Rule 40 is back.
Remember all that chatter from last cycle about a potentially crowded field of candidates vying for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination, and the possibility that the ensuing chaos would lead to a scenario where multiple (or no) candidates would control a majority of delegates from eight states and have all/none of their names placed in nomination at the convention, leading to even more chaos?
It is fine if you do not. But FHQ does. Vividly. It was all the rage from 2014 into 2016, peaking in April of that year and gathering steam again in the lead up to the July convention.
Now, however, the 2016 chaos narrative is being replaced by a 2020 threat narrative, all with Rule 40 as the predicate.
The short version of the threat narrative is this:
The current RNC rules for the 2020 nomination process set a low bar for a potential challenger to President Trump. At Trump's own nominating convention in 2016, delegates adopted a revision to Rule 40 for 2020. Rather than requiring the control of the majority of delegates from eight states to have one's name placed in nomination, the 2020 process would require the control of a plurality of delegates from only five states. This was a reversion to the threshold from before 2016. By extension, the thinking goes that the lower threshold for 2020 means a greater potential threat to the president and that the threshold should be raised.
Of course, there is a rule for that. Well, rules anyway.
First, Rule 12, added at the 2012 convention for the 2016 cycle and carried over to 2020, allows for amendments to Rules 1-11 and Rules 13-25. Noticeably, that is a list of amendable rules that does not include Rule 40. And even if Rule 40 was among the amendable rules, amendments to the 2020 rules had to be adopted by September 30, 2018.
Second, there was a vehicle put in place to devise recommended amendments to the group of rules that could be changed. Rule 10(a)(10) created the Temporary Committee on the Presidential Nominating Process (TCPNP) whose charge was to make such recommendations by May 31, 2018 in order for them to be considered, adopted and/or rejected by the full Republican National Committee prior to the September deadline laid out in Rule 12. Although their discussions were wide-ranging, all the TCPNP recommended and the RNC adopted was the elimination of the debates sanctioning committee the RNC created for the 2016 cycle.
In other words, the window for making changes to the rules has passed and Rule 40 was not among the rules that could be changed anyway.
None of those realities have stopped some from suggesting that because the RNC is a private organization, it can change its rules at any time. Nor has it dissuaded (at least one) RNC member from raising the idea of a suspension of the rules in order to fix "loopholes" in the 2020 process.
Look, FHQ is skeptical of that. It is not that there are doubts because of some rules technicality that guards against changes. Those are outlined above. Rather, there is reason to be skeptical of a change in the rules at this point because of something I often told folks with respect to the rules discussion ahead of the 2016 Republican National Convention: it is fine to talk about potential changes to any rule that any voting member finds unsavory for whatever reason. Yet, it is another thing altogether to devise an alternative that can win the support of the requisite number of voting members to make that change.
In other words, the devil is in the details.
And if the details include the RNC acting unilaterally to change the nomination rules for 2020 in a way unprecedented in the history of the party, then cobbling together winning coalition to make any change would likely be a very steep climb indeed. Morton Blackwell, the national committeeman from Virginia, spoke against a motion to create this very change during the Convention Rules Committee meeting the week before the party convened in Cleveland in 2016. That motion was withdrawn.
In the end, parties have these rules in place and keep them relatively constant for a reason. They create certainty, or if not that, then prevent chaos. A party that changes rules mid-cycle and outside of the process laid forth for making changes -- typically from the highest authority for both of the major US political parties, the national convention -- is a party with no rules. To make a change now sets the precedent that similarly-timed changes can be made in the future, potentially pitting the party organization against the convention itself (because the convention could change the rules back or to whatever a majority there could agree on). Recognition of constant, stable rules, like constant and stable law, is necessary.
Take the rule in question, Rule 40. The national committeeman from the Virgin Islands, Jevon Williams, suggests that the rules, and Rule 40 in particular, were adopted at a time when there was no thought toward how they may affect an incumbent running for renomination/reelection, creating "loopholes".
[NOTE: That is not the case for anyone who watched the proceedings of the Republican National Convention Rules Committee in the lead up to the convention.]
But even if that was true and there were "loopholes", the plan was to return to the way the Rule 40 looked prior to 2016. George W. Bush was renominated in 2004 under those same rules. Before that in the 1990s, the threshold was even lower, set at a plurality in just three states. And prior to that, there was no threshold in the early equivalent to Rule 40. Past Republican presidents, then, have been renominated and reelected under similar rules.1
So, it should be noted that the overarching rules of the process are being made the scapegoat here for a problem that is not rules-based. If a given president is popular enough, particularly among his or her primary electorate, then that tends to 1) ward off a primary challenge and by extension, 2) renders the rules-based issues at least nonexistent and at most a minor nuisance.
As a coda to all of this FHQ will say that rules tinkering is nothing new here. What is new in this instance in 2019 is the timing. The cycle is beyond the point at which national rules can be changed. The process is in the midst of another phase now. Yes, most will be paying the primary amount of attention in the coming days and weeks and months to candidate jumping in to the race and what they are up to.
However, behind all of that is a parallel process where past presidents have wielded some influence: the rules on the state level. Typically incumbent presidents are loathe to change the rules that got them the nomination in the first place and in turn the national parties typically hold pat with those overarching rules. Yet, on the state level, there are opportunities to make small scale changes that may benefit a particular candidate. State governments for years have changed the dates of their primaries and often to help out a favorite son or daughter. Illinois, for example, uprooted its traditional March primary for the 2008 cycle to ideally give Barack Obama a leg up on a crowded Super Tuesday.
But presidents do this too. The Carter reelection effort foresaw a 1980 challenge from Ted Kennedy and as a result sought to alter the playing field. Their prescription was not to change the national delegate rules, but to manage things at the state level, lobbying a cadre of southern states to hold a subregional primary early in the primary calendar. That Alabama-Florida-Georgia primary was seen as a potential positive response for Carter to any gains Kennedy might make in the earlier New Hampshire and Massachusetts primaries.
While that specific sort of maneuvering is not yet evident in the actions of those officials in the Trump reelection campaign, there is evidence that delegate slates are being built on the same level. That is far more fertile ground for advantageous changes than altering the national delegate process at this late stage. Don't look for changes to Rule 40. Look to the states and what Team Trump is doing there.
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1 Actually, the reversion to the pre-2016 threshold was met joyously by the voting members of Convention Rules Committee in 2016. But the change in 2012 -- for the 2016 cycle -- raised the bar to a majority of delegates in eight states with an incumbent President Romney in mind. That is why Ben Ginsberg and Jon Sununu took so much flak coming out of Tampa. But the changes each time were made by the party's highest authority, the national convention.
