in Delaware. That rendered the contest in the First state virtually meaningless. The candidates and press were in New Hampshire. Wyoming is a tough draw for the candidates and media in the best of times, but in January neither group was likely to provide caucuses with much attention. [See also Nevada in 2011]
If the party rules do not dissuade Vermont, then look for the parties in New Hampshire to put pressure on the candidates to steer clear of the Green Mountain state. That is how it has worked in New Hampshire in the post-reform era.
UPDATE: Is this bill meant to help Senator Bernie Sanders?
UPDATE (2/18/15): Identical legislation introduced in state House
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1 Senator Pollina is a member of the Progressive Party in Vermont.
Recent Posts:
Texas Bill Introduced to Move Presidential Primary to January
Idaho Republican Party Votes to Return to Presidential Primary, but...
DC Presidential Primary Continues Slow Crawl to June
Are you following FHQ on Twitter, Google+ and Facebook? Click on the links to join in.
State Senator Anthony Pollina (PD-28th, North Middlesex)1 introduced S 76 to not only schedule the Vermont presidential primary for the same date as the New Hampshire primary, but to also leave that date setting power to the Vermont secretary of state. This would not only tether the Vermont primary to its counterpart in neighboring New Hampshire, but it also mimics the New Hampshire presidential primary law to some degree by ceding the date-setting power to the secretary of state.
Now, FHQ says to some degree. The New Hampshire law sets the Granite state primary for the second Tuesday in March. If, however, other states opt to go earlier than that point on the calendar -- an outcome that is a given in the post-reform era -- the New Hampshire secretary of state has the ability/requirement to move the presidential primary to a spot on the calendar seven days before any other similar election. The Vermont bill does not really provide its secretary of state with such power. The bill calls for the primary date to be the same as New Hampshire's and would require the secretary of state to set that date once New Hampshire's date is settled.
That is not the same as the New Hampshire law. But that is not the key point here. The important thing is that we have witnessed all of this before. New Hampshire and Secretary of State Bill Gardner in particular has been adept at playing this waiting game; not setting a date for New Hampshire until the dust has either completely settled or has all but reached that state (see 2011 for examples here, here and here). Adept is an apt description, but seasoned would be accurate as well. Gardner and New Hampshire have been through this before. His office has the ability to wait other states out and in turn the state's election administration apparatus has to be able to respond quickly and hold an essentially snap election just weeks later (a less than two month turnaround in 2008 and 2012).
But this potential Vermont challenge is slightly different than the normal threat to New Hampshire's first in the nation status. This is similar to the North Carolina threat to South Carolina. This is not a situation where a state has drawn a specific line in the sand (see Texas) that only requires New Hampshire to jump to an earlier date. Rather, Vermont -- like North Carolina -- has tethered the date of its contest to that of another state. In other words, there is no escaping the challenging state.
Nevertheless, this tethering is not unusual territory for New Hampshire and Secretary Gardner. Delaware coupled its primary to New Hampshire's in 1996 and 2000; the Saturday after New Hampshire. Wyoming Republicans in 2007 initially scheduled their caucuses for the same date as New Hampshire for 2008 before opting to go before the Granite state. In both instances, New Hampshire escaped. In the Delaware case, the candidates were basically blackballed by the parties in New Hampshire if they campaigned in Delaware. That rendered the contest in the First state virtually meaningless. The candidates and press were in New Hampshire. Wyoming is a tough draw for the candidates and media in the best of times, but in January neither group was likely to provide caucuses with much attention. [See also Nevada in 2011]
If the party rules do not dissuade Vermont, then look for the parties in New Hampshire to put pressure on the candidates to steer clear of the Green Mountain state. That is how it has worked in New Hampshire in the post-reform era.
UPDATE: Is this bill meant to help Senator Bernie Sanders?
UPDATE (2/18/15): Identical legislation introduced in state House
--
1 Senator Pollina is a member of the Progressive Party in Vermont.
Recent Posts:
Texas Bill Introduced to Move Presidential Primary to January
Idaho Republican Party Votes to Return to Presidential Primary, but...
DC Presidential Primary Continues Slow Crawl to June
Are you following FHQ on Twitter, Google+ and Facebook? Click on the links to join in.
Thursday, March 6, 2014
An SEC Primary in 2016? Not so fast… (Part II)
A couple of weeks ago FHQ examined the likelihood that the states most closely associated with Secretary of State Brian Kemp's (R-GA) southeastern regional primary proposal would be able to implement a presidential primary move. That was more of an internal look at what may affect the calculus in each state. The post touched on outside factors that may affect that decision-making process, but only in passing. Obviously, there are other matters that may intervene to complicate things.
There is some history here. The idea of a southern regional primary is not a new one. Barely a year after the reformed presidential nomination process got its first trial run in 1972, Jimmy Carter was out laying the groundwork for a nomination bid on the Democratic side in 1976 but was also trumpeting the strategic virtues of holding a collective southern regional primary. The benefits seemed clear. The South would speak with one voice and propel a more moderate-to-conservative candidate to the Democratic nomination who could, in turn, better compete in the general election.
As it turned out, it took the states of the South a decade and a half to coordinate this, bringing the idea to fruition. It took some cajoling from the Carter folks ahead of the 1980 renomination run against Ted Kennedy to convince legislators in Florida to hold pat in March and legislators in Alabama and Georgia to move up to coincide with the primary in the Sunshine state. That subregional primary was to serve as a counterweight to the delegate gains Kennedy was likely to win in New Hampshire and Massachusetts.1
Four years later, several southern and border states adopted caucuses for the competitive Democratic nomination race, joining Alabama, Florida and Georgia in March, though not all on the same date. Only the Oklahoma Democratic caucuses were on that same second Tuesday in March date. Caucuses in Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi and South Carolina followed later in the month. Collectively the South spoke with something approximating a single voice, but the result was not support for a more moderate candidate.2 Rather, it was support for Walter Mondale.
There was, then, no alignment between the notion of a strong, unified regional voice in the process and a homegrown, southern, moderate-to-conservative candidate. The former seemed more likely with a southern bloc of contests, but that did not happen until the 1988 invisible primary. Even then -- with everything lined up -- the South did not speak with one voice in the 1988 Democratic primary. The unintended consequence was that three Democratic candidates emerged from the Southern Super Tuesday with a claim to victory -- Dukakis in the populous South (Florida and Texas), Gore in the peripheral South and Jackson in the Deep South -- all while George HW Bush used a sweep of the region on Super Tuesday to consolidate his hold on the Republican nomination.
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The dynamics of any given nomination race matter and it is difficult to gauge ahead of time -- as a decision-maker on the state level -- what those dynamics will look like in, say, two years time. That is the cautionary tale for those thinking of coordinating primaries in 2016. That past repeated itself to some degree in 2008 on the Democratic side (though not in a regional sense). Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton roughly split the logjam of national contests on Super Tuesday while John McCain significantly stretched the delegate lead he had established during the January contests.