Wednesday, January 2, 2019
Saturday, December 8, 2018
Nebraska Democrats Opt to Move Back to Presidential Primary for 2020
This is a reversion to the mode of delegate selection Cornhusker state Democrats used prior to 2008. For that cycle and the succeeding two cycles, the party held caucuses. And the primary motivation for the switch from primary to caucus ahead of 2008 was to move to an earlier date on the presidential primary calendar. That allowed for (Saturday after Super Tuesday) February caucuses as opposed to the traditional May primary.
But that move never got rid of the primary. By Nebraska law, caucus or not, a party's candidates appear on the presidential primary ballot. And in both of the competitive Democratic presidential cycles of 2008 and 2016 the later primary added two turnout data points for comparison to the caucuses. Despite the later date of the non-binding primary contests, the turnout was higher than in the caucuses.
That has remained a sticking point in discussions in and out of the state party in Nebraska and has been a primary incentive to move back to a primary election currently scheduled for May.
Nebraska now becomes the sixth state to make a switch from a 2016 caucus to a 2020 presidential primary; joining Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, and Utah.
The Nebraska change has been added to the FHQ 2020 presidential primary calendar.
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Related Posts:
Caucus or Primary? Nebraska Democrats Have the Decision Before Them
Nebraska Democratic Party Platform Committee Passes Caucus-to-Primary Resolution
Nebraska Democrats Signal Caucus-to-Primary Switch for 2020
Thursday, December 6, 2018
Caucus or Primary? Nebraska Democrats Have the Decision Before Them
Yet, the party is not newly coming into this discussion. In fact, at its 2018 state convention this past June, Democratic delegates considered the matter as well. The state convention platform committee at the time ultimately passed a resolution calling for a switch to a primary from the caucus system the party has used to select and allocate national convention delegates from the Cornhusker state for each of the last three cycles (since 2008).
But news of the inner workings within the party on the caucus-to-primary question went quiet after that point. The convention resolution on the matter did not (and does not now) appear among the listed resolutions that were passed on the floor of the convention at the time.
However, it was listed among the passed resolutions in late June. Here's the language:
Ultimately, this really is neither here nor there, but it was odd.
Regardless, the resolution would have been non-binding on the party. Additionally, the progression of the idea -- switching from a caucus to a primary -- has followed if not taken an expedited path as laid out by NDP Chair Jane Kleeb at the time of the state convention:
The party’s State Central Committee most likely won’t make a final decision until March, after the national Democratic Party issues guidance to the states, said Chairwoman Jane Kleeb.The party has seemingly moved the consideration of caucus-to-primary up a quarter from March 2019 to December 2018 in order to incorporate the decision on mode of delegate selection into the party's draft delegate selection plan to be submitted to the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee by early May.
Heading into the decisive State Central Committee meeting December 7-8, it should be noted that the resolution to eliminate the caucuses drew cheers back at the state convention when it was introduced in the platform committee and as of late November the idea of a caucus-to-primary shift was said by party Chair Kleeb to have held a three to one advantage among the party's grassroots.
Take that as internal momentum to change the state Democrats' mode of delegate selection for 2020. And that parallels the external momentum to move from caucuses to primaries in Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, and Utah that has already produced change in 2016-18.
Wednesday, December 5, 2018
In Wisconsin, Legislature Moves on Other Measures But Ends Effort at Earlier Presidential Primary
In the end, the price tag associated with creating an all-new and separate presidential primary election was too much for Wisconsin legislators. The Joint Finance Committee balked:
Obviously, any proposal to save the expenditure and move everything to March would additionally fail to lower the turnout on the judicial election. It would still be tethered to the presidential primary.
As described in an earlier post, this discussion of a primary move happened under unique circumstances in the Badger state, unique enough that it likely will not be repeated as the legislature convenes a new session in January. Often proposed primary shifts will come up on a recurring basis in state legislatures, but this one in Wisconsin is unlikely to follow that trend.
And all is not lost: that first Tuesday in April date would have Wisconsin -- as of now anyway -- all by itself in 2020.
The plan to move the presidential primary was aimed at making sure conservative state Supreme Court Justice Daniel Kelly is not up for election on the same day as the presidential primary in April 2020, when Republicans fear Democratic turnout will be high.
Moving the primary to March would cost taxpayers nearly $7 million and municipal clerks warned it would be hard to conduct so many elections so close together.
The committee didn't approve the legislation and leaders said they doubted it would come up on the floor of the Senate or Assembly.SB 885 did not come up on the floor, and will end up a casualty of this brief legislative lame duck session. The idea of a March presidential primary likely ends there. First, Republicans in the legislature pushing the measure would face resistance from the same elections clerks in January but would also have to contend with a Democratic governor then. And even if they sought to move everything -- presidential primary and judicial election -- up to March, such a proposal would save on expenditures, but also likely continue to draw the ire of elections officials because of the quick turnaround from the February spring primary.
Obviously, any proposal to save the expenditure and move everything to March would additionally fail to lower the turnout on the judicial election. It would still be tethered to the presidential primary.
As described in an earlier post, this discussion of a primary move happened under unique circumstances in the Badger state, unique enough that it likely will not be repeated as the legislature convenes a new session in January. Often proposed primary shifts will come up on a recurring basis in state legislatures, but this one in Wisconsin is unlikely to follow that trend.
And all is not lost: that first Tuesday in April date would have Wisconsin -- as of now anyway -- all by itself in 2020.
Monday, December 3, 2018
Wisconsin Bill Would Shift Presidential Primary to March
Given the 2020 calendar layout, that would mean a shift up by four weeks for the Wisconsin primary, pushing it up in line with previously scheduled contests in Michigan and Ohio. Conceivably, the new Minnesota presidential primary could end up on that date as well. Parties there can decide on a date other than the first Tuesday in March. With Minnesota and Wisconsin on board, the second Tuesday in March would look like a Great Lakes/Big Ten primary on the heels of Super Tuesday.
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UPDATE (12/4/18):
The potential primary move continues to draw the ire of elections administrators on both sides of the aisle in Wisconsin:
The bipartisan panel [the Wisconsin Election Commission] voted 6-0 on a motion to inform lawmakers of the difficulties of moving the election, which could cost as much as $6.8 million and which a top Republican leader has said is aimed at helping re-elect conservative state Supreme Court Justice Daniel Kelly.FHQ talked about some of that opposition here:
Find much more about the contours of the potential Wisconsin move here.
This legislation will also be added to the 2020 presidential primary calendar here.
Tuesday, November 20, 2018
Wisconsin Republicans Consider Lame Duck Push to Create a Separate March Presidential Primary for 2020
In the wake of the 2018 midterm elections, Republicans in Wisconsin are looking at a change to the scheduling of the 2020 presidential primary in the Badger state.
To the extent the scheduling of presidential primaries is localized like that, it almost always focuses on the costs (see the 2012 cycle in particular). It is rarer to see something as politically raw in its calculations as the proposal in Wisconsin. Although one could look on it as a logical, albeit localized, extension of a slippery slope one could trace to national Democratic maneuvering in the lead up to 2012.
Look, this is not one of those "on both sides" sorts of things, but as the 2020 cycle heads into 2019, these are the sorts of process tales that need to be told beyond the regular rhythms of primary movement in the post-reform era.
And in the scope of all post-reform shifts in the dates of presidential primary elections across the country, it is not a typical proposed move. To be more precise, the proposed move forward -- from an April position on the calendar to March -- is entirely within the norm. State actors began to consider pushing up primary dates for 1972 almost before the ink was dry on the McGovern-Fraser reforms and they were adopted. That is not what is atypical about the potential move in Wisconsin.
Instead, it is the how, the why, and the when of the proposed shift in Wisconsin that deviates from how most states have gone about these changes in the past.
First, the timing of this is unusual. Although it is not unheard of, it has historically been the case that most of the movement on the presidential primary calendar has taken place in the year before the presidential election. There are exceptions of course. Missouri legislators pushing the 2004 presidential primary in the Show-Me state up from March to February in 2002 comes to mind. But while there are exceptions, the year prior to a presidential has been the window in which states have tended to make these scheduling decisions.
The reasoning is sound enough: That is when state actors the most up-to-date information (who is running, which parties have contested races, what other states are doing, etc.). It is also a time that occurs at the confluence of new legislatures being sworn in following midterms and when the urgency for a change of primary dates is at its highest (or at least when the timing is most on the radars of state legislators).
But by that mark, Wisconsin legislators are only slightly jumping the gun, right? After all, Texas legislators in 2010 prefiled legislation to move the primary in Lone Star state up for the 2012 cycle. However, Texas legislators introduced that legislation in anticipation of the start to the 2011-12 session. That is not what is happening in Wisconsin. Rather, legislators in the Badger state are considering these changes as part of a lame duck session as the bookend to unified Republican control of state government.
That draws this back to the how and why of the proposal.
Again, it is not atypical for states to move up the dates of their presidential primaries in post-reform era. In fact, Wisconsin has done this in the past: moving the spring election, including the presidential primary and the general election for judicial and other offices, from April to March for the 1996 cycle.1 And then for the 2004 cycle, legislators there bumped the presidential primary from the spring election in April to the spring primary in February.
But in both of those cases the Wisconsin presidential primary move was either tethered to the move of a set of elections -- the whole spring election was moved -- or toggled from one pre-existing election (the April spring election) to another (the February spring primary). The distinction is subtle, perhaps, but meaningful. Those moves meant the budgetary requirements were close to neutral.
Neither added to the budgetary bottom line in Wisconsin.
Contrast that with the proposed shift for the 2020 cycle. The idea of the hypothetical bill -- and none has been introduced to this point -- would be to create an all-new and separate presidential primary to be scheduled in March 2020, between the February spring primary and the April spring election. That new election would cost the state at least $7 million (and mean a third election in consecutive months for election administrators).
But why not shift into that February position as legislators in Wisconsin did during the 2004 cycle? That is not a viable option to legislators in 2020. Whereas February contests (outside of Iowa and New Hampshire) were allowed by national party rules during 2004, they are not in 2020. Nor were they in either 2012 or 2016 when states faced penalties to their national convention delegations for timing violations. This is why the 2015 bill to once again move the Wisconsin primary from April to February went nowhere. It would have put the Wisconsin delegations to both parties' national conventions at risk of penalty.
Left with no realistic alternative among the elections already on the calendar (the costs of which are already accounted for), Wisconsin Republicans are focusing on separate March option. That option, if not the price tag, are additionally enticing to a party set to lose unified control of state government when Democrat Tony Evers is sworn in as governor because it would hypothetically separate a high-profile, high turnout presidential primary from the spring election for judicial offices.
That would put the spring election at the close of a February-March-April election-a-thon (elect-a-thon?) in Wisconsin. That is not only difficult for election administrators and places a significant burden on voters as well. Turning out for three elections in three months runs the risk of driving up voter fatigue and driving down turnout. The latter is seen as potentially advantageous to Republicans in the state and those behind this proposed primary move being floated.
And that makes the why of this unusual too. It counters the exact kind of maneuvering that FHQ mentioned just recently: that idle Republican legislators facing an at-this-point noncompetitive presidential renomination race would consider moving primaries back rather than forward. That, however, is more nationally-focused maneuvering. The proposed Wisconsin move is more locall-minded. Procedurally, it is aimed not at the national implications in either the Democratic or Republican presidential nomination races, but at a methodical severing of one high-profile election (presidential primary) from another election (the judicial election set to occur during the April spring election).
To the extent the scheduling of presidential primaries is localized like that, it almost always focuses on the costs (see the 2012 cycle in particular). It is rarer to see something as politically raw in its calculations as the proposal in Wisconsin. Although one could look on it as a logical, albeit localized, extension of a slippery slope one could trace to national Democratic maneuvering in the lead up to 2012.
Look, this is not one of those "on both sides" sorts of things, but as the 2020 cycle heads into 2019, these are the sorts of process tales that need to be told beyond the regular rhythms of primary movement in the post-reform era.
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1 That move for 1996 was part of an effort to create a Great Lakes regional primary that included Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio.
Monday, November 19, 2018
Cross-Party Involvement in Presidential Nominations: 2020 Primary Calendar Scheduling
In the time since the midterms nearly two weeks ago, FHQ has been mulling over a morning after tweet from The National Journal's Hanna Trudo:
After all, we seemingly are a long way from back channel comments attributed former President Bush about some of the candidates involved in the 2008 cycle. But that was more commentary than outright attempt to intervene. And Republicans had their own active nomination race that cycle anyway.