What are the dynamics FHQ is talking about?
The candidates who run combined with the sequence of primaries and caucuses and the rules of delegate allocation are basics. And all are unknown at this point in time to those state-level decision-makers. There is a baseline calendar for 2016, but the question is how state actors view that terrain in light of the national party rules on (national convention) delegate selection. Actually, this constitutes several questions:
None of this is happening in a vacuum. These decisions to move a primary or caucuses are not independent of one another. The answer to question #1 depends on the willingness and ability of the state to move based on structural factors. FHQ has already discussed that for the states potentially involved in this retro-southern regional primary concept proposed by Georgia Secretary of State Kemp. Nothing in that proposal suggests that any of the southern go rogue, so the states of the South will avoid penalty so long as the Democratic National Committee retains a similar calendar to the Republican National Committee.
But there is something to questions #3-5 posed above. Partnering with other states in a region has its advantages, but it seems that that exercise has diminishing returns for the states involved as more states sign on. This needs a deeper examination, but one could argue that the most successful regional primaries have been subregional primaries; smaller clusters of contests at a point on the calendar that provides that group of states with the spotlight and is also earlier than the point at which 50% plus one of the delegates has been allocated to one candidate (effectively ending the nomination race). Contrast the 1988 Southern Super Tuesday with the 2008 Potomac Primary (Maryland, Virginia and Washington, DC), for example.
The former was a mega-primary that allowed candidates to pick and choose their spots (as on the Democratic side in 1988). One could also just as easily see such a contest giving advantage to an unintended beneficiary (as on the Republican side in 1988). That is, someone of the party opposite the dominant partisanship of the region or a front-running candidate with the resources to compete in such a large number of states. Alternatively, the latter, if shrewdly scheduled (in this case a week after a rush of more than 25 contests in 2008), can draw candidates into a small area of competition with similar issues. Again, that was true in 2008 with the Potomac Primary, but one could also consider the Alabama/Mississippi cluster the week after Super Tuesday in 2012 another of these. Many have argued that those contests were evidence of Romney's poor showings in the South, but while the former Massachusetts governor lost in both, he emerged at near parity with Santorum and Gingrich in the delegate count in each. In other words, it was competitive; something a subregional cluster would desire.
This is actually an idea that the DNC attempted to nurture in 2012: clusters of primaries. Neighboring groups of three or more states that held concurrent primaries in or after April on the calendar a 15% delegate bonus. That was viewed as a way of matching up state and candidate interests but also for giving incentive to later primary and caucuses dates.
Broadly speaking, though, this is an hypothesis that needs some additional research. Is there at point of diminishing returns in terms of what states and candidates get out of a Super Tuesday pile up of contests. Smaller, distinct (date and regional proximity) clusters may be better able to accomplish this. That seemed to be part of the lesson that states seemed to have learned after 2008. Part of the motivation many states had in moving back was a change in national party rules (the February to March transition of the post-carve-out window), but the other part was that a number of states herded to Super Tuesday in 2008 and got nothing out of it.
Those are the competing interests facing those states willing to move around for the 2016 cycle: 1) Learn the lesson of 2008 and attempt to pick and choose a spot on the calendar (either alone or as a small cluster of subregional states) or 2) Move en masse to the earliest date allowed by the parties -- the first Tuesday in March.3 Those two options are not mutually exclusive. It could be that a group of southern states, for instance, cluster on March 1 (fulfilling the first option with the exception maybe of the small cluster) and that has the effect of triggering a rush on the date by other states. That reactionary group of states would be operating under the rationale -- as was the case before 2008 -- that if they do not move they will run the risk of falling after the point in the races where enough of the delegates have been allocated to have singled out a presumptive nominee.
There may also be the added layer of indirect involvement from the national parties as well; coaxing some states to move around. And this goes both ways; not Democratic and Republican so much as moving up and back. In 2012, there was some talk about national Democrats urging some states to move back to negatively affect the Republican process. Northeastern states would move back, making the front half of the calendar more southern and conservative. That would, in turn, hypothetically hurt Romney. The result was something of a mixed bag. Romney had a somewhat rough path to the nomination, but that was not a function of a conservative first half of the calendar. There was a good regional mix of early contests even if a group of mid-Atlantic/northeastern states moved back into late April. The real culprit for the drawn out Republican contest was the dispersion of contests across the entire calendar.
Assuming we witness some movement on Secretary Kemp's southern regional primary on March 1, we could see Republicans (nationally or the RNC quietly) urge just the opposite of what Democrats wanted in 2012. The idea of a southern regional primary isn't new as discussed above, but neither is the idea of a regional primary in this cycle. It was just last November that RNC Chairman Reince Priebus was talking about a midwestern regional primary. If contests in the South begin moving up to March 1, there could very quickly be a quiet yet concerted effort to find a group of contests to serve as a counterbalance on the Republican calendar either on March 1 or not long after. Ohio is already scheduled for that week after Super Tuesday.
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States once were slow to react to primary/caucuses movement in other states. A move in one cycle was met with a move in a the next subsequent cycle (if a state was compelled to move at all). That process has sped up over the last several presidential election cycles and reaction time had decreased. Since California moved its presidential primary from June to March in the 1996 cycle -- shifting with it the center of gravity in terms of the balance of delegates allocated over time across the primary calendar -- states have begun reacting within cycle. In other words, moving to a date that looks ripe for the taking now does not necessarily mean that that same date will not be jam packed with a number of other contests in the near future.
This hypothesis fits well in the policy diffusion literature. It also is something that FHQ has explored to some extent in a regional context. If one state moves its primary or caucuses, does that increase the likelihood that a neighboring state moves as well? What we found across a limited dataset -- the 2004 and 2008 cycles -- was the exact opposite: That if a neighboring state moved up, it decreased movement in surrounding states. At this point, FHQ is willing to chalk that up to a limited number of observations in just primary states across just a couple of cycles. It bears further research.
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Again, it is easy to look at the surface issues here and move on if you are a state-level actor. Move up, bring along some regional partners, get more attention and affect the nomination. Under that surface, though, there is a lot to think through. It can quickly become a complicated series of unknowns. The changes to the Republican delegate selection rules have limited the world of possibilities by adding some penalties with teeth, but that does not mean that there are not 50 states -- some with multiple actors involved -- that are attempting to reduce uncertainty, game the system and gain an advantage for themselves (in terms of gaining attention and influencing the process). One move by a state or a series of states can set off any number of possibilities in reaction.
That's the take home message in this jumbled mess: unintended consequences. One move begets another move that may negate your original move. And there usually is not a rejoinder to the response. There isn't time.