Yet, typically, parties will keep the other party's process at arms length. Sure, press releases and mass emails are always going to be a part of this exchange in the open market of the battle between parties. But as is our wont here at FHQ, we tend to put these things in the context of the mechanics of presidential nominations. And that is what I turned to upon reading Trudo's tweet.
Often we think of partisan actors in elective office behaving in a manner to best advantage their party's interests (if not the party). Think in particular about the lengths to which actors on the state legislative level have sought to position their presidential primaries in calendar positions over the years to have some impact on the presidential nomination process in their own party.
Southern Democratic leaders, for example, famously pined for a process that would yield a southern moderate-to-conservative nominee throughout the two cycles in the 1970s and into the 1980s. The idea was that that type of nominee would stand a better chance at winning a general election. And the stars aligned in 1988, at least procedurally. Fourteen southern states -- headed by Democratic-controlled state governments -- shifted to and coalesced on the second Tuesday in March; just on the heels of the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary.
Sometimes, however, the best laid plans go awry. And that was the case for southern Democrats in the 1988 cycle. Try as they might, the plan did not work. Rather than speaking with one regional voice, the results across the South were split on the Democratic side. Dukakis won the big states (Florida and Texas), Jackson the Deep South, and Gore the peripheral South. The plan backfired.
But what can be gleaned from that is how state actors have typically approached the calendar scheduling part of this process: To the extent they sough to have influence, it was either to give voters a larger voice in the process (by moving earlier) or to influence who the nominee was in the party of legislators making the decisions.
In other words, the impact was to be an intra-party positive for some candidate (favorite son) or some faction within the broader party coalition.
Yet, this logic was turned on its head in the 2012 cycle. No longer was the motivation for states to move forward on the calendar to have some positive impact. Instead, the negative incentive in the form of (flawed) national party penalties was to push states back in the process in an effort to create a later start to primary season, one not bumping up against the New Year's festivities.
States retained the ability to cluster on the earliest -- although theoretically later compared to 2008 -- date, but all of those February 2008 states shifted in a seemingly partisan manner. Those with Republican-controlled state governments tended to move their presidential primaries back less than those in Democratic-controlled states. And there was at least some (anecdotal) evidence that the Democratic side of the equation was a concerted effort; to shift more liberal states later in the process to draw out and stir up a hypothetical race that foresaw a Mitt Romney nomination. Now, the logic underlying that effort can certainly be questioned -- liberal states in the aggregate do not necessarily have moderate-to-liberal Republican primary electorates -- but the intervention is there.
And that is where at least some of the focus should be heading into 2019: how will states shift around on the 2020 calendar? Much of the spotlight has been on the impact the re-positioning of the California presidential primary will have on the Democratic nomination process. That is not wrong. It is a noteworthy shift. But it leans on a logic rooted in the past: partisan actors (Democrats in California) making positive, partisan decisions (to move the primary in the Golden state up).
How much can we expect Republican actors to act? Will Republican-controlled states sit idly by and maintain early calendar positions? Or will Republican states, say those involved in the SEC primary from 2016, proactively move to another position so as to have some impact on the Democratic nomination process? Those southern states moving back would mean the shift of an important bloc in the Democratic primary electorate: African Americans.
There are no clear answers to these questions at this point, but 2019 will begin to offer them as state legislatures begin to convene for their 2019 sessions and begin to weigh primary calendar moves.
Yes, this is evidence of the Republican National Committee chipping away at a potential high-profile 2020 challenger to the sitting Republican president in a press release. That is not exactly uncommon. However, that email left me wondering about the extent to which either the RNC and/or the broader Republican Party would/will attempt to intervene in the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination and how overt those efforts might be..@GOP just sent mass email marking Tuesday as “an especially bad night for Elizabeth Warren” pic.twitter.com/HFbbiewEum— Hanna Trudo (@HCTrudo) November 7, 2018
After all, we seemingly are a long way from back channel comments attributed former President Bush about some of the candidates involved in the 2008 cycle. But that was more commentary than outright attempt to intervene. And Republicans had their own active nomination race that cycle anyway.
Yet, typically, parties will keep the other party's process at arms length. Sure, press releases and mass emails are always going to be a part of this exchange in the open market of the battle between parties. But as is our wont here at FHQ, we tend to put these things in the context of the mechanics of presidential nominations. And that is what I turned to upon reading Trudo's tweet.
Often we think of partisan actors in elective office behaving in a manner to best advantage their party's interests (if not the party). Think in particular about the lengths to which actors on the state legislative level have sought to position their presidential primaries in calendar positions over the years to have some impact on the presidential nomination process in their own party.
Southern Democratic leaders, for example, famously pined for a process that would yield a southern moderate-to-conservative nominee throughout the two cycles in the 1970s and into the 1980s. The idea was that that type of nominee would stand a better chance at winning a general election. And the stars aligned in 1988, at least procedurally. Fourteen southern states -- headed by Democratic-controlled state governments -- shifted to and coalesced on the second Tuesday in March; just on the heels of the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary.
Sometimes, however, the best laid plans go awry. And that was the case for southern Democrats in the 1988 cycle. Try as they might, the plan did not work. Rather than speaking with one regional voice, the results across the South were split on the Democratic side. Dukakis won the big states (Florida and Texas), Jackson the Deep South, and Gore the peripheral South. The plan backfired.
But what can be gleaned from that is how state actors have typically approached the calendar scheduling part of this process: To the extent they sough to have influence, it was either to give voters a larger voice in the process (by moving earlier) or to influence who the nominee was in the party of legislators making the decisions.
In other words, the impact was to be an intra-party positive for some candidate (favorite son) or some faction within the broader party coalition.
Yet, this logic was turned on its head in the 2012 cycle. No longer was the motivation for states to move forward on the calendar to have some positive impact. Instead, the negative incentive in the form of (flawed) national party penalties was to push states back in the process in an effort to create a later start to primary season, one not bumping up against the New Year's festivities.
States retained the ability to cluster on the earliest -- although theoretically later compared to 2008 -- date, but all of those February 2008 states shifted in a seemingly partisan manner. Those with Republican-controlled state governments tended to move their presidential primaries back less than those in Democratic-controlled states. And there was at least some (anecdotal) evidence that the Democratic side of the equation was a concerted effort; to shift more liberal states later in the process to draw out and stir up a hypothetical race that foresaw a Mitt Romney nomination. Now, the logic underlying that effort can certainly be questioned -- liberal states in the aggregate do not necessarily have moderate-to-liberal Republican primary electorates -- but the intervention is there.