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1 As it turned out, Carter won New Hampshire and all three southern states in the 1980 primaries and it was not until later in the calendar that Kennedy began to close the delegate gap. Even that was too little too late.
2 Jesse Jackson's win in South Carolina and Gary Hart's in Oklahoma were the only two holes in an otherwise unified South. Those exceptions were early (March) contests and undercut the idea of the South collectively influencing the process by backing one candidate.
3 There is a third option as well. States could simply hold their ground and stay where current state law has the primary scheduled. Many states will do this as well.
There is some history here. The idea of a southern regional primary is not a new one. Barely a year after the reformed presidential nomination process got its first trial run in 1972, Jimmy Carter was out laying the groundwork for a nomination bid on the Democratic side in 1976 but was also trumpeting the strategic virtues of holding a collective southern regional primary. The benefits seemed clear. The South would speak with one voice and propel a more moderate-to-conservative candidate to the Democratic nomination who could, in turn, better compete in the general election.
As it turned out, it took the states of the South a decade and a half to coordinate this, bringing the idea to fruition. It took some cajoling from the Carter folks ahead of the 1980 renomination run against Ted Kennedy to convince legislators in Florida to hold pat in March and legislators in Alabama and Georgia to move up to coincide with the primary in the Sunshine state. That subregional primary was to serve as a counterweight to the delegate gains Kennedy was likely to win in New Hampshire and Massachusetts.1
Four years later, several southern and border states adopted caucuses for the competitive Democratic nomination race, joining Alabama, Florida and Georgia in March, though not all on the same date. Only the Oklahoma Democratic caucuses were on that same second Tuesday in March date. Caucuses in Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi and South Carolina followed later in the month. Collectively the South spoke with something approximating a single voice, but the result was not support for a more moderate candidate.2 Rather, it was support for Walter Mondale.
There was, then, no alignment between the notion of a strong, unified regional voice in the process and a homegrown, southern, moderate-to-conservative candidate. The former seemed more likely with a southern bloc of contests, but that did not happen until the 1988 invisible primary. Even then -- with everything lined up -- the South did not speak with one voice in the 1988 Democratic primary. The unintended consequence was that three Democratic candidates emerged from the Southern Super Tuesday with a claim to victory -- Dukakis in the populous South (Florida and Texas), Gore in the peripheral South and Jackson in the Deep South -- all while George HW Bush used a sweep of the region on Super Tuesday to consolidate his hold on the Republican nomination.
--
The dynamics of any given nomination race matter and it is difficult to gauge ahead of time -- as a decision-maker on the state level -- what those dynamics will look like in, say, two years time. That is the cautionary tale for those thinking of coordinating primaries in 2016. That past repeated itself to some degree in 2008 on the Democratic side (though not in a regional sense). Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton roughly split the logjam of national contests on Super Tuesday while John McCain significantly stretched the delegate lead he had established during the January contests.
What are the dynamics FHQ is talking about?
The candidates who run combined with the sequence of primaries and caucuses and the rules of delegate allocation are basics. And all are unknown at this point in time to those state-level decision-makers. There is a baseline calendar for 2016, but the question is how state actors view that terrain in light of the national party rules on (national convention) delegate selection. Actually, this constitutes several questions:
- Do we want to move our delegate selection contest up (to an earlier point on the calendar)?
- Does a new position mean incurring a penalty from one or both national parties?
- Does a new position mean conducting an election on the same day as a number of other regional partners?
- Does a new position mean conducting an election on the same day as a number of other states with no one dominant region?
- Does moving to a new position to create a regional primary (question #3) mean that other states (or regions -- see question #4) will herd toward that date; typically in the post-reform era, the first date allowed by both national parties (the first Tuesday in March in 2016)?
None of this is happening in a vacuum. These decisions to move a primary or caucuses are not independent of one another. The answer to question #1 depends on the willingness and ability of the state to move based on structural factors. FHQ has already discussed that for the states potentially involved in this retro-southern regional primary concept proposed by Georgia Secretary of State Kemp. Nothing in that proposal suggests that any of the southern go rogue, so the states of the South will avoid penalty so long as the Democratic National Committee retains a similar calendar to the Republican National Committee.
But there is something to questions #3-5 posed above. Partnering with other states in a region has its advantages, but it seems that that exercise has diminishing returns for the states involved as more states sign on. This needs a deeper examination, but one could argue that the most successful regional primaries have been subregional primaries; smaller clusters of contests at a point on the calendar that provides that group of states with the spotlight and is also earlier than the point at which 50% plus one of the delegates has been allocated to one candidate (effectively ending the nomination race). Contrast the 1988 Southern Super Tuesday with the 2008 Potomac Primary (Maryland, Virginia and Washington, DC), for example.
The former was a mega-primary that allowed candidates to pick and choose their spots (as on the Democratic side in 1988). One could also just as easily see such a contest giving advantage to an unintended beneficiary (as on the Republican side in 1988). That is, someone of the party opposite the dominant partisanship of the region or a front-running candidate with the resources to compete in such a large number of states. Alternatively, the latter, if shrewdly scheduled (in this case a week after a rush of more than 25 contests in 2008), can draw candidates into a small area of competition with similar issues. Again, that was true in 2008 with the Potomac Primary, but one could also consider the Alabama/Mississippi cluster the week after Super Tuesday in 2012 another of these. Many have argued that those contests were evidence of Romney's poor showings in the South, but while the former Massachusetts governor lost in both, he emerged at near parity with Santorum and Gingrich in the delegate count in each. In other words, it was competitive; something a subregional cluster would desire.
This is actually an idea that the DNC attempted to nurture in 2012: clusters of primaries. Neighboring groups of three or more states that held concurrent primaries in or after April on the calendar a 15% delegate bonus. That was viewed as a way of matching up state and candidate interests but also for giving incentive to later primary and caucuses dates.
Broadly speaking, though, this is an hypothesis that needs some additional research. Is there at point of diminishing returns in terms of what states and candidates get out of a Super Tuesday pile up of contests. Smaller, distinct (date and regional proximity) clusters may be better able to accomplish this. That seemed to be part of the lesson that states seemed to have learned after 2008. Part of the motivation many states had in moving back was a change in national party rules (the February to March transition of the post-carve-out window), but the other part was that a number of states herded to Super Tuesday in 2008 and got nothing out of it.
Those are the competing interests facing those states willing to move around for the 2016 cycle: 1) Learn the lesson of 2008 and attempt to pick and choose a spot on the calendar (either alone or as a small cluster of subregional states) or 2) Move en masse to the earliest date allowed by the parties -- the first Tuesday in March.3 Those two options are not mutually exclusive. It could be that a group of southern states, for instance, cluster on March 1 (fulfilling the first option with the exception maybe of the small cluster) and that has the effect of triggering a rush on the date by other states. That reactionary group of states would be operating under the rationale -- as was the case before 2008 -- that if they do not move they will run the risk of falling after the point in the races where enough of the delegates have been allocated to have singled out a presumptive nominee.
There may also be the added layer of indirect involvement from the national parties as well; coaxing some states to move around. And this goes both ways; not Democratic and Republican so much as moving up and back. In 2012, there was some talk about national Democrats urging some states to move back to negatively affect the Republican process. Northeastern states would move back, making the front half of the calendar more southern and conservative. That would, in turn, hypothetically hurt Romney. The result was something of a mixed bag. Romney had a somewhat rough path to the nomination, but that was not a function of a conservative first half of the calendar. There was a good regional mix of early contests even if a group of mid-Atlantic/northeastern states moved back into late April. The real culprit for the drawn out Republican contest was the dispersion of contests across the entire calendar.
Assuming we witness some movement on Secretary Kemp's southern regional primary on March 1, we could see Republicans (nationally or the RNC quietly) urge just the opposite of what Democrats wanted in 2012. The idea of a southern regional primary isn't new as discussed above, but neither is the idea of a regional primary in this cycle. It was just last November that RNC Chairman Reince Priebus was talking about a midwestern regional primary. If contests in the South begin moving up to March 1, there could very quickly be a quiet yet concerted effort to find a group of contests to serve as a counterbalance on the Republican calendar either on March 1 or not long after. Ohio is already scheduled for that week after Super Tuesday.
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States once were slow to react to primary/caucuses movement in other states. A move in one cycle was met with a move in a the next subsequent cycle (if a state was compelled to move at all). That process has sped up over the last several presidential election cycles and reaction time had decreased. Since California moved its presidential primary from June to March in the 1996 cycle -- shifting with it the center of gravity in terms of the balance of delegates allocated over time across the primary calendar -- states have begun reacting within cycle. In other words, moving to a date that looks ripe for the taking now does not necessarily mean that that same date will not be jam packed with a number of other contests in the near future.
This hypothesis fits well in the policy diffusion literature. It also is something that FHQ has explored to some extent in a regional context. If one state moves its primary or caucuses, does that increase the likelihood that a neighboring state moves as well? What we found across a limited dataset -- the 2004 and 2008 cycles -- was the exact opposite: That if a neighboring state moved up, it decreased movement in surrounding states. At this point, FHQ is willing to chalk that up to a limited number of observations in just primary states across just a couple of cycles. It bears further research.
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Again, it is easy to look at the surface issues here and move on if you are a state-level actor. Move up, bring along some regional partners, get more attention and affect the nomination. Under that surface, though, there is a lot to think through. It can quickly become a complicated series of unknowns. The changes to the Republican delegate selection rules have limited the world of possibilities by adding some penalties with teeth, but that does not mean that there are not 50 states -- some with multiple actors involved -- that are attempting to reduce uncertainty, game the system and gain an advantage for themselves (in terms of gaining attention and influencing the process). One move by a state or a series of states can set off any number of possibilities in reaction.
That's the take home message in this jumbled mess: unintended consequences. One move begets another move that may negate your original move. And there usually is not a rejoinder to the response. There isn't time.
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1 As it turned out, Carter won New Hampshire and all three southern states in the 1980 primaries and it was not until later in the calendar that Kennedy began to close the delegate gap. Even that was too little too late.
2 Jesse Jackson's win in South Carolina and Gary Hart's in Oklahoma were the only two holes in an otherwise unified South. Those exceptions were early (March) contests and undercut the idea of the South collectively influencing the process by backing one candidate.
3 There is a third option as well. States could simply hold their ground and stay where current state law has the primary scheduled. Many states will do this as well.
Thursday, February 20, 2014
An SEC Primary in 2016? Not so fast… (Part I)
Last week at the National Association of Secretaries of State meeting in Washington, Georgia secretary of state, Brian Kemp (R), rolled out a proposal for the alignment of southern presidential primaries on the first Tuesday in March in 2016. And Secretary Kemp has gotten some "positive feedback" on the plan from others in Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi.1
That's all well and good, but let's have a bit of a look under the hood on this thing. In the first part, FHQ will look at those states named above that have expressed an interest in the possibility of a southeastern regional primary.
The date that Secretary Kemp has proposed for what has been affectionately called the SEC primary is March 1. That is the first date on which states other than the four carve-outs -- Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina -- can hold delegate selection events under the actual (RNC) or expected (DNC) rules. In other words, that may be an attractive landing point for any number of states (see Super Tuesday on February 5, 2008). As of now, March 1 already has a southern flavor. Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia are scheduled for that date according to current state laws in each. Adding Georgia to the mix gives the South the clearest and strongest regional voice on that date. That would make five out of the eight states southern with Massachusetts and Vermont serving as only a token regional counterweight.
But what is the likelihood that others (from the South) join those four (or five if one counts Georgia) on March 1?
Georgia is unique in that the state legislature ceded the authority to set the date of the Peach state presidential primary to the secretary of state in 2011. That makes Georgia like New Hampshire in that regard. Basically what that transfer of power means is that Georgia, like New Hampshire, is better able to move its presidential primary around without the potential for gridlock or just inaction on the part of a state legislature. Getting Georgia to March 1, then, is an easier task than it will be for other states.
And there will be something of a dilemma in the other states to whom that Secretary Kemp has reached out. Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi will have push a date change through their legislatures. Secretaries of state in each of those states can (attempt to) initiate the legislative process on such moves, but that is no guarantee that there will actually be any shifting. The reason there is no guarantee is that such a proposal raises questions about the expected utility of a move. Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are already in March.
What difference does it make to move up a week (as is the case in Alabama and Mississippi) or two-ish (for Louisiana's now customary Saturday primary)?
In Alabama and Mississippi, the expected cost or benefit of a move may or may not be financial. Both are already in March, so the trade-off is more a matter of going with a larger group of southern states and risking getting lost in the shuffle or sticking with a smaller subregional primary on a date a week later when they may collectively and effectively counterbalance the Ohio primary on the same date. That is a tougher question to answer when both dates -- the first and second Tuesday in March -- are potentially attractive landing points on the calendar for a number of states. Getting lost in the shuffle may be a foregone conclusion when it is all said and done and the calendar is finalized in late 2015.
The gamble is similar in Louisiana in that the internal debate is a function of choosing between a date where they may have a greater share of the spotlight later on (if the nomination races are still going in late March) and a date when many other southern states hold their contests; a proposition the nets the Pelican state some regional clout but not necessarily direct attention from the candidates. The situation in Louisiana is complicated by the fact that the state has utilized a Saturday primary the last two cycles. Part of that is designed to reserve a spot on the presidential primary stage where Louisiana stands alone or with other smaller and/or caucuses states. The spotlight favors them.