And that is where at least some of the focus should be heading into 2019: how will states shift around on the 2020 calendar? Much of the spotlight has been on the impact the re-positioning of the California presidential primary will have on the Democratic nomination process. That is not wrong. It is a noteworthy shift. But it leans on a logic rooted in the past: partisan actors (Democrats in California) making positive, partisan decisions (to move the primary in the Golden state up).
How much can we expect Republican actors to act? Will Republican-controlled states sit idly by and maintain early calendar positions? Or will Republican states, say those involved in the SEC primary from 2016, proactively move to another position so as to have some impact on the Democratic nomination process? Those southern states moving back would mean the shift of an important bloc in the Democratic primary electorate: African Americans.
There are no clear answers to these questions at this point, but 2019 will begin to offer them as state legislatures begin to convene for their 2019 sessions and begin to weigh primary calendar moves.
Tuesday, September 4, 2018
The Iowa Straw Poll and the Regular Rhythms of the Presidential Nomination Process
FHQ got a sneak peek of Jonathan Bernstein's Friday column on Thursday when we had a chance to chat after my APSA roundtable on the 2020 presidential nomination process. At the time, I agreed with him. Honestly, thoughts of the straw poll that wasn't in Iowa in 2016 had long ago been washed over and displaced with the logjam of events that happened during and since the 2016 cycle. So, sure, perhaps no straw poll meant one fewer winnowing opportunity; one coordination event lost.
But the more I thought about it -- and I had time when I was stuck on the T during an outage on the way home that evening -- the more I thought, well, surely there was some event that filled the void that the Ames Straw Poll absence had left behind. Although they were down in number in 2016 -- just like primary debates -- from the 2012 cycle, there were other straw polls that were conducted during the year leading up the first votes being cast in the caucuses in Iowa.
Initially, FHQ thought of the fall straw poll annually conducted at the Value Voters Summit. That is an event and a straw poll that receives some attention, falls in roughly the same window of time in which the Iowa straw poll occurs, and even could be said to deal with a similar socially conservative constituency.
However, through the lens of Google Trends, there is not much evidence to suggest that the VVS straw poll filled the void left by the Ames straw poll in any meaningful way.1
The same general trend holds for the other events that peppered the calendar throughout 2015, whether it was the straw poll earlier in the year at CPAC or the one at the Southern Republican Leadership Conference. Those events could have been stand-ins for the straw poll, but were not. In fact, in the cases of CPAC and the SRLC, those events preceded the mid-June cancelation of the Iowa straw poll in 2015.
And this speaks to something Bernstein raised in his post; what he called the stab(ility) of the rules. FHQ has often evoked the same concept but under a different banner: the regular rhythms of the presidential nomination process. I agree with Bernstein that the silliness factor involved in the Iowa straw poll was quite high. And while that is true, it also served valuable functions in both coordination and winnowing.
Yes, Iowa Republicans ended the practice for the 2016 cycle and that was as much a function of pressure from the national party (because of the Hawkeye state's perceived two bites at the apple), but also because a number of the potential candidates signaled they were not going to participate.
While that is noteworthy, the why the straw poll ended is less important than why there was nothing waiting in the wings to fill the void. After all the RNC did sanction a primary debate -- the first of the cycle -- in the same August time span in which debates had been held in Iowa roughly in conjunction with the straw poll. But that Cleveland debate was a solo event with no attendant straw poll. Count that as a missed opportunity perhaps.
Another miss could be found in the collective wisdom of the aggregated straw poll results for the 2016 cycle. Most pointed in the same directions, often elevating either Ted Cruz or Ben Carson. And just as often Scott Walker finished third.
There were, perhaps, opportunities for coordination and to force some winnowing there, but there was no effort to emphasize those events or the candidates who did well (either positively or negatively). And that was consistent with a cycle that saw some active maneuvering from the national party in the area of the nomination rules (2013-14), but was hands off other than sanctioning debates when 2015 rolled around. That is not to suggest the party and the variety of actors within the broader party coalition were silent when it came to Trump specifically. Rather, it demonstrates a break in the regular rhythms of the process and that there was no active counter to those breaks from a coordination standpoint.
One could say that there were few profiles in courage among Republicans during the 2016 cycle. But just as easily, and likely more accurately, one could also say Republican party actors were trying to maintain a delicate balance between what elites wanted out of the process (winning the White House) and what was valued by a vocal faction of the base of primary voters (ABE -- anything but the establishment). Coordinating in the face of those tensions is difficult at best, and that difficulty can give rise to unexpected results; unintended consequences even.
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1 The picture looks a bit better when one changes the search terms from "Value Voters Summit straw poll" to simply "Value Voters Summit", but the spikes pale in comparison to the sharp upticks around the Ames straw polls in both 2007 and 2011. The jump was actually smaller in 2015 when there was no straw poll in Iowa than it was in either 2007 or 2011 when there was.
But the more I thought about it -- and I had time when I was stuck on the T during an outage on the way home that evening -- the more I thought, well, surely there was some event that filled the void that the Ames Straw Poll absence had left behind. Although they were down in number in 2016 -- just like primary debates -- from the 2012 cycle, there were other straw polls that were conducted during the year leading up the first votes being cast in the caucuses in Iowa.
Initially, FHQ thought of the fall straw poll annually conducted at the Value Voters Summit. That is an event and a straw poll that receives some attention, falls in roughly the same window of time in which the Iowa straw poll occurs, and even could be said to deal with a similar socially conservative constituency.
However, through the lens of Google Trends, there is not much evidence to suggest that the VVS straw poll filled the void left by the Ames straw poll in any meaningful way.1
The same general trend holds for the other events that peppered the calendar throughout 2015, whether it was the straw poll earlier in the year at CPAC or the one at the Southern Republican Leadership Conference. Those events could have been stand-ins for the straw poll, but were not. In fact, in the cases of CPAC and the SRLC, those events preceded the mid-June cancelation of the Iowa straw poll in 2015.
And this speaks to something Bernstein raised in his post; what he called the stab(ility) of the rules. FHQ has often evoked the same concept but under a different banner: the regular rhythms of the presidential nomination process. I agree with Bernstein that the silliness factor involved in the Iowa straw poll was quite high. And while that is true, it also served valuable functions in both coordination and winnowing.
Yes, Iowa Republicans ended the practice for the 2016 cycle and that was as much a function of pressure from the national party (because of the Hawkeye state's perceived two bites at the apple), but also because a number of the potential candidates signaled they were not going to participate.
While that is noteworthy, the why the straw poll ended is less important than why there was nothing waiting in the wings to fill the void. After all the RNC did sanction a primary debate -- the first of the cycle -- in the same August time span in which debates had been held in Iowa roughly in conjunction with the straw poll. But that Cleveland debate was a solo event with no attendant straw poll. Count that as a missed opportunity perhaps.
Another miss could be found in the collective wisdom of the aggregated straw poll results for the 2016 cycle. Most pointed in the same directions, often elevating either Ted Cruz or Ben Carson. And just as often Scott Walker finished third.
There were, perhaps, opportunities for coordination and to force some winnowing there, but there was no effort to emphasize those events or the candidates who did well (either positively or negatively). And that was consistent with a cycle that saw some active maneuvering from the national party in the area of the nomination rules (2013-14), but was hands off other than sanctioning debates when 2015 rolled around. That is not to suggest the party and the variety of actors within the broader party coalition were silent when it came to Trump specifically. Rather, it demonstrates a break in the regular rhythms of the process and that there was no active counter to those breaks from a coordination standpoint.
One could say that there were few profiles in courage among Republicans during the 2016 cycle. But just as easily, and likely more accurately, one could also say Republican party actors were trying to maintain a delicate balance between what elites wanted out of the process (winning the White House) and what was valued by a vocal faction of the base of primary voters (ABE -- anything but the establishment). Coordinating in the face of those tensions is difficult at best, and that difficulty can give rise to unexpected results; unintended consequences even.
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1 The picture looks a bit better when one changes the search terms from "Value Voters Summit straw poll" to simply "Value Voters Summit", but the spikes pale in comparison to the sharp upticks around the Ames straw polls in both 2007 and 2011. The jump was actually smaller in 2015 when there was no straw poll in Iowa than it was in either 2007 or 2011 when there was.
Thursday, July 19, 2018
Unity Reform Commission Seeing Its Recommendations 'Substantially Adopted' Sends Rules Package on to DNC
Following a brief (by rules meetings standards) conference call on Tuesday, July 17, Unity Reform Commission Chair Jennifer O'Malley-Dillon and Vice Chair Larry Cohen released the following statement (via the DNC):
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FHQ will not call the aforementioned conference call a formality, but the pace with which the URC reviewed the work of the Rules and Bylaws Committee -- reconciling it with the URC recommendations from December -- made it appear as if it was just that.
And it was not just the pace. There were few times during the conference call in which objections were made. URC member, Jim Zogby, raised some concerns about a couple of subsections to the party reform section of the URC report. And vice chair, Larry Cohen, made a passing reference to the fact that the Rules and Bylaws Committee scaled back the language on how forcefully the national party would push states/state parties to change registration rules, for example. But that was the extent of the dissension. Zogby's issues will see a review by the Rules and Bylaws Committee either at its pre-DNC meeting gathering or during the winter meeting in early 2019. On the other hand, Cohen's point was more a comment on preference, but one that implied how limited the national parties are in exercising enforcement when change requires movement by state governments; state governments in some cases of which are controlled by the Republican Party.
With little dissension, then, the URC signed off on the rules reform package the Rules and Bylaws Committee has devised, clearing its path for consideration before the full DNC in August. That there has now been near unanimity on these changes at the URC stage in 2017, the RBC stage in 2018, and the URC review stage sends a clear signal to the members of the DNC ahead of the party's vote next month to adopt the changes to the delegate selection rules and convention call for 2020.
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Real time thread on URC conference call meeting:
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Related:
2020 Delegate Selection Rules and Convention Call Pass Democratic Rules and Bylaws Committee Hurdle
Third Way? Third Way Plus? The Democrats' Rules and Bylaws Committee Again Revisits Superdelegates
DNC Unity Reform Commission Report
“We are proud to fully support the Rules and Bylaws Committee’s proposals for substantially adopting the Unity Reform Commission’s recommendations. Following the 2016 Democratic National Convention, the URC was established by party members with a mandate to review our party’s presidential nominating process and make meaningful reforms to strengthen our party and expand its reach. After several meetings, we proposed our recommendations for making our party more accessible, transparent, and inclusive. Since delivering our recommendations to the DNC last December, DNC Chair Tom Perez and the members of the Rules and Bylaws Committee have worked diligently to develop the new processes through which we will select our presidential nominees in future election cycles.
“These new reforms will increase participation, empower our candidates to be more competitive across the country, bring new and unaffiliated voters into the party, broaden our base at the grassroots level, expand the use of primaries, and make caucuses more accessible to people like shift workers and overseas military personnel. Notably, in a reform that we fully support, the new rules will reduce the influence, whether real or perceived, of unpledged delegates.
“These proposed reforms carry support from this commission made up of individuals that represent the vibrant, diverse quilt that makes up the Democratic Party. As such, we are confident that we’re going to head into 2018 and 2020 a stronger, more unified, competitive, and energized party that is welcome to every voter who shares our values.”[Bolded links added by FHQ]
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FHQ will not call the aforementioned conference call a formality, but the pace with which the URC reviewed the work of the Rules and Bylaws Committee -- reconciling it with the URC recommendations from December -- made it appear as if it was just that.
And it was not just the pace. There were few times during the conference call in which objections were made. URC member, Jim Zogby, raised some concerns about a couple of subsections to the party reform section of the URC report. And vice chair, Larry Cohen, made a passing reference to the fact that the Rules and Bylaws Committee scaled back the language on how forcefully the national party would push states/state parties to change registration rules, for example. But that was the extent of the dissension. Zogby's issues will see a review by the Rules and Bylaws Committee either at its pre-DNC meeting gathering or during the winter meeting in early 2019. On the other hand, Cohen's point was more a comment on preference, but one that implied how limited the national parties are in exercising enforcement when change requires movement by state governments; state governments in some cases of which are controlled by the Republican Party.
With little dissension, then, the URC signed off on the rules reform package the Rules and Bylaws Committee has devised, clearing its path for consideration before the full DNC in August. That there has now been near unanimity on these changes at the URC stage in 2017, the RBC stage in 2018, and the URC review stage sends a clear signal to the members of the DNC ahead of the party's vote next month to adopt the changes to the delegate selection rules and convention call for 2020.