Legislators in Arkansas face a slightly different calculus. First of all, the new RNC rules almost force Arkansas to consider moving up. Currently scheduled for the next to last Tuesday in May, the Arkansas primary falls at a point on the calendar after the cutoff for when primaries will need to be held to accommodate a late June or early to mid-July Republican convention. But that only adds to the classic late state dilemma: move everything up (presidential primary, state and local primaries and all) or create a separate presidential primary that is easier to move around (but also costs the state additional election funds)? Arkansas has twice gone the latter route (1988 and 2008) and twice has gotten essentially no bang for its buck, the extra expenditure got the state nothing in the way of advertising dollars or candidate attention. How ready and willing is Arkansas going to be to repeat that pattern? The alternative -- moving a consolidated set of primaries to an earlier date -- has its own pitfalls. Such a move impacts state legislators tasked with making the move in the first place. Moving a consolidated primary up lengthens a state legislators general election campaign. It also potentially means that the primary campaign overlaps with the state legislative sessions which means the primary phase campaigning will be happening during the state legislative session. Both potentially make legislators' decisions that much more difficult.
Despite officials being open to the idea of a regional primary in the southeast, that does not necessarily mean that it will be enough to overcome the questions that will be raised during state legislative efforts to move primary dates for 2016 around. Those questions represent potential roadblocks in the legislative process that could derail movement to earlier positions on the primary calendar.
Of course, that is not all that complicates the potential effectiveness of this proposal or its intended implementation. FHQ will examine the other issues attendant to this proposal that may pop up in the intervening period between now and 2016 in part two.
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1 Below is the press release from Secretary Kemp's office yesterday:
That's all well and good, but let's have a bit of a look under the hood on this thing. In the first part, FHQ will look at those states named above that have expressed an interest in the possibility of a southeastern regional primary.
The date that Secretary Kemp has proposed for what has been affectionately called the SEC primary is March 1. That is the first date on which states other than the four carve-outs -- Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina -- can hold delegate selection events under the actual (RNC) or expected (DNC) rules. In other words, that may be an attractive landing point for any number of states (see Super Tuesday on February 5, 2008). As of now, March 1 already has a southern flavor. Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia are scheduled for that date according to current state laws in each. Adding Georgia to the mix gives the South the clearest and strongest regional voice on that date. That would make five out of the eight states southern with Massachusetts and Vermont serving as only a token regional counterweight.
But what is the likelihood that others (from the South) join those four (or five if one counts Georgia) on March 1?
Georgia is unique in that the state legislature ceded the authority to set the date of the Peach state presidential primary to the secretary of state in 2011. That makes Georgia like New Hampshire in that regard. Basically what that transfer of power means is that Georgia, like New Hampshire, is better able to move its presidential primary around without the potential for gridlock or just inaction on the part of a state legislature. Getting Georgia to March 1, then, is an easier task than it will be for other states.
And there will be something of a dilemma in the other states to whom that Secretary Kemp has reached out. Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi will have push a date change through their legislatures. Secretaries of state in each of those states can (attempt to) initiate the legislative process on such moves, but that is no guarantee that there will actually be any shifting. The reason there is no guarantee is that such a proposal raises questions about the expected utility of a move. Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are already in March.
What difference does it make to move up a week (as is the case in Alabama and Mississippi) or two-ish (for Louisiana's now customary Saturday primary)?
In Alabama and Mississippi, the expected cost or benefit of a move may or may not be financial. Both are already in March, so the trade-off is more a matter of going with a larger group of southern states and risking getting lost in the shuffle or sticking with a smaller subregional primary on a date a week later when they may collectively and effectively counterbalance the Ohio primary on the same date. That is a tougher question to answer when both dates -- the first and second Tuesday in March -- are potentially attractive landing points on the calendar for a number of states. Getting lost in the shuffle may be a foregone conclusion when it is all said and done and the calendar is finalized in late 2015.
The gamble is similar in Louisiana in that the internal debate is a function of choosing between a date where they may have a greater share of the spotlight later on (if the nomination races are still going in late March) and a date when many other southern states hold their contests; a proposition the nets the Pelican state some regional clout but not necessarily direct attention from the candidates. The situation in Louisiana is complicated by the fact that the state has utilized a Saturday primary the last two cycles. Part of that is designed to reserve a spot on the presidential primary stage where Louisiana stands alone or with other smaller and/or caucuses states. The spotlight favors them.
Legislators in Arkansas face a slightly different calculus. First of all, the new RNC rules almost force Arkansas to consider moving up. Currently scheduled for the next to last Tuesday in May, the Arkansas primary falls at a point on the calendar after the cutoff for when primaries will need to be held to accommodate a late June or early to mid-July Republican convention. But that only adds to the classic late state dilemma: move everything up (presidential primary, state and local primaries and all) or create a separate presidential primary that is easier to move around (but also costs the state additional election funds)? Arkansas has twice gone the latter route (1988 and 2008) and twice has gotten essentially no bang for its buck, the extra expenditure got the state nothing in the way of advertising dollars or candidate attention. How ready and willing is Arkansas going to be to repeat that pattern? The alternative -- moving a consolidated set of primaries to an earlier date -- has its own pitfalls. Such a move impacts state legislators tasked with making the move in the first place. Moving a consolidated primary up lengthens a state legislators general election campaign. It also potentially means that the primary campaign overlaps with the state legislative sessions which means the primary phase campaigning will be happening during the state legislative session. Both potentially make legislators' decisions that much more difficult.
Despite officials being open to the idea of a regional primary in the southeast, that does not necessarily mean that it will be enough to overcome the questions that will be raised during state legislative efforts to move primary dates for 2016 around. Those questions represent potential roadblocks in the legislative process that could derail movement to earlier positions on the primary calendar.
Of course, that is not all that complicates the potential effectiveness of this proposal or its intended implementation. FHQ will examine the other issues attendant to this proposal that may pop up in the intervening period between now and 2016 in part two.
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1 Below is the press release from Secretary Kemp's office yesterday:
Friday, January 27, 2012
Possible Repeal Would Place Ohio Presidential Primary Back in March for Future Cycles
Before FHQ gets into this, let me state that none of the following would in any way affect the date of the 2012 Ohio presidential primary. Ohio will hold its presidential primary on March 6, 2012.
Last year the Ohio legislature passed a controversial elections bill that would have impacted absentee voting and restricted early voting. The bill also shifted the presidential primary in the Buckeye state from the first Tuesday in March to the first Tuesday in May. It was the other provisions that led to a petition drive to place the new election law on the November 2012 ballot. That has implications for when future presidential primaries will be held in Ohio. The primary issue came back up in the discussions around the redrawing of the congressional district lines in the state and was placed back on the original early March date in a round of late-December 2011 legislation, but only for the 2012 cycle.