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Real time thread on URC conference call meeting:
2020 Delegate Selection Rules and Convention Call Pass Democratic Rules and Bylaws Committee Hurdlehttps://t.co/N4CwF8kgIY— Josh Putnam (@FHQ) July 17, 2018
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Related:
2020 Delegate Selection Rules and Convention Call Pass Democratic Rules and Bylaws Committee Hurdle
Third Way? Third Way Plus? The Democrats' Rules and Bylaws Committee Again Revisits Superdelegates
DNC Unity Reform Commission Report
Tuesday, July 17, 2018
2020 Delegate Selection Rules and Convention Call Pass Democratic Rules and Bylaws Committee Hurdle
Last week the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (RBC) once again reconvened in Washington, DC to finalize its proposed package of recommended changes to the delegate selection rules, call for the convention, and bylaws for the 2020 cycle. Despite some of the headlines trumpeting what a momentous occasion it was, the meeting was, in reality, another incremental step in the process of finalizing the amendment proposals. It was a meeting intended to polish one final time the changes the panel would send to the full DNC for consideration in August.
Now, that is not to minimize the work of the RBC over the last six months. Indeed, from a macro perspective the changes the members of the Democratic National Committee will vote on at its Chicago meeting next month represent some fairly significant potential changes to the Democratic presidential nomination process. But the RBC arrived at those decisions in fits and starts over a series of meetings during the first half of 2018. In other words, the heavy lifting had already been done.
Take, for example, the oft-discussed Third Way Plus proposal to reduce the role of superdelegates in the nomination process. Yes, the RBC voted on the exact language of those changes at this final July 11 meeting (27 votes for , 2 abstentions), but the group had previously passed off on the framework by a similar vote (27 for, 1 against, and 1 abstention) during a June 27 conference call meeting.
And that is the way it most often goes: changes both monumental and incremental can get lost among all of the rules tinkering that occurs at periodic but regular meetings of the Rules and Bylaws Committee.
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While that superdelegate/automatic delegate change and the remainder of the amendments package will go before the full DNC in August, the convention-created committee where many of the proposed changes found their inspiration -- the Unity Reform Commission (URC) -- has the ability to review the package and reconcile it with their own work from 2017.
A thumbs up from the URC means the DNC will likely have an up or down vote -- pending any amendments from DNC members -- on the package of changes.
Any dissension in the URC review process likely signals amendments to come from the URC itself. Their threshold is whether the RBC in the URC's judgment has "substantially adopted" the URC recommendations. If, in the committee's judgment, the RBC has failed to meet that subjective threshold in the areas of primaries, caucuses, unpledged delegates, and party reform, then the URC can put before the full DNC next month proposals that will.
Two additional notes should be added here:
First, recall the membership of the URC. Although there was wide consensus across nearly all of the planks in each of the four areas (There were only two instances in which unanimity was not reached.), the panel tilted toward the more establishment faction (Clinton-chosen plus Perez-chosen members). Should, for example then, the Sanders faction of the URC come to the conclusion that some recommendation was not substantially adopted, they would need help from the other faction to get an alternative before the full DNC. [It could work in the opposite direction as well, but the establishment faction would have the votes without needing any Sanders-aligned support. That said, this scenario seems unlikely.]
It should also be noted that the DNC parliamentarian urged the RBC during its final July 11 meeting to adopt well ahead of the DNC meeting a clear protocol for amendments to be introduced at that meeting. Objection to a proposed change, as is the case with the platform amendment process at the national convention, would not be sufficient to derail a change. Rather, an objection plus an already devised and drafted alternative must be provided. The URC, then, can object, but it will have to work out an alternative proposal for the DNC to consider. And that proposal would have to include the exact language of the change. [This was an issue with the URC recommendations. The RBC spent the first few meetings this year trying to transition the proposals to language that could be inserted in the rules, convention call, and bylaws.] That would add to the items on the URC plate in its review meeting; items that could potentially take up time as the clock ticks down toward the DNC meeting.
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Procedure aside, at what is the URC looking from the RBC and can it be reconciled with the recommendations the group settled on throughout 2017?
On superdelegates/automatic delegates, the RBC, it could be argued, went beyond the recommendations of the URC. Rather than fashioning a plan to leave a third of the superdelegates in place and bind the remaining two-thirds of the would-be automatic delegates based on statewide primary or caucus results, the RBC remedy for curbing the influence of superdelegates was to remove them from the equation on the first ballot roll call vote at the national convention.
The third way plus proposal was introduced during the June 27 RBC conference call meeting by member Elaine Kamarck. Her motion was the following:
There were additional tangential recommendations made around the edges concerning automatic delegates. Under current rules, unpledged delegates are barred from seeking pledged delegate slots. However, the third way plus proposal gave the RBC reason to revisit that; to lift that prohibition, allowing automatic delegates a way to participate in the first ballot vote. To do that, an amendment adopted during the July 11 RBC meeting, would force any automatic delegate taking a pledged slot to give up their automatic status.
While that may seem like a backdoor to superdelegate participation -- and it technically is -- this is a point that came up during the URC meetings in 2017. The conclusion then among some members was if automatic delegates are willing to forego their automatic status, then they can run for pledged slots.
FHQ elaborated on this in a series of tweets during the July 11 RBC meeting:
Collectively, the URC is likely to green light these changes given that they exceed the two more complicated, less workable recommendations on unpledged delegates.
In the areas of caucuses and primaries, most of those recommendations were consolidated into some changes to the requirements and encouragements from the national party to state parties in Rule 2. Those recommended changes drafted by member Frank Leone were adopted during the May 8 RBC meeting.
These too are likely to pass muster with the URC in whole or in part. This series of requirements more functionally embeds the recommendations in the delegate selection rules.
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The URC meets via conference call starting at 2pm on Tuesday, July 17.
Now, that is not to minimize the work of the RBC over the last six months. Indeed, from a macro perspective the changes the members of the Democratic National Committee will vote on at its Chicago meeting next month represent some fairly significant potential changes to the Democratic presidential nomination process. But the RBC arrived at those decisions in fits and starts over a series of meetings during the first half of 2018. In other words, the heavy lifting had already been done.
Take, for example, the oft-discussed Third Way Plus proposal to reduce the role of superdelegates in the nomination process. Yes, the RBC voted on the exact language of those changes at this final July 11 meeting (27 votes for , 2 abstentions), but the group had previously passed off on the framework by a similar vote (27 for, 1 against, and 1 abstention) during a June 27 conference call meeting.
And that is the way it most often goes: changes both monumental and incremental can get lost among all of the rules tinkering that occurs at periodic but regular meetings of the Rules and Bylaws Committee.
--
While that superdelegate/automatic delegate change and the remainder of the amendments package will go before the full DNC in August, the convention-created committee where many of the proposed changes found their inspiration -- the Unity Reform Commission (URC) -- has the ability to review the package and reconcile it with their own work from 2017.
A thumbs up from the URC means the DNC will likely have an up or down vote -- pending any amendments from DNC members -- on the package of changes.
Any dissension in the URC review process likely signals amendments to come from the URC itself. Their threshold is whether the RBC in the URC's judgment has "substantially adopted" the URC recommendations. If, in the committee's judgment, the RBC has failed to meet that subjective threshold in the areas of primaries, caucuses, unpledged delegates, and party reform, then the URC can put before the full DNC next month proposals that will.
Two additional notes should be added here:
First, recall the membership of the URC. Although there was wide consensus across nearly all of the planks in each of the four areas (There were only two instances in which unanimity was not reached.), the panel tilted toward the more establishment faction (Clinton-chosen plus Perez-chosen members). Should, for example then, the Sanders faction of the URC come to the conclusion that some recommendation was not substantially adopted, they would need help from the other faction to get an alternative before the full DNC. [It could work in the opposite direction as well, but the establishment faction would have the votes without needing any Sanders-aligned support. That said, this scenario seems unlikely.]
It should also be noted that the DNC parliamentarian urged the RBC during its final July 11 meeting to adopt well ahead of the DNC meeting a clear protocol for amendments to be introduced at that meeting. Objection to a proposed change, as is the case with the platform amendment process at the national convention, would not be sufficient to derail a change. Rather, an objection plus an already devised and drafted alternative must be provided. The URC, then, can object, but it will have to work out an alternative proposal for the DNC to consider. And that proposal would have to include the exact language of the change. [This was an issue with the URC recommendations. The RBC spent the first few meetings this year trying to transition the proposals to language that could be inserted in the rules, convention call, and bylaws.] That would add to the items on the URC plate in its review meeting; items that could potentially take up time as the clock ticks down toward the DNC meeting.
--
Procedure aside, at what is the URC looking from the RBC and can it be reconciled with the recommendations the group settled on throughout 2017?
On superdelegates/automatic delegates, the RBC, it could be argued, went beyond the recommendations of the URC. Rather than fashioning a plan to leave a third of the superdelegates in place and bind the remaining two-thirds of the would-be automatic delegates based on statewide primary or caucus results, the RBC remedy for curbing the influence of superdelegates was to remove them from the equation on the first ballot roll call vote at the national convention.
The third way plus proposal was introduced during the June 27 RBC conference call meeting by member Elaine Kamarck. Her motion was the following:
All current unpledged delegates will become automatic delegates. On the first ballot of the presidential roll call, only pledged delegates will be permitted to vote unless a presidential candidate has secured enough pledged delegates to receive the nomination under any circumstances. At that point, automatic delegates should be permitted to vote. This determination shall be made by the DNC secretary upon certification of pledged delegates at the conclusion of the primary and caucus process. The threshold for a presidential candidate to secure the nomination is a majority (50% + 1) of all eligible delegate votes. In the event that the nominating contest moves beyond the first ballot, all automatic delegates would be able to cast a vote for the candidate of their choice on the second ballot and all subsequent ballots until a nominee is chosen. Automatic delegates would retain their ability to vote according to their own preferences on all other convention matters including the credentials, convention rules, platform, and the vice presidential nomination.This framework was adopted as described in the first section above. The intent and the eventual language set up the conditions under which the now-automatic delegates can or cannot participate in the first round of voting.
- If a candidate wins 50 percent of the pledged delegates plus one during or by the end of primary season, then the superdelegates are barred from the first ballot.
- If a candidate wins 50 percent of all of the delegates (including superdelegates) plus one, then the superdelegate opt-in is triggered and that faction of delegates can participate in the first (and only) round of voting.
- If no candidate wins a majority of either pledged or all delegates during or by the end of primary season, then superdelegates are barred from the first round and allowed in to vote in the second round to break the stalemate.
There were additional tangential recommendations made around the edges concerning automatic delegates. Under current rules, unpledged delegates are barred from seeking pledged delegate slots. However, the third way plus proposal gave the RBC reason to revisit that; to lift that prohibition, allowing automatic delegates a way to participate in the first ballot vote. To do that, an amendment adopted during the July 11 RBC meeting, would force any automatic delegate taking a pledged slot to give up their automatic status.
While that may seem like a backdoor to superdelegate participation -- and it technically is -- this is a point that came up during the URC meetings in 2017. The conclusion then among some members was if automatic delegates are willing to forego their automatic status, then they can run for pledged slots.
FHQ elaborated on this in a series of tweets during the July 11 RBC meeting:
DNC Secretary Rae puts on the table for discussion the part of Article I.J of the convention call restricting automatic delegates -- formerly superdelegates -- from running for delegate slots. #DNCRBC— Josh Putnam (@FHQ) July 11, 2018
Rae mentions that some DNC members have approached him about the idea of lifting that automatic delegate restriction so they could run for pledged slots (and give up automatic status). #DNCRBC— Josh Putnam (@FHQ) July 11, 2018
This was one of the upsides of having superdelegates: It freed up quite a number of pledged delegate slots for grassroots activists that might otherwise be won in district and state conventions by party insider-types.#DNCRBC— Josh Putnam (@FHQ) July 11, 2018
Just to follow up on the automatics running for pledged slots discussion: DNC members and elected folks in the pre-superdelegate era were often hesitant to challenge their constituents for pledged delegate slots. #DNCRBC— Josh Putnam (@FHQ) July 11, 2018
And that was *part* of the impetus for creating the superdelegates in the first place: To get elected involved in the process *at the convention* (as per Hunt Commission Report). #DNCRBC— Josh Putnam (@FHQ) July 11, 2018
Collectively, the URC is likely to green light these changes given that they exceed the two more complicated, less workable recommendations on unpledged delegates.
In the areas of caucuses and primaries, most of those recommendations were consolidated into some changes to the requirements and encouragements from the national party to state parties in Rule 2. Those recommended changes drafted by member Frank Leone were adopted during the May 8 RBC meeting.
That proposal -- those proposed amendments to Rule 2 -- are making the rounds at the #dncrbc meeting this morning. pic.twitter.com/Nvp9Zs8ioM— Josh Putnam (@FHQ) May 8, 2018
These too are likely to pass muster with the URC in whole or in part. This series of requirements more functionally embeds the recommendations in the delegate selection rules.
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The URC meets via conference call starting at 2pm on Tuesday, July 17.
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