That would put the scheduling of future presidential primaries in Ohio in limbo until at least November when voters will either confirm or reject the new law. The former would move the primary to May while the latter would keep the primary in March.
However, an alternative option has been raised by Ohio Secretary of State John Husted. Secretary Husted has brought up with members of the Ohio legislature the idea of repealing HB 194 before it appears on the ballot. Such a move, if proposed, passed and signed into law, would make March the regular date for the presidential primary in Ohio in 2016 and beyond. And barring further action by the legislature on the full host of issues contained in the new law, that would be where the primary would stay. Now, given Secretary Husted's comments today, it is not a foregone conclusion that the legislature would not address some of the early and absentee voting provisions in the law, but it would seem unlikely that legislators would address the primary date again. The catalyst for the primary date change was the looming possible fight over new congressional districts. Secretary Husted in January 2011 cautioned that a primary date change may be necessary for local and state elections officials to get prepared for the 2012 primaries -- particularly the new districts. [Yes, the fight went into December and the primary remained on March 6.]
But long story short, a repeal of the legislation would take the future primary date issue out of limbo, but of course, leave open the option for the legislature to revisit the matter prior to 2016, if they so chose. But with no further redistricting on the horizon between now and, say, 2015, there is and would be no impetus for a change.
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Last year the Ohio legislature passed a controversial elections bill that would have impacted absentee voting and restricted early voting. The bill also shifted the presidential primary in the Buckeye state from the first Tuesday in March to the first Tuesday in May. It was the other provisions that led to a petition drive to place the new election law on the November 2012 ballot. That has implications for when future presidential primaries will be held in Ohio. The primary issue came back up in the discussions around the redrawing of the congressional district lines in the state and was placed back on the original early March date in a round of late-December 2011 legislation, but only for the 2012 cycle.
That would put the scheduling of future presidential primaries in Ohio in limbo until at least November when voters will either confirm or reject the new law. The former would move the primary to May while the latter would keep the primary in March.
However, an alternative option has been raised by Ohio Secretary of State John Husted. Secretary Husted has brought up with members of the Ohio legislature the idea of repealing HB 194 before it appears on the ballot. Such a move, if proposed, passed and signed into law, would make March the regular date for the presidential primary in Ohio in 2016 and beyond. And barring further action by the legislature on the full host of issues contained in the new law, that would be where the primary would stay. Now, given Secretary Husted's comments today, it is not a foregone conclusion that the legislature would not address some of the early and absentee voting provisions in the law, but it would seem unlikely that legislators would address the primary date again. The catalyst for the primary date change was the looming possible fight over new congressional districts. Secretary Husted in January 2011 cautioned that a primary date change may be necessary for local and state elections officials to get prepared for the 2012 primaries -- particularly the new districts. [Yes, the fight went into December and the primary remained on March 6.]
But long story short, a repeal of the legislation would take the future primary date issue out of limbo, but of course, leave open the option for the legislature to revisit the matter prior to 2016, if they so chose. But with no further redistricting on the horizon between now and, say, 2015, there is and would be no impetus for a change.
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Wednesday, November 2, 2011
New Hampshire Primary Scheduled for January 10
[Click to Enlarge]
New Hampshire Secretary of State Bill Gardner this morning set January 10 as the date of the presidential primary in the Granite state. With New Hampshire in place -- behind the January 3 caucuses in Iowa and ahead of the Republican primary in South Carolina on January 21 -- the front of the 2012 presidential primary calendar is as set in stone as it will be. There may be some additional shuffling among a handful of states -- North Carolina and Massachusetts may move and Missouri Democrats may stick with the non-compliant February 7 primary -- but none will threaten the alignment that has now developed at the beginning of the calendar.
Tuesday, January 3:
Iowa caucuses
Tuesday, January 10:
New Hampshire
Saturday, January 21:
South Carolina Republican primary
Tuesday, January 31:
Florida
Saturday, February 4:Notes:
Nevada Republican caucuses
Bill Gardner set the date of the 2012 primary three weeks ahead of the pace set in 2007. Thanksgiving eve -- the date on which the New Hampshire secretary of state set the date of the 2008 primary -- is three weeks from today.
Ten weeks from yesterday is January 10. That means there are 69 days until the New Hampshire primary. Set your itineraries accordingly, candidates.
December 2011 primaries or caucuses are now officially off the table. Not to worry. 2015 is right around the corner.
Thursday, September 29, 2011
Georgia Presidential Primary to March 6
[Click to Enlarge]
Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp has just announced that the Georgia presidential primary will be held on Tuesday, March 6. That secret came out last night. What was more revealing to FHQ was that Secretary Kemp made several comments about the way in which the Georgia Republican Party will allocate its delegates.
The highlights (We'll have more analysis later.):
- The allocation will be proportional, but with winner-take-all triggers.
- To get any delegates, whether statewide or at the congressional district level, a candidate must clear the 20% vote threshold.
- A candidate can take all of a congressional district's three delegates (42 delegates in total) if he or she surpasses the 50% barrier in the vote total. Otherwise, the top vote-getter in the district will be apportioned 2 delegates with the second place finisher taking the remaining delegate.
- FHQ will have to listen back to Secretary Kemp's answer on the delegate allocation question to confirm whether those threshold rules also apply to the 30 statewide, at-large delegates.
Those rules can be consequential depending on the dynamics of the race at the time Georgia rolls around on March 6. If the race has narrowed to two candidates, then the likelihood of a more winner-take-most allocation of the delegates becomes much more likely. If the field has not been winnowed much, then a more proportional allocation in application is likely. For more on that see our previous entry on the subject.
For more on the implications of this move for Georgia, see last night's post.
Wednesday, September 28, 2011
Signs Point Toward a March 6 Presidential Primary in Georgia
The AP's Errin Haines is reporting that Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp will set the Peach state presidential primary for March 6 at a press conference on Thursday. FHQ has driven a lot of the Georgia as a rogue state discussion since the legislation to hand the presidential primary date setting authority over to the secretary of state was first introduced in the Georgia General Assembly back in March. But the simple truth of the matter is that there was always just as much evidence for or against that notion all along. Early on, the Georgia Republican Party seemed wary of a non-compliant primary's impact on the delegate allocation. At the same time, Kemp made mention of coupling the Georgia primary with Florida's, of jumping the March 6 barrier if Florida did, and of settling on a date after Iowa and New Hampshire. Each time, however, the secretary always stopped short of endorsing a move to any date earlier than March 6.
The desire may have been there. The ability was certainly there. Yet, the willingness to jump into January or February was and apparently is lacking. Why, then, should the General Assembly have granted the secretary of state the flexibility to move the primary when all he did was move it back by a month relative to 2008? It was after all pretty clear by March -- when the legislation was introduced -- that most of the twenty states that entered 2011 with non-compliant primaries or caucuses were making some effort to move back and not forward. If early was preferred, the legislature could have left well enough alone and kept the primary on the first Tuesday in February or legislators could have moved the primary back to the first Tuesday in March -- the earliest date allowed by the national parties and the date on which the Georgia primary was held from 1992-2004.
The answer, of course, is that just because the flexibility afforded the secretary of state -- the same type of flexibility New Hampshire's Secretary of State Bill Gardner has used so adeptly since 1976 -- may not have been useful in 2012 but may be in future cycles. It was a long term change that was left idle in its maiden voyage.
If Secretary Kemp does in fact opt for a March 6 date tomorrow, what does that mean? Well, it means very little for the state of the overall calendar. Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, South Carolina and Florida will have one less threat to their early positions. The move is curious in one regard: Kemp is selecting a date that is the most crowded date on the calendar; a move even more at odds with the added flexibility behind the date selection. That said, Georgia, even on a date with eleven other Republican contests would be the biggest delegate prize on March 6 outside of Texas. And the Lone Star state may see limited competition with both Rick Perry and Ron Paul in the race. Ohio is the only other state on March 6 that may rival Georgia in its ability to grab attention. The Buckeye state has fewer delegates but is a more likely general election target; one on which the Romney campaign may focus almost exclusively completely after chalking up wins in Massachusetts and Vermont. [Romney also did very well in the caucus states in 2008. There are several western caucus states on March 6 that could potentially be fertile ground for the former Massachusetts governor if the focus is on the southern contests on March 6. That, however, is an open question at this point.]
Georgia, then, can stand out from the pack on March 6 based on delegates, but, depending on the dynamics of the race at that point in the race, could end up being hurt if, say, Romney is pulling ahead after the Florida, Arizona, Michigan stretch in the calendar and isn't focused on the South as much as on the general election and in organizing in battleground states like Ohio with early primaries. Yes, that is a fairly specific scenario a little more than five months out, but it is worth noting.
One way or another, we will have a definitive answer on the date of the Georgia primary Thursday morning.
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The desire may have been there. The ability was certainly there. Yet, the willingness to jump into January or February was and apparently is lacking. Why, then, should the General Assembly have granted the secretary of state the flexibility to move the primary when all he did was move it back by a month relative to 2008? It was after all pretty clear by March -- when the legislation was introduced -- that most of the twenty states that entered 2011 with non-compliant primaries or caucuses were making some effort to move back and not forward. If early was preferred, the legislature could have left well enough alone and kept the primary on the first Tuesday in February or legislators could have moved the primary back to the first Tuesday in March -- the earliest date allowed by the national parties and the date on which the Georgia primary was held from 1992-2004.
The answer, of course, is that just because the flexibility afforded the secretary of state -- the same type of flexibility New Hampshire's Secretary of State Bill Gardner has used so adeptly since 1976 -- may not have been useful in 2012 but may be in future cycles. It was a long term change that was left idle in its maiden voyage.
If Secretary Kemp does in fact opt for a March 6 date tomorrow, what does that mean? Well, it means very little for the state of the overall calendar. Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, South Carolina and Florida will have one less threat to their early positions. The move is curious in one regard: Kemp is selecting a date that is the most crowded date on the calendar; a move even more at odds with the added flexibility behind the date selection. That said, Georgia, even on a date with eleven other Republican contests would be the biggest delegate prize on March 6 outside of Texas. And the Lone Star state may see limited competition with both Rick Perry and Ron Paul in the race. Ohio is the only other state on March 6 that may rival Georgia in its ability to grab attention. The Buckeye state has fewer delegates but is a more likely general election target; one on which the Romney campaign may focus almost exclusively completely after chalking up wins in Massachusetts and Vermont. [Romney also did very well in the caucus states in 2008. There are several western caucus states on March 6 that could potentially be fertile ground for the former Massachusetts governor if the focus is on the southern contests on March 6. That, however, is an open question at this point.]
Georgia, then, can stand out from the pack on March 6 based on delegates, but, depending on the dynamics of the race at that point in the race, could end up being hurt if, say, Romney is pulling ahead after the Florida, Arizona, Michigan stretch in the calendar and isn't focused on the South as much as on the general election and in organizing in battleground states like Ohio with early primaries. Yes, that is a fairly specific scenario a little more than five months out, but it is worth noting.
One way or another, we will have a definitive answer on the date of the Georgia primary Thursday morning.
Saturday, September 24, 2011
Ga. weighs when to set presidential primary
Friday, July 15, 2011
Gardner Speaks: New Hampshire Might Not Stick with Feb. 14 Presidential Primary Date
Rare are the times that New Hampshire Secretary of State William Gardner says much of anything about the presidential primary in the Granite state. ...unless or until, of course, he sets the date for the contest. It was more earth-shattering, then, that he gave a recent interview with Shira Shoenberg of The Boston Globe on the subject, than it was that Gardner indicated that February 14 is not all that likely to be the date on which the New Hampshire primary will be held in 2012.
Indeed, that date always depended upon other, non-exempt states moving their primaries and caucuses in line with the guidelines for delegate selection. And that's something FHQ has been saying was a low probability since last year because of all the states that had to move to comply with national party rules. The list of states has been whittled down, but there remains a handful of states that may serve as a threat to New Hampshire or any of the other early states. Again, as I said earlier this week, the most likely scenario will see the four earliest states in January with a smattering of rogue, non-compliant states mostly in February but perhaps slipping into the end of January. Every other state will follow on or after March 6.
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On another note, the mention of Michigan, Florida, Arizona and now Missouri being possible threats to New Hampshire is not new, but the talk of of West Virginia and Wisconsin is. The legislature in Wisconsin has a bill that has passed the Senate and another that originated in the Assembly before the lower chamber now, but those probably will not get a vote until later in the summer. There is, however, bipartisan support for the legislation and the Republican majority in both chambers has sponsored it. As for West Virginia, there was talk out of the Mountain state earlier in the week that indicated at least some likelihood of West Virginia Republicans adopting a convention system beginning with January county caucuses and ending with a Super Tuesday (March 6) state convention. This is the same system Mountain state Republicans used in 2008. The sticking point for New Hampshire in the West Virginia proposal is the January 24 county caucuses. But those caucuses only select non-binding slates of delegates to move on to the state convention. With that said, in 2008, West Virginia Republicans held county caucus meetings across a two week period as opposed to one day. That may give New Hampshire Secretary of State Gardner pause. After all, Iowa's caucuses are similarly non-binding, as are the February 7 caucuses in Minnesota.
The main point remains that none of this is really a surprise. Given the lack of any real meaningful penalties on non-compliant states, there were bound to be a few states -- even beyond Florida and Michigan -- that would challenge the national parties (especially the RNC). In that environment, New Hampshire was a near certainty to move up ahead of the proposed February 14 date.
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Friday, July 1, 2011
More from Secretary Kemp on Coupling Georgia's Presidential Primary with Florida's
Joshua Stewart of Georgia Public Broadcast got a few additional comments out of Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp on the issue of the timing of the Peach state's presidential primary next year:
“You sometimes feel like the president is picked in Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina and that’s maybe not a general consensus of what the real electorate throughout the country may be thinking,” Kemp said.
...and...
“If there was a way we could have our date the same as theirs, I think it would be attractive for candidates to be able to come and campaign in both these states because you could hit both states in one day [and] we have media markets that overlap,” Kemp said. “There’s just a lot of good synergy.”
The first statement is a throw-away. I'll reiterate what I've said before on this point: the national parties will be the ones to determine whether Iowa, New Hampshire and South Carolina and winnowing the fields "properly" or creating a "general consensus" of which the parties are not supportive. That hasn't happened yet.
Now, the second point is more useful. It is more evidence that Kemp is open to the idea of coupling the Georgia primary with the contest in Florida. The reporting on this has attempted to link the Georgia situation with the recent stories about a brokered March 1 (or 2 or 3) date for the Florida primary. That, I think, doesn't accurately capture the situation. As I've tried to argue, Florida wants the fifth position behind Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina, and if other states threaten that, Florida is likely not going to be willing to slip into an early, but only slightly non-compliant March position. If Michigan jumps to January, for instance, Florida isn't necessarily going to sit idly by and accept an early March position while the early four states bump their own contests up.
To be clear, Kemp made his initial comments to Jim Galloway at the AJC in the context of the possibility of a March Florida primary, but that does not mean that Georgia won't go earlier than that. Recall also, that even if Florida has a problem with Georgia holding a primary concurrently with the Sunshine state primary, it won't matter. Florida law requires a decision from the Presidential Preference Primary Date Selection Committee by October 1 and Secretary Kemp has an additional two months beyond that (December 1) to make his decision regarding the Georgia primary.
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Tuesday, June 28, 2011
Where Georgia's Presidential Primary Might End Up
The AJC's Jim Galloway touched base with Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp today and chatted about the presidential primary in the state. Their discussion revolved to some extent around the thinking behind the secretary's upcoming decision to set the date of the Peach state's presidential primary. This is certainly a rare glimpse into the date-setting decision-making calculus. The only other secretary of state in a similar position is New Hampshire Secretary of State Bill Gardner. And Gardner has typically played it close to the vest, holding out until the last possible threat to New Hampshire's primacy has settled on a date.
Kemp, however, broke with his Granite state counterpart and revealed some of his thoughts on the primary in reacting to recent primary news out of neighboring South Carolina and Florida.
On the possibility that the South Carolina GOP, facing financial constraints, would have to switch from a primary to a caucus, Kemp volunteered to move Georgia into the first-in-the-South primary position according to Galloway.
On Florida being allowed by the RNC to hold a primary in March, but before the allowed March 6 starting point, Kemp basically asked, "Why not Georgia?" This is a possibility that FHQ has speculated on in the past as well.
All told, what does this tell us that we didn't already know? Well, not all that much. The reason Georgia's legislature ceded the power to set the date of the presidential primary over to the secretary of state was to give the state some added flexibility in scheduling the primary; something an early adjourning legislature often prevents. There was some evidence -- circumstantial perhaps -- that Georgia was willing to potentially go rogue on the national parties. But Kemp's comments to Galloway provide us with some concrete evidence that selecting a date outside of the parties' designated window for nominating contests is a possibility in the Peach state.
It should also be noted that South Carolina is not likely to willingly surrender its first-in-the-South status, and though the Republican Party in South Carolina won't have state funds for their primary, they will have a primary and not a caucus. A for the possibility of an early, but out of window March primary in Florida, that possibility will depend on what the feelings in the Sunshine state are to the potential moves in Michigan and Arizona. Regardless, I think aligning the Georgia primary with Florida's is an attractive option to Kemp. What remains to be seen is whether Florida's Presidential Preference Primary Date Selection Committee is amendable to the idea. They may be out of luck though. The deadline for the committee in Florida to select a date is October 1. Kemp has until December 1 with the decision in Georgia.
Again, we now have an idea that Georgia is willing to join the early, but rogue group of primary states.
NOTE: Please note that Galloway incorrectly identifies the date of the South Carolina primary as January 28. That is not the date of the primary. The DNC set aside February 28 as the date of the South Carolina Democratic primary, but Republicans in South Carolina don't have to hold a primary on the same date as the Democrats. The RNC rules just specify that a South Carolina primary can take place in February some time, without setting a specific date.
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Friday, May 13, 2011
Governor Deal Signs Presidential Primary Date Setting Power Over to Georgia Secretary of State
On Friday, May 13, Governor Nathan Deal (R) signed HB 454 into law. The bill transfers the authority for setting the date of the Georgia presidential primary from the General Assembly to the secretary of state. The Peach state's current secretary of state, Brian Kemp, will have until December 1 (at the latest) to choose the date on which Georgia will hold its presidential primary. Though that December deadline and the 60 days required to be within the point of selecting a date and holding the contest would allow for a primary as early as the last Tuesday in January, early signals out of the Republican Party of Georgia indicate a likely April primary. That, however, may depend on the chair Georgia Republicans select this weekend at their annual state convention.
Part of the reason for the higher likelihood of an April primary hinges on Georgia Republicans traditionally holding winner-take-all primaries; something the new Republican delegate selection rules do not allow before April. Presumably, the state party would have a chance to alter the winner-take-all rules to avoid that problem (...if an earlier primary without penalties is desired).1 It is not clear whether Kemp, a Republican, would follow the suggestions of the state party, but it is likely given the fact that the primary is a means of the party allocating its delegates to the national convention.
One final note should probably be made as the path of this legislation has reached its completion. By ceding the power to the secretary of state, the Georgia General Assembly has granted the state more flexibility -- on par with New Hampshire and similar though not exactly like what is happening in Florida -- to select a presidential primary date that will put the state in a position on the calendar to influence the nomination. The short legislative session that Georgia typically holds so early in the year has continually hampered the states ability to be as free as some other states in selecting a time for a primary.
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This move on Georgia's part moves the Peach state out of February and now has Georgia designated as "No Date" for our purposes here at FHQ until Secretary Kemp selects a date for the presidential primary.
Follow this link for a look back at the legislative process behind this bill and other presidential primary news in Georgia.
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1 Texas has had the same problem but has no recourse between now and next year's primary due to the fact that the Republican Party of Texas has already held its 2011 state convention and has no means of changing its winner-take-all requirement.
